INTernational Context
of Indonesia’s Counter-Terrorism Policy, 2001 - 2004

Ali Muhammad, PhD
Program Studi Hubungan Internasional, Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta
Email: alim_umy@yahoo.com

Abstract: Terrorism is a serious security problem in Indonesia as indicated by a suicide bomb attack in Solo church and mosque in the Cirebon Police office complex (2011), JW Marriot (2009) and a series of terror attacks before. This article discusses the international context and the implications for the government’s counter-terrorism policy. The extent to which international factors affect the government's counter-terrorism policy during the years 2001-2004? This period is considered important because it is a critical period in the war against terrorism. The argument is that global context "War on Terrorism" major impact on the direction of counter-terrorism policy in Indonesia. Led by United States (USA) and supported by its allies, international pressure has forced the government of Indonesia previously impressed hesitate to take crucial steps: for example, the application of anti-terrorism law, the arrest of the perpetrators of acts of terrorism and the "spiritual leader" of Al-Jama'ah Al-Islamiyah (AJAI)) and the prohibition of Al-Aqsa. The U.S. and its allies are using a combination of instruments - in the form of an intensive diplomatic channels, financial support, technical assistance and anti-terrorism pledge to abolish the military embargo - to persuade the government that initially reluctant to follow perspective and American pressure. This article also argues that, although the government has received several international pressure and reject others because of domestic political considerations, international influence has strengthened the government's determination and capability of agents in combating terror network in Indonesia.

Keywords: Indonesia, war on terror, international pressures, counterterrorism policy

Introduction
Terrorism as a security problem has not disappeared in Indonesia as indicated by recent suicide bomb attacks on a church and a police station (2011), J. W. Marriot hotel (2009) and previous consecutive terror attacks. This article examines international factor and its implications on government’s counterterrorism counterterrorism policy 2000-2009. After the 9/11 tragedy, the Bush administration started to wage the so-called “Global War on Terror” (GWOT). The US vigorously demanded the international community to join in the fight against Al-Qaeda and its affiliates, initiated...
“regime change” in Afghanistan and Iraq, and exerted pressure on reluctant countries. No country in the world, including Indonesia, could escape from the influences of the new global political environment. How and to what extent did pressures originating from the US and its allies shape the direction of the Indonesian government’s counter-terrorism policy?

This article shows that the GWOT has profound impacts on the course of the government’s counter-terrorism policy. Led by the US and supported by its allies, international pressures have forced the initially reluctant Indonesian government to take crucial counter-terrorism measures, such as adopting anti-terrorism laws, arresting suspected terrorists, including the “spiritual leader” of Al-Jamaah Al-Islamiyah (AJAI) and proscribing AJAI as a terrorist organization. The US and its allies utilized a combination of instruments—in the form of intensive diplomatic channels, economic inducements, anti-terrorism assistance as well as the pledge to lift the military embargo—to force the reluctant government to follow and to conform to the American perspective. This article goes on to argue that, although the government accepted some of the international demands and resisted some others for domestic political considerations, international influence has considerably bolstered the government’s determination and capability in denting the terrorist network.

The organization of this article is as follows; firstly, it begins by exploring the global political environment, i.e. Bush’s “war on terror” and its consequences for Southeast Asia and Indonesia. Secondly, it investigates the manifestations of international influences that will be divided into two main themes: the sort of action the US and its allies demanded the government to take as well as the sort of instruments they employed to exert those pressures. Finally, it examines the implications of international pressures on the course of the government’s counter-terrorism policy, followed by concluding remarks.

International Context: Bush’ War on Terror

Explaining the course of the Indonesian government’s counter-terrorism policy cannot be detached from the context of the global political context since September 11, 2001. Great powers have always had the capacity and the desire to influence the international system of which they are part. What is remarkable about the contemporary global environment is that one great power, the United States, is far more influential than any other country in this regard. The United States has a unique potential to shape both rules and regulations that govern the increasingly interconnected international system and the behaviour of the other states. 54

After 9/11, President George W. Bush unilaterally declared the so-called “global war on terror” (GWOT) and sent strong messages to the world, “either you are with us or you are with the terrorists.” 55 Fighting against terrorism turned out to be the top priority of the US foreign policy replacing the former priorities, such as democracy and human rights promotion. The United States strived assertively to build an international alliance to fight against Al-Qaeda, its affiliates, and its

55 George W. Bush, “Address to a Joint session of Congress and the American People,” 20 September
imitators. Almost all the states in the world cannot escape from the impact of the new foreign policy agenda of the only global super power.\textsuperscript{56}

By using what is popularly known as the “Bush Doctrine,” the Bush administration designed “regime change” in Afghanistan, a military operation to topple the Taliban regime in 2002 that was alleged to be providing a safe haven for Osama bin Laden and his global terror network. Without the consent of the United Nations, the US also launched another military intervention in Iraq to topple the Saddam Hussein regime in 2003 which was erroneously alleged of developing weapons of mass-destruction.

The Bush administration released the US National Security Strategy (NSS) in September 2002 that represented an attempt to move beyond merely pre-empting terrorist organizations and “rogue states” before they attack the US. It casts a far wider net, seeking to address issues, such as “the stability of the Middle East,” “oil” as well as “the role of the United Nations and the position of the US in the 21st century.” Five months after the release of the NSS the more narrowly focused US National Strategy for Countering Terrorism (NSCT) was announced. A follow up of the document operationalizing elements of the NSS, the NSCT reveals fully the “muscular Wilsonian” side of the Bush White House. The aim of the NSCT is “to stop terrorist attacks against the United States, its interests,” and “US friends and allies around the world.”\textsuperscript{57}

To this end, the NSCT identifies the so-called “4D strategy” to counter global terrorism. First, the US and its allies will “defeat terrorist organizations of global reach by attacking their sanctuary, leadership, command, control, and communications, material support and finance. Second, they will “deny sponsorship, support, and sanctuary to terrorists by ensuring other states accept their responsibility to take action against these international threats within their sovereign territory. In this respect the NSCT identifies four categories of states: “willing and able,” “weak but unwilling,” “reluctant” and “unwilling.” The document asserts that while Washington would work with and assist the first two categories of partners in their fight against terrorism, it would “convince” reluctant partners “to change course and meet their international obligations.” The third D of the NSCT identifies the need for the US to “defend the American homeland and its citizens and interests abroad.” The final D: the NSCT observes that Washington will seek to “diminish the underlying conditions” that terrorists seek to exploit.\textsuperscript{58}

\textbf{Regional Context: Southeast Asia as “the Second Front”}

Bush’s global war against Al-Qaeda and its affiliates has significantly transformed the US relations with other parts of the world, including Southeast Asia. The United States
alarmingly considered Southeast Asia to be a “second front” in its global campaign against terrorism. According to Rabasa, the rise of “the second front” discourse reflected the perceived high level of the terrorist threat in Southeast Asia i.e., the presence of so-called “radical Islamic factions” and armed militias and their base of support, the prevalence of porous borders and large swaths of ungoverned areas throughout the region, and other political and environmental conditions favourable to the operations of terrorist groups. Abuza agrees with the Rabasa’s analysis, “Southeast Asian states are havens for a small number of terrorists, and have been penetrated by Al-Qaeda operatives...” The perception that Southeast Asia is “a breeding ground of terrorism” was also expressed clearly by many American officials. In February 2002, for instance, a secret Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) report called Malaysia a "primary operational launch pad" for the September 11 attacks—a charge that has since been dismissed as exaggerated by Western intelligence sources. Meanwhile, some American analysts have described Abu Sayyaf, the rebel group fighting the government in the southern Philippine islands around Mindanao and known for kidnapping Westerners, as “similar to the Taliban.” Worse still, the National Review and analysts at the Heritage Foundation have declared Indonesia as “the next Afghanistan.”

A steady stream of senior Pentagon and State Department officials, along with the FBI Director, also visited Southeast Asia. From January 2002, the United States has dispatched 660 troops on a training mission to the southern Philippines, encouraged Singapore and Malaysia to hunt down so-called “Islamic fundamentalists” and urged the Indonesian government to do likewise. More American troops were arriving on the Philippine island of Basilan to carry out a series of construction projects to facilitate military operations.

According to Rabasa, in view of unfolding information about the terrorist network in Southeast Asia, it is a reality that the terrorist threat in the region is serious enough to justify the Bush administration focusing on it. The designation of Southeast Asia as “a second front” in an international struggle against terrorism has helped to focus the needed attention of the US policymakers, the bureaucracy, and Congress on the region and provide coherence to the overall U.S. approach.

It is also fair to say that the US relations with the governments in the region are a crucial part for the global campaign against terrorism. The 9/11 Commission recommends conceptualizing the battle against terrorism in the “Second Front” as a two-pronged campaign: on the one hand, it aims at disrupting the leadership of Al-Qaeda and like-minded terrorist networks. On the other hand, it also competes against the rise of radical

63 Ibid.
64 Ibid.
ideologies within the Islamic world that inspire terrorism. The U.S. policy in Southeast Asia necessarily has been focused on the first goal, which is more immediate and requires an emphasis on the policy tools necessary to kill and capture specific individuals, locate and destroy terrorist training facilities, and identify terrorist financing networks. However, Indonesia was initially reluctant to join in the Bush’ GWOT to fight the terrorist network within its borders.

Indonesia: Jamaah Islamiyah Uncovered

The United States, Singapore, and Australia uncovered an Al-Qaeda-linked terrorist group with cells operating in several Southeast Asian countries, named Jamaah Islamiyah (the full name is Al-Jamaah Al-Islamiyah). The evidence emerged after Singaporean intelligence successfully foiled a terror plot against various Western targets in Singapore. They discovered that this clandestine Islamic militant network, Jamaah Islamiyah, was responsible for a foiled plot to attack various targets in Singapore and various bomb attacks in Indonesia. The US authorities also found information originating from the interrogation and confession of Al-Qaeda operative, Omar al-Faruq, to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

After the Bali Bombing 2002, the US Secretary of State, Collin Powel, stated straightforwardly, “it is an example of how terrorism threatens democratic institutions, undermines economies and destabilizes regions.” The quandary has emerged since the US and its allies perceived that Indonesian government is inadequately responding to terrorist threats emanating from the archipelago. An Indonesian political scientist writes fittingly, “since the end of 2001, Indonesia was again under pressure from Bush administration in the campaign against terrorism. However, one year after the 9/11 tragedy, Indonesia remained reluctant to follow what the US wants.” As Indonesia showed its reluctance to follow what the US wanted, according to NSCT, the Bush administration would “convince reluctant partners to change course and meet their international obligation.”

International Pressures: Demand

The US and its allies began to exert their influence on the Indonesian government since 9/11 and intensified it since the Bali Bombing 2002. They urged government to take crucial counterterrorism measures, among others...

---

69 Ibid
71 United States National Strategy for Combating Terrorism… 11, Rabasa points out that the Indonesian government is feeling the pressure over the perception abroad -- especially in the United States. Other governments in the region have been very proactive in the war on terror. Malaysia and Singapore have taken high-profile steps to round up members of local terrorist networks, and the Philippines is hosting U.S. forces going after the Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines. Jakarta, however, has been reluctant to take action against local groups with terrorist
including to dent terrorism by adopting anti-terrorism laws, to arrest the suspected terrorists and the “spiritual leader” of the *Al-Jamaah Al-Islamiyah*; and to outlaw the AJAI as a terrorist organization.

**The Adoption of a Legal Framework: Anti-terrorism Law**

After the 9/11 tragedy, Asian countries—particularly in Southeast Asia and Indonesia—have been under considerable pressure to step up “legal reforms” to prevent the spread of terrorist groups in the region. The reforms are part of increased regional cooperation in policing potential terrorist threats. The changes to legal systems in Southeast Asia are largely driven by United States and European pressure after the 9/11 tragedy. As a result of international pressures, the Megawati administration proposed RUU Anti-Terorisme (an anti-terrorism bill) to the parliament at the beginning of 2002. However, the government proposal remained at a standstill because it sparked domestic resistance and many politicians, including the vice president Hamzah Haz, were not yet sure of the importance of such a law. Therefore, the parliament delayed the discussion of the bill.

After the Bali Bombing 2002, international pressures increased on the Megawati administration to act firmly against terrorism. The Australian foreign Minister, Alexander Downer, and the Minister for Justice, Chris Ellison, visited Bali and Jakarta to urge the Indonesian authorities “to get serious about knocking out terrorist cells,” following concerns about long-standing inaction by the Indonesian government. The Australian Prime Minister, John Howard, announced the diplomatic mission in parliament as he condemned the “barbaric, brutal mass murder of tourists in Bali.”

The ministerial visit to Indonesia was to bring offers of additional Australian resources, on top of the eight ASIO (the Australian Secret Intelligence Organization) officers and 44 federal police already sent, to track terrorist networks in Indonesia. The head of ASIO, Dennis Richardson, and the commissioner of the Australian Federal Police, Mick Keelty, also accompanied the ministers. In particular, the mission aimed to urge Indonesia to make more of an effort to crush *Jamaah Islamiyah* (JI), a radical Islamic organization linked to al-Qaeda.

The external pressures were effective enough to force the reluctant government to take determined action by quickly adopting anti-terrorism laws. On 18 October 2002 the president issued *Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti UU (Government Regulation in Lieu of Law)* No. 1 of 2002 concerning the Eradication of Criminal Acts. On the same day, the Government also issued GRL No. 2 of 2002 making GRL No. 1 retroactively applicable to the Bali Bombings. Both GRLs were passed by the Indonesian parliament and became Law in 2003.

Besides the pressures from the US and Australia, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) also exerted pressure on the

---

74 Ibid.
75 Ibid.
76 See, “Indonesia’s Anti-Terrorism Decree a threat to basic rights,” 28 October 2002, *TAPOL,*
Indonesian government because they believed that Indonesia’s financial system had been misused for crimes, including terrorism.\textsuperscript{77} FATF President, Claes Norgren, stated that the task force gave warnings and applied pressure on the Indonesian government based on the information that it had obtained. President George Bush sent a warning letter to Bank Indonesia Governor, Burhanuddin Abdullah, as the institution was considered to be late in implementing the Law against Money Laundering.\textsuperscript{78} US Ambassador to Indonesia, Ralph L. Boyce, also threatened that the FATF could impose sanctions against Indonesia. America could impose the Patriot Act 311, meaning that “US financial institutions would freeze their relationships with financial institutions and individuals from a country being sanctioned.”\textsuperscript{79} The Indonesian government complied and the parliament amended the Law No 15/2002 on money laundering in the following month.\textsuperscript{80}

**The Arrest of the “Spiritual Leader” of Al-Jamaah Al-Islamiyah**

Besides pressure to adopt anti terrorist law international pressures also urged the Indonesian government to arrest the alleged “spiritual leader” of AJAI, Abubakar Ba’asyir, and secretly transfer him to the US. The American partners, Singapore and Australia, also strongly believe that Ba’asyir is the spiritual leader of Al-Jamaah Al-Islamiyah, a terrorist organization linked to Al-Qaeda.\textsuperscript{81} The “radical” cleric is one of the founders of Al-Mukmin Boarding School and *Lukmanul Hakim Boarding School* in Ulu Tiram, Johor, as well as the amir of *Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia* (MMI), a revivalist Islamic organization founded in Yogyakarta in 2000.

The American pressures were exposed to the public by a former translator of President Bush, Fred Burk. Burk witnessed that President Bush’s special envoy, Karen Brooks, and the US ambassador, Ralph L. Boyce, held a secret meeting with President Megawati in her residence on 6 September 2002. In the meeting, the delegation demanded that Megawati should arrest the alleged “spiritual leader of *Jamaah Islamiyah*”.

Previously, the Megawati government had complied with the US demands to arrest Omar Al-Faruk and secretly transfer him into US custody (rendition) in the summer of 2002. According to Al-Faruq’s reported confession, Al-Qaeda encouraged the efforts of Abubakar Ba’asyir to spark a religious war in Indonesia and implement his vision of an Islamic state. He also implicated Ba’asyir in the Christmas 2000 church bombings in Indonesia. Ba’asyir categorically denied the *Time* Magazine’s report and planned to take legal action against the magazine.\textsuperscript{82} The publicity over al-Faruq’s arrest increased the international pressure on the Megawati government to take more action against other suspected terrorists, including the

\textsuperscript{77} [Accessed on 20 October 2009].
\textsuperscript{79} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{80} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{81} *Fight against terror*, Singapore’s National Security Strategy (National Security Coordination Centre, 2004), 27.
\textsuperscript{82} Ba’asyir swore to God that he was never the amir of AJAI. He also said that he did not ever know the organization. He heard the name only after his arrest. See, Irfan S. Awwas, *Pengadilan Teroris* [Terrorist Court] (Yogyakarta: Wihdah Press, 2004), 86-9 and 111-2
However, the Megawati administration rejected the pressures to arrest Ba‘asyir, arguing that there was no enough evidence against him. At that moment, President Megawati said, “This man [Ba‘asyir] is too well-known in Indonesia, if he disappeared, it would place me in a complicated situation.”

After the Bali bombing on 12 October 2002, the Indonesian authorities were under intensive pressure so that they finally complied. However, after the authorities arrested Ba‘asyir, the Indonesian court failed to present any convincing evidence against him that he was actually the spiritual leader of AJAI. He was convicted only of immigration offences, forgery and involvement in subversion as an accomplice and sentenced to four years in jail including time served. Prosecutors were roundly criticized by the US and the Australian governments for putting up an ineffective case against him.

Six months later, in March 2004, the Supreme Court reduced his sentence to 18 months and the government was forced to schedule his release from Jakarta’s Selemba prison for late April 2004. The US and the Australian governments expressed their disappointment at what they saw as “another failure of Indonesia’s shaky legal system.”

After his release from the prison, the U.S again urged the Indonesian authorities to re-arrest him. A senior US official was quoted by the New York Times as saying: “[Ba‘asyir’s] not just a rabble rouser and trouble maker, but has been directly involved in terrorist activities.”

The US ambassador for Indonesia, Ralph L. Boyce’s wished that the amir of MMI had no more ability “to do anything, to lead his organization, and to spread his influence.”

Tom Ridge, then U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security, visited Jakarta immediately after the Supreme Court’s ruling to release Ba‘asyir and urged the Megawati administration to reinstate terrorism charges against him. Tom Ridge said that Ba‘asyir had an “intense and deep involvement . . . in both the execution and planning of terrorist activities” and hoped that Ba‘asyir could “be brought to justice in a different way.” The Megawati government eventually complied with the mounting American pressures, and by using information derived from the interrogations of Hambali as well as the Bali bombers, the police re-arrested Ba‘asyir when he had completed serving his initial sentence. However, an effort by the Bush administration to ensure that Ba‘asyir remained in jail and was fully prosecuted on terrorism charges had set off a diplomatic and political tempest.

**Proscription of Al-Jamaah Islamiyah Al-Islamiyah**

The US officially declared Jamaah Islamiyah “spiritual leader.”

However, the Megawati administration rejected the pressures to arrest Ba‘asyir, arguing that there was not enough evidence against him. At that moment, President Megawati said, “This man [Ba‘asyir] is too well-known in Indonesia, if he disappeared, it would place me in a complicated situation.”

After the Bali bombing on 12 October 2002, the Indonesian authorities were under intensive pressure so that they finally complied. However, after the authorities arrested Ba‘asyir, the Indonesian court failed to present any convincing evidence against him that he was actually the spiritual leader of AJAI. He was convicted only of immigration offences, forgery and involvement in subversion as an accomplice and sentenced to four years in jail including time served. Prosecutors were roundly criticized by the US and the Australian governments for putting up an ineffective case against him.

Six months later, in March 2004, the Supreme Court reduced his sentence to 18 months and the government was forced to schedule his release from Jakarta’s Selemba prison for late April 2004. The US and the Australian governments expressed their disappointment at what they saw as “another failure of Indonesia’s shaky legal system.”

After his release from the prison, the U.S again urged the Indonesian authorities to re-arrest him. A senior US official was quoted by the New York Times as saying: “[Ba‘asyir’s] not just a rabble rouser and trouble maker, but has been directly involved in terrorist activities.”

The US ambassador for Indonesia, Ralph L. Boyce’s wished that the amir of MMI had no more ability “to do anything, to lead his organization, and to spread his influence.”

Tom Ridge, then U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security, visited Jakarta immediately after the Supreme Court’s ruling to release Ba‘asyir and urged the Megawati administration to reinstate terrorism charges against him. Tom Ridge said that Ba‘asyir had an “intense and deep involvement . . . in both the execution and planning of terrorist activities” and hoped that Ba‘asyir could “be brought to justice in a different way.” The Megawati government eventually complied with the mounting American pressures, and by using information derived from the interrogations of Hambali as well as the Bali bombers, the police re-arrested Ba‘asyir when he had completed serving his initial sentence. However, an effort by the Bush administration to ensure that Ba‘asyir remained in jail and was fully prosecuted on terrorism charges had set off a diplomatic and political tempest.

**Proscription of Al-Jamaah Islamiyah Al-Islamiyah**

The US officially declared Jamaah

---

83 Angel M. Rabasa, et. al.), 397. al
84 Ibid.
85 Greg Barton believes that there was a large volume of evidence that could have been tendered in court, but was not. Greg Barton, *Jemaah Islamiyah: Radical Islamism in Indonesia* (Singapore: Ridge Book, 2005).
Islamiyah as a foreign terrorist organization on 20 October 2002 and called for the organization to be added to the United Nations list of formally declared terrorist organizations. They made its designation under Executive Order 13224 which gave the government broad authority to freeze assets held by terrorist organizations and their members in the United States. The US Treasury Secretary, John Snow, stated that “this designation is yet another important step in the ongoing effort by the international community to shut down Jamaah Islamiyah terrorist operations in Southeast Asia.” The United States also urged the Indonesian government to follow the lead of the United Nations by putting the Jamaah Islamiyah as a terrorist organization.

The US partner in the Pacific, Australia, also urged the Indonesian governments to proscribe Jamaah Islamiyah which was believed to be behind the bombings on Bali 2002 and other consecutive bombings. By taking measures against this organization, Australia hoped that President Yudhoyono would be “sending a strong signal to Indonesia moderate group.”

Although the government and the Indonesian police (POLRI) have actively hunted down the members of the organization since the Bali bombing 2002, however, the Megawati and Yudhoyono administrations remained reluctant to proscribe this organization. Ansyaad Mbai, the head of the Counterterrorism Coordinating Desk at the Coordinating Ministry for Politics, Law and Security Affairs, said that the government had the intention to ban it. He stated that President Yudhoyono was very concerned about the Al-Qaeda-linked network, but had not acted amid fears that outlawing the group could trigger a backlash among Islamic conservatives.

However, a spokesman for the president stated that a ban on the AJAI was not on the government's agenda, despite promises by the president to get tough on terrorism. A spokesman for Indonesia's top security minister also denied there were plans to ban AJAI—a move which arguably would make it easier for the authorities to arrest suspected militant members of the organization. President Yudhoyono said the failure to ban AJAI did not hinder Indonesia's determination to fight terrorism and prosecute terrorists.

International Pressures: Instruments

As has been mentioned in the introductory chapter, a country can use different tactics to influence another country, such as persuasion, the granting of rewards, the threat of punishment, the infliction of non-violent punishment, and the use of force. How did the US convince the Indonesian government to change course and meet their international obligation to fight terrorist network? As will be demonstrated below, they used a combination of instruments and resources and, in particular, they used intensive diplomatic channels, economic inducements, technical assistance as well as the promise to lift the military embargo that the US had imposed on the Indonesian military since 1993.

\[90\] Ibid.
\[93\] Ibid.
\[94\] Ibid.
Intensive Diplomatic Channels

To pressurize the Indonesian government, at the outset, the US and the Australian governments utilized intensive diplomatic channels to urge the reluctant Megawati administration to take counterterrorism measures in accordance with their perspective.

To achieve that objective, a series of high profile US officials visited Indonesia. In March 2002, for instance, FBI director Robert Mueller made a two-day stop in Jakarta. He made statements to persuade the Megawati administration to participate in the US agenda.

Within a month, US trade representative, Robert Zoellick, visited president Megawati and talked about an agenda broader than trade alone. Again, his message was crafted to persuade her administration to participate in the GWOT, offering US support for counter-terrorism initiatives and emphasizing that more robust action against terrorism would be consistent with “her father’s values.” In August 2002, Secretary of State, Collin Powell, came to Indonesia bearing incentives worth US$50 million, which involved the partial lifting of congressional restriction upon US aid to the Indonesian military.

On 17 September 2002, a senior White House aide, Karen Brooks, was also dispatched to Jakarta to convince the Megawati administration to take tougher anti-terrorist measures. Brooks was a former Fulbright scholar in Jakarta and a personal friend of Megawati. According to the New York Times, Brooks’ visit was to impress on the Megawati administration the seriousness of the terrorism problem, but even more important, it was to give some courage to the Indonesian leader, who faced the prospect of widespread demonstrations by Muslims if she cracked down on the terrorist network too hard. The Far Eastern Economic Review also reported that the US official warned President Megawati that, if Jakarta failed, the US would unilaterally put both Ba‘asyir and AJAI on its terrorist hit list.

The US diplomatic instruments to influence the Indonesian government were also held regularly at senior government level. The medium was bilateral “Security Dialogues” between the United States—Indonesian officials that were held annually since 9/11.

The American partner in the Pacific, Australia, also used diplomatic channels to influence Indonesia. Australian Defence Minister, Robert Hill, speaking at the Asian Aerospace Conference in Singapore on 27 February 2002, declared, “We wish to encourage the Indonesian government to combat these terrorist groupings within Indonesia more effectively than what they’ve been able to do to date.” Hill’s comments reinforced the message of Prime Minister, John Howard, who signed an agreement with the Megawati government to cooperate on anti-terrorist measures in early February 2002.

---

96 Quoted by Peter Romaniuk, Global and Local Wars in Terror: Policy Convergence and Counter-Terrorism in South and Southeast Asia (PhD Dissertation, Brown University, 2006), 163.
97 Ibid.
98 Ibid.
101 John Roberts, “Pressure Builds on Jakarta to Toe the Line on Bush's "War on Terrorism" World
completed in October 2003—includes a firing range, shoot house, breaching facades, and classrooms. Australia, apparently using the same architectural plans, then built another INP counter-terrorism training facility on a soccer field at the National Police Academy (AKPOL), the site of a former Japanese tea plantation at Semarang. The Semarang training site has a shoot house, simulation and dry fire buildings, and four different breaching facades. The site has 54 wireless remote controlled cameras to monitor training exercises. The site also features a four-story hotel on which students practice assaults and extractions. In addition, the Semarang site has an aircraft, a train in a train station, and a “boat in a moat” where students can practise hostage rescue and related activities. A U.S. source suggested, however, that this training site is not being fully used by the police due to lack of operations and maintenance funds. 106 ATA uses a unit development approach in building capacity at Detachment 88. 107

Besides the US, Australia was very active in influencing the Indonesian government as well. Australia devoted US$27.7 million over five years to support the establishment of the Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation (JCLEC) at the police academy in Semarang, Central Java, staffed by Indonesian and Australian intelligence officers and lawyers. The aim was to improve intelligence, investigation techniques and skills, and case management. Australia also assisted with development of the intelligence and investigative arms of Densus 88; the operation of the Transnational Crime Coordination Centre in Sentul, Bogor; and the financial intelligence unit of the Ministry of Finance. Australia’s overall contribution was estimated at between US$7 to US$8 million annually over five years. 108

Australia and Indonesia also signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Counterterrorism in January 2002, even prior to the Bali bombing, in which they agreed to cooperate on information and intelligence sharing, law enforcement, anti-money laundering and terrorist laundering, cooperation on border control systems and aviation security. Australia pledged US$ 6.46 million in aid to Indonesia. 109 In February 2005, Australia and Indonesia began a customs capacity building assistance programme to enhance Indonesian customs intelligence development and port and ship search and surveillance capabilities. Australia was also providing significant assistance to improve Indonesia’s lax border control passenger movement alert checking system. An agreement known as the “Arrangement on the Joint Australia-Indonesia Aviation Security Capacity Building Project” was also signed in March 2005. 110

Since 2004, Australia has doubled counter-terrorism assistance to Indonesia from $A10 million to $A20 million over five years. They worked to develop an expanded programme of assistance in close cooperation with the Indonesian Government. It built a range of key counter-terrorism programmes in three key areas - enhancing the capacity of the Indonesian National Police (POLRI), travel security and combating terrorist financing and addresses new priorities identified by the Indonesian Government. The Transnational

106 Ibid, 70.
107 Ibid.
Anti-Terrorism Assistance

To persuade the Indonesian government in the fight against terrorism, the US also provides “carrots” in the form of Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA). Indonesia is a major recipient of the ATA programme, a congressionally-funded Programme administered by the State Department’s Office of Diplomatic Security through US contract personal in Indonesia. The ATA programme dates from 2001 when State Department specialist conducted a "needs assessment" to determine the existing counterterrorism capabilities of the Indonesian National Police (INP) and identified training and equipment requirement. The assessment resulted in a plan to train 100 investigators, 150 special weapons and tactics (SWAT) personnel and 50 bomb disposal technicians and post-blast investigators over a three-year period (through 30 September 2005). The programme trains only police as U.S law prohibits training foreign military or paramilitary personnel.102

The Bali bombings on 12 October 2002 catalyzed Indonesian support for the ATA training effort. ATA in-country training in Indonesia began in 2003. In July 2003 the U.S. programme graduated 30 counter-terrorism investigators who were sent to the Counter-Narcotics Task Force headed by General Gores Mere. The trainees were assigned to “chase and capture” teams that comprised the ad hoc Anti-Terror and Bomb (ATB) Task Force. They worked on both the Bali bombings and the J.W. Marriott bombing cases and participated in several significant

arrests in 2003 and 2004.103

The delay in the formal establishment of Special Detachment 88 resulted from technical problems in the US authority to equip the new Indonesian counter-terrorist force. By October 2003 the programme had graduated Crisis Response Teams (CRT) and bomb disposal technicians who would eventually become the core of Detachment 88, with the CRTs being the unit’s “strike arm.” At that time, however, the ATA programme had neither the resources to equip the Indonesian unit nor the authority from the US Congress to provide equipment. So, during the second CRT training session, they brought the first CRT back for training on new equipment and graduated the second CRT in late December 2003. Equipped by ATA funding, Detachment 88 was officially “stood/set up” in March 2004. By the end of the ATA programme four 24-man Crisis Response Teams and two 15-man Explosive Incident Countermeasures teams had been trained. These teams were deployed at the Police Headquarters, Jakarta, North Sumatra and Bali. Additional courses were held in Post-Blast Investigation, Major Case Management, Tactical Command, Anti-Terrorist Instructor Development and Weapons of Mass Destruction Operations.104 The U.S. budget for the ATA programme is moderate but significant for the Indonesian authority in counterterrorism efforts.105

ATA training operates under the principle that Indonesian police units will be centrally trained and locally deployed. The US also funded construction of a $3.5 M counterterrorism training facility in East of Bogor at Megamendung. This facility—


103 Ibid, 68.
104 Ibid, 88.
105 Ibid, 69.
Crime Centre (TNCC), for which Australia has provided $A4.7 million, continues to provide a focal point within POLRI for the prevention, identification and dismantling of all forms of transnational crime, including terrorism.\textsuperscript{111}

**Economic Inducements**

To sway the Indonesian government counterterrorism policy, the US also provided “carrots” (economic assistance). Indonesia — along with Pakistan, India, and the Philippines — became the foci of the Bush Administration’s counterterrorism efforts in South and Southeast Asia due to their strategic importance, large Muslim populations and insurgency movements with link to terrorist groups. Since 9/11, the Bush Administration reoriented foreign economic assistance programmes particularly to “front line” states in the war on terrorism.\textsuperscript{112}

The US State Department reports that the overarching US foreign policy priority in Indonesia is “to assist its transformation into a stable, moderate democracy capable of addressing regional and global challenges in partnership with the international community.”\textsuperscript{113} Indonesia faces many development and security challenges, including terrorist threats, ethnic and separatist conflict, weak institutions, high levels of corruption, poverty and unemployment, low levels of education, and poor health condition. The largest strategic objective in terms of funding in people ($87.6 million), which includes education, health, and clean water programmes. A major U.S. assistance initiative is the six-year, $157 million education programme that began in 2004.\textsuperscript{114}

It is important to note here that the second largest area of US aid is peace and security—the Bush administration requested $41.7 million for FY2008 for the Indonesian military and police to fight terrorism, combat weapons proliferation and other transnational crimes, monitor strategic waterways, and cooperate with the United States armed forces. This increase in funding reflects the normalization of military ties in 2005.\textsuperscript{115}

Table on the US Economic Assistance to Indonesia 2004—2009 is presented below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>FY2004</th>
<th>FY 2005</th>
<th>FY 2006</th>
<th>FY 2007 estimate</th>
<th>FY 2009 Request</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CSH</td>
<td>33,000</td>
<td>37,100</td>
<td>28,017</td>
<td>27,507</td>
<td>25,737</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DA</td>
<td>33,291</td>
<td>27,848</td>
<td>33,199</td>
<td>29,532</td>
<td>70,953</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESF</td>
<td>45,705</td>
<td>60,460</td>
<td>69,300</td>
<td>69,300</td>
<td>64,474</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMF</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>990</td>
<td>6,175</td>
<td>15,572</td>
<td>15,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GHAI</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMET</td>
<td>599</td>
<td>728</td>
<td>938</td>
<td>1,398</td>
<td>927</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INCLE</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4,950</td>
<td>4,700</td>
<td>6,150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NADR</td>
<td>5,778</td>
<td>6,262</td>
<td>6,888</td>
<td>8,881</td>
<td>5,861</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NADR-EXBS</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P.L. 480 Title II</td>
<td>3,315</td>
<td>11,900</td>
<td>18,190</td>
<td>18,321</td>
<td>189,674</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>125,908</td>
<td>140,410</td>
<td>144,282</td>
<td>147,321</td>
<td>196,304</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Child Survival and Health (CSH), Development Assistance (DA), Economic Support Funds (ESF), Foreign Military Financing (FMF), International Military Education and Training (IMET), International

\textsuperscript{111}“Australia Doubles Counter-Terrorism Assistance to Indonesia,” Media Release, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Archived, AA 04 086, 7 December, 2004
\textsuperscript{112}Thomas Lum, “US Foreign Aid to East and South Asia: Selected Recipients,” *CRS Report for Congress*, Order Code RL31362, (8 October 2008), 2.
\textsuperscript{113}Ibid, 18.
\textsuperscript{114}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{115}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{116}This table is from Thomas Lum, 18; and Bruce
Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE), Non-proliferation Anti-terrorism Demining and Related Programmes Export Control and Border Security Assistance (NADR-EXBS), Non-proliferation Anti-terrorism Demining and Related Programmes Antiterrorism Assistance (NADR-ATA).

**Pledge to reduce Military Embargo**

Finally to persuade the Indonesian government to fight against terrorism, the Bush administration also pledged to reduce gradually the military embargo on the Indonesian military. The new policy was formally enunciated during the visit of President Megawati to Washington on 19 September 2001, barely a week after the September 11 attacks. The United States agreed to a significant expansion of military relations, including a new security dialogue and an end to the embargo on the sale of nonlethal military items.\(^{117}\)

Under the banner of the “global war on terrorism,” Peter Symonds writes, the Bush administration was “pushing the Indonesian government to reestablish close military relations with the US, including the possible stationing of American troops in the archipelago.”\(^{118}\) As US-Indonesian military cooperation remained the subject of a ban by US Congress, Washington’s moves had been relatively low-key but nonetheless concerted and insistent.\(^{119}\)

The US-Indonesian military ties were previously restricted after the 1991 Santa Cruz massacre in Dili, East Timor, in which more than 270 people were killed by Indonesian troops with US-supplied weapons. The massacre prompted human rights groups and activists to demand that Congress sanction the Indonesian military. Consequently, the US Congress restricted most military aid to Indonesia by refusing to fund the International Military and Training (IMET) programme for TNI personnel in October 1992.\(^{120}\)

In furtherance of President Bush’s promise to Megawati, the US Ambassador to Indonesia, Ralph L. Boyce, promised that he will fight in the Congress to get a reduction on the military embargo imposed by his government. The ambassador promised to lobby the US government so that the weapons embargo against Indonesia was reduced. The Ambassador and East Fleet Commander also agreed to hold a joint military training exercise between the United States and Indonesian Navy.\(^{121}\)

According to a State Department official, the United States took steady steps toward full normalization of military relations. The spokesman of the State Department's Office said the United States was resuming "selected areas" of military assistance for Indonesia, noting President Bush's declaration that "normal military relations would be in the interest of both countries." According to the US Department of State, the US was to resume Foreign Military Financing (FMF) for Indonesia in selected areas of military

---

\(^{117}\) Angel M. Rabasa, et. al. 395.

\(^{119}\) Peter Symonds Ibid.


\(^{121}\) Ibid.
assistance that was announced on 22 November 2005. FMF would cover specific military programmes and units that would help to modernize Indonesia's military as well as support U.S. and Indonesian joint objectives such as counterterrorism and maritime security, according to the State Department.

**Implications of the Counterterrorism Policy**

Although the Indonesian government did not comply with all demands imposed on it, such as outlawing the AJAI and “punishing” rigorously the AJAI's spiritual leader international pressures—which began after 9/11 and intensified after the Bali Bombing 2002—have produced two major policy implications. The first is the strengthening of the government’s determination to fight the terrorist network. International influences in the form of intensive diplomatic channels, anti-terrorism assistance, economic inducements, and the promise to lift the military embargo have effectively changed the government stance from hesitancy to determination in the fight against terrorism. The second implication is the significant enhancement of the government’s capability in denting the terrorism network. In particular, the US supports to set up a counter terrorist police unit (Densus 88) have bolstered the Indonesian police capability to dent the terrorist network in Indonesia.

**Increasing the Government’s Determination**

The first major implication of international pressures on the Indonesian government is its increasing determination to fight terrorism. Previously, Megawati was the first president from a Muslim country to pay a visit and express her condolences to the US after the tragedy of 9/11 and she promised to support the GWOT. However, when she returned home, she changed her stance because of opposition from Muslim revivalist groups accusing the president of “surrendering to the US pressures.” As a result, she withdrew her initial support for the American GWOT and she rejected the US demand to crack down on the terrorist network in Indonesia. As a consequence, Indonesia was perceived by the US and its allies as a “reluctant partner” in the war against terrorism.

However, since the Bali Bombing 2002, mounting American and Australian pressures changed considerably the government’s hesitant response towards the terrorism problem. She became resolute in cracking down on the conspirators responsible for the Bombing. After the horrendous event, Megawati stated characteristically, "This is my question: If you are the government, what will you do? Will you do nothing? With such a bombing tragedy in Bali and you do nothing; you will be condemned [by international community]." Although the skepticism remained rampant among the Muslim community concerning who were the “real” conspirators, she was determined to act by issuing a Government Regulation in Lieu of Law (GRL) of anti-terrorism as a legal framework to fight against terrorism. It is fair to say that the government had become relatively immune from the societal pressures because of the mounting international pressure.

---


The Megawati government’s determination was continued by her successor, President Yudhoyono. He was a former member of Megawati’s cabinet in charge of political and security affairs. After the inauguration, he stated that combating terrorism had become one of the top priorities of his administration and illustrated his seriousness of the purpose by directing the Indonesian National Police (POLRI) to capture the masterminds of the J.W. Marriott bombing (2003) and the Australian Embassy bombings (2004) “within 100 days of his administration.” In August 2007, President Yudhoyono in his State of the Union address stated that “the acts of terrorism that have caused unrest in our society in the past years have been handled.... We have succeeded in preventing and tackling the acts of terrorism in the country.” He went on to add that more needs to be done to address the root causes of terrorism including “poverty, injustice, extremism, and a culture of violence.”

Bolstering the Government’s Capability

The second major implication of international pressures is the strengthening of the government’s capability to dent the terrorist network. Specifically, US Anti-terrorism Assistance (ATA) has provided funds for the establishment and training of a special counterterrorist police unit, Densus 88. Such assistance has included financial intelligence unit training to strengthen anti-money laundering, counter-terror intelligence analysts’ training, an analyst exchange programme with the Treasury Department and training and assistance to establish a border security system as part of the Terrorist Interdiction Programme (see, Chapter III). With the American and Australian support, the government’s capability increased significantly in denting the terror network of the AJAI.

Despite the controversies among the Muslim community regarding who were the “real” culprits in any major terrorist bombings, the police quickly arrested and brought to justice the terrorists involved in the Bali Bombings and other consecutive bombings in Indonesia. Based on scientific crime investigation on the ground, the police quickly and accurately identified the main terror suspects in the Bali Bombing 2002 and quickly arrested Amrozi, Ali Gufron, Imam Samudera, Ali Imron, and other conspirators. The increasing capability of the Indonesian police, supported by international partners, is recognized by the first convicted Bali Bomber arrested by the police, Amrozi. When the police attempted to arrest him, he did not fight but instead began to laugh. He exclaimed surprisingly, “Gosh, you guys are very clever. How did you find me?”

The increasing capability of the Indonesian police can also be observed from the fact that, within 10 years of hard work, the police and Densus 88 has successfully captured 464 persons involved in terror activities and killed some others, including the most wanted terrorists, Dr. Azahari bin Hussin in 2005 and Noordin M. Top in 2009.


127 Kompas, “Dalam 10 Tahun Polisi Tangkap 464 Teroris” [During 10 years the Indonesian National Police Has Captured 1464 Terrorists], 3 October, 2009.
Moreover, the Indonesian judicial system has tried fairly and jailed many terrorists.\textsuperscript{128}

\textbf{Conclusion}

This article attempted to explain how the government’s counterterrorism policy cannot be detached from the international political context. First of all, i.e Global war on Terror led by the US. The US assertively demanded the international community to take part in the fight against Al-Qaeda and its affiliates and exerted pressures on any countries that were reluctant to participate. In Southeast Asia as the “Second Front,” the US and its allies began to exert pressures on the “hesitant” Indonesian government since the 9/11 and intensified them since the Bali Bombing 2002.

Secondly, a combination of instruments -in the form of intensive diplomatic channels, economic inducements, technical assistance as well as the promise to lift the military embargo -were used to compel this “reluctant partner” to follow the American lead. They urged the Indonesian government to take crucial counter-terrorism measures, among others including to adopt anti-terrorism laws; to arrest the suspected terrorists and the “JI spiritual leader” wanted by the US; and to ban the AJAI as a terrorist organization. International pressure on Indonesia shaped significantly the route of the government’s counterterrorism policy.

Finally, due to mounting international pressure, particularly after the Bali Bombing 2002, the hesitant Indonesian government became resolute in denting the terror network. Despite the widespread skepticism among the Muslim community regarding who was the “real” actor behind the consecutive bombings the government quickly issued Government Regulation in Lieu of Law (GRL) of anti-terrorism as the legal framework and reorganized the police to respond more effectively in destroying the terror network in Indonesia. The issuance of the GRL, which was later passed by the parliament, indicated the government’s resolute effort to fight terrorism.

With the US Anti Terrorism Assistance (ATA), the Indonesian Police Chief established anti-terror police units (i.e. ATB Task Force and Densus 88) that have significantly bolstered the government’s capability to dent the terrorist network. Based on scientific crime investigation, the police could identify accurately the perpetrators of the Bali Bombing 2002 and other consecutive attacks so that they could arrest and bring to justice persons responsible for the attacks. Up to the present time, the Special Task Force and Densus 88 have captured more than 400 terrorists and killed a number of key terrorist leaders.*

\textbf{References}


Barton, Greg, Jemaah Islamiyah: \textit{Radical Islamism in Indonesia} (Singapore, Ridge,25)


Cipto, Bambang, “Tekanan Amerika terhadap Indonesia : Kajian atas Kebijakan Luar Negeri Clinton terhadap Indonesia [The American Pressure on Indonesia: A Study of Clinton’s Foreign Policy on Indonesia]

\textsuperscript{128}Bahtiar Effendy, “ Combating Terrorism in Indonesia: Where are We Now Exactly?” \textit{The Jakarta Post}, Monday, 21 July, 2008.


**Website**


**JURNAL**


“Australia Doubles Counter-Terrorism Assintance to Indonesia,” Media Release, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Archived, AA 04 086, 7 December, 2004


Conboy, Ken, *The Second Front: Inside Asia’s Most Dangerous Terrorist Network*,
(Jakarta and Singapore: Equinox, 2006).

New York Time, 24 October 2002

Times, Tuesday, 20 April 2004


Effendy, Bahtiar, “ Combating Terrorism in Indonesia: Where are We Now Exactly?”


Kompas, “Dalam 10 Tahun Polisi Tangkap 464 Teroris” [During 10 years the Indonesian National Police Has Captured 1464 Terrorists], 3 October 2009

Lum, Thomas, “US Foreign Aid to East and South Asia: Selected Recipients,” CRS Report for Congress, Order Code RI31362, (8 October 2008)

MacBeth, John, “Why Bashir’s to Be Set Free,”


Perwita, Anak Agung Banyu, Indonesia and the Muslim World: Islam and Secularism in the Foreign Policy of Soeharto and Beyond,(Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2007)

Ramakrishna, Kumar, “ The Southeast Asian Approach’ to counterterrorism: Learning from Indonesia and Malaysia ,” The Journal of Conflict Studies vol.25, 1,

(Summer 2005).

Romaniuk, Peter, Global and Local Wars in Terror: Policy Convergence and Counter-Terrorism in South and Southeast Asia, (PhD Dissertation, Brown University, 2006).


Sidney Morning Herald,“Indonesia Won’t Outlaw Terror Gourp JI, 23 March, 2005.


