CHURCH, ECONOMY AND THE QUESTION OF HORIZONS

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ABSTRACT

This paper analyses why theology has to develop a concern with economy and economics and elaborates a perspective for a new debate between theologians and economists about socio-ethical problems in public life. The hermeneutically reflected relationship between church and economic life has been elaborated in a number of principles of community development. Church and economy are seen as two important 'horizons of human life'. Economic developments, symptoms of crisis and symptoms of stagnation are mainly present in the Church's social teaching owing to the fact that faith communities and their leaders are confronted with these social problems. This paper approaches the relationship between the two horizons in a perspective of public theology. An open conversation between theology and economics focuses on a new praxis-led theology. Whenever the meaning of 'the good life' is attached to the realisation of functions and capacities in the concrete markets within an actual economy, the actuality of the economic reality is placed within a horizon that expresses a sense of that life. It then becomes possible to state that a concrete set of functions and capacities are in service to humanity.
By Way of Introduction

Christian theology in our time arises from a renewed reflection on the missionary activity of Christian faith communities. But as faith communities spread all over the world only exist in plural and are landmarked by a variety of societal and cultural contexts, the missionary activity of Christian faith communities has to be contextualised as well. Asian bishop-conferences are confronted in this respect with a series of challenges quite different from challenges European bishop-conferences have to deal with. Being a Christian community in a society that is characterised by an important 'middle class' requires a conceptualising and strategic 'mission' that is by no means useful and authentic when a society is divided by a clash between a small minority of very wealthy people and a huge mass of (extremely) poor people. The classic dictum ecclesia semper reformanda has to be contextualised in such a way that the 'catholic' principle in the Christian confession of faith has to be understood as a horizon, rather than as a point of departure of theological reflection about the reality of the church. The church will become catholic (that is her mission) only by contextualised programmes of reformation.

This ecclesiological point of view actually is confronted with a historical reality that asks for analysis of the many influences of a globalising economy on specific societal and cultural phenomena. Economic globalisation has by no means to be understood as an all and everything devouring 'monster', although many theologians in the first and third world do so. In a way, this is a reaction on economic globalisation that emerges from their passionate concern for human communities and cultures that suffer from many inhuman effects of economic globalisation. But, in my opinion, the passionate concern for the humanity of human beings (a core principle of Christian faith communities) urges to think global and to act local also in this respect. Resistance (by theologians and
church leaders) against violence and devastation of human communities requires a theological analysis of economic and social parameters of what happens historically in given communities. Programmes of reformation (see above) can be contextualised only in this way.

The following sentences of my late colleague Prof. Beemer are therefore of great importance. In his farewell address (Nijmegen, 6 Nov 1992) he stated: 'There is no such thing as pure theology; the inclusion of a non-theological but historically conscious social theory, and any sociological research emanating from it (such as research on processes of impoverishment), is essential in learning to recognize the human inclination towards God and the aversion from God in our history.' His field was 'moral theology'. He explained – using words of Thomas Aquinas – theology being a scientific reflection on 'the human inclination towards God and the aversion from God in our history'. He explained moral theology – in Aquinas' approach as well - being a reflection how human life can be recognised as inclined towards and / or averted from the telos of human life.

This paper will elaborate some perspectives on community building being an essential dimension of programmes of reformation as mentioned above. There are three sections. The first section is about the concept of church. The second section deals with the concept of economy. The final section will explore a concept of community development in the perspective of public theology.

Church as a Horizon of Human Life

Ever since the 19th century – 'the great era of the Church' as the famous French theologian Yves Congar o.p. has put it - ecclesiology is a distinct part of theological research and reflection. The 19th century was the era of an enormous missionary expansion of Christian churches and – as we recognise now – the era of an enormous expansion of eurocentrism, in ecclesiology as well. All kind of ecclesial institutions, architecture and ecclesial movements have been spread all over the world by Christian missionaries who were organised in mostly hierarchical structures based in Europe. Many of these missionaries have understood their work being part of a programme of plantatio ecclesiae. According to them, the substance of the church was there already, but needed to be spread as widely as possible. So, they have developed all kind of copies of originally European ideas,
habits, attitudes and so on in the so-called mission-territories. And they have done it in a passionate understanding of their Christian calling to submit their whole life to the message of the Gospel.

Perhaps, already during the 50s and 60s of the 20th century, many of these missionaries became aware that they themselves not only changed by their work in a social and cultural context in e.g. Asia or Africa as their spirituality and lifestyle deeply changed through their commitment to the other people whom they take care of. Many of them have understood that architecture, liturgy, movements and so on had to change as well. And whenever the official churches in their policies and structures have made room for that, church institutions changed as well. In the Anglican church, monastic life forms came up for communities build up with Indian people. Same goes for some communities in the originally Protestant churches in e.g. the Church of North India. Traditional Catholic ideas about formation of a new generation of priests and brothers changed in Indonesia. Even the question whether priestly-ministry requires celibacy became a question of debate, e.g. in Africa.

These questions about institutional 'configuration' of Christian church-life have made clear that the horizon of missionary thinking and acting was moving, and it still moves. Everyone in Christian churches is nowadays aware of the great conflicts these questions have caused. And actually these tensions between changing spiritualities and more or less fixed institutions continue to raise big conflicts in the Christian churches. Anyone who likes to reduce these conflicts to matters of loyalty (loyalty to your own culture versus loyalty to the church), refuses to recognise that changing spirituality includes a renewed awareness of how church can be perceived and understood being a horizon of real human life. In my opinion, programmes of contextualised reformation (see above) can only be developed when these tensions between spirituality and institutions are taken into account.

I am writing here about fundamental questions of pastoral strategy. But I am writing about fundamental theological questions as well. I like to pay attention to the theological dimension of these questions. The German reformed theologian Dietrich Bonhoeffer has – in his famous 'Letters from prison' (Gefängnisbriefe) – explained that the human inclination towards God (as Beemer has put it many years after Bonhoeffer was killed by the Nazi's in 1944) does not imply something additional to what human social and cultural activity is about. According to Bonhoeffer, we have – being in
the Church – just to act accordingly the parameters of the public life in our society. He coined this approach of being a Christian in your society a 'non-religious' way of being as you don't have to draw up a way of acting that – like a surplus – should add something to real life, something that should be essential and more important than human life itself. According to Bonhoeffer, the non-religious character of spirituality, of institutions, of thinking, of building up a community, do not contradict the human inclination towards God and is not per se an example of aversion from God. The inclination towards God is named (by Bonhoeffer) a 'disciplina arcani'. There is an inner mystery in our public and personal life being human beings. Incarnational faith does not imply an additional dimension of our humanly living in our own world. Another famous (Catholic) theologian, M-D. Chenu, OP. used to refer to a line of Thomas Aquinas stating gratia non suppleat naturam sed perficit. The grace of God does not replace our human reality but brings it to its own telos.

Thinking about the Church as a horizon of human life, we can refer to the concepts of the World Council of Churches. The WCC has summarized this horizon by speaking about 'a mission for a peaceful, just and sustainable society'. These words imply that theology focuses on social questions and the direct political implications of economic choices. The theological contribution to programmes supporting these goals is mainly seen in the urgency to make the Gospel's message comprehensible in discussions with the 'handiwork of practical economics'. A first task for theologians – in this respect – is critically stripped off the 'idolatrous' forms of their own interpretations of Christian traditions and Church policies in the name of belief in God. Not every public claim about peace, justice and sustainability, being proposed in the field of politics or the church, has to be assessed fruitful. Especially the dimension of organization of power (e.g. corruption and casteism) in the many ways social and political targets are being brought forward in public life and in the church ask for a continuous criticism, also by theologians. But from a socio-ethical point of view, there is a second task to be discerned. The problem centres on the question how (in the socio-economic life) the dignity of the human person, his total calling and the well-being of all of society is to be respected and advanced. The Church sees the advancement of the dignity of the human person as a central aspect of its missionary activity. The German theologian and ethicist Arno Anzenbacher sees the socio-ethical aspect of the problem in the question how the notion of the human person as it is expressed here
should be related to the concept of subject that is present in the market economy system. Anzenbacher defines the subject in the market economy system as the person who assumes the role in the market of entrepreneur, capitalist, employee or consumer.

**Economy as a Horizon of Human Life**

Arno Anzenbacher speaks about the market-economical concept of modern man that is characterised by an autonomous system steered more or less 'automatically' by rational preferences of the *homo oeconomicus*. This asks for some explanation of the background of this concept (homo oeconomicus). As in predominant (i.e. the so-called neo-classical) thinking of economics is no room for the concept of *telos* of human life, all debate between theologians and economists about socio-ethical problems in public life seems to be useless. Therefore this section will reconstruct some elements of this argument.

The 18th century has brought, after a period of politics related mercantilism, the emergence of a new branch of independent science: the economics. The emergence of this science goes along with the domination of utilitarian philosophy, in spite of a totally different approach of the relation of economics and ethics in the seminal work of one of the founding fathers, Adam Smith. His oeuvre knows two famous works, *The Wealth of Nations* and *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*. They are to be interpreted as a 'twin'. In this work on modern economy and its actors, economics and ethics are deeply related.

Fifty years after Smith, economics got connected with utilitarianism (in Jeremy Bentham's work). Nowadays, from a utilitarian point of view only the sum or average of individual welfare matters. Utilitarianism is a form of consequentialist ethical theory. Actions, rules or policies are morally permissible if and only if there is no alternative with better consequences. One important good in many of these theories is the satisfaction of needs, though not as a fundamental or intrinsic good but taken as an informed preference. In standard theory, these preferences are derived from choices. Compared to the Aristotelian-Thomistic conceptions of good and common good, this conception of preferences reveals an enormous gap. According to classical approaches, agents have to ask themselves what they should do if they live or act well. They do not stress the intentional
dimension of human actions and decisions but their object, their end. In standard economic theory, the analysis is not directed towards ends but towards decisions, towards doing what one most prefers to do. The analysis of behaviour is directed towards maximizing the ability to rank $x$ and $y$.

And as the economics emerged in societies which were strongly influenced by Calvinism and its suspicion of earthly authority in both church and state, the traditional Catholic approach of common good had to meet criticism from economists’ stress on intelligent pursuit of private gain. Schumpeter states: ‘...whether as cause or consequence, this [utilitarian] philosophy expresses only too well the spirit of social irresponsibility which characterised the passion and the secular or rather secularized state of the nineteenth century. And in the midst of moral confusion, economic success serves only to render still more serious the social and political situation which is the natural result of a century of economic liberalism’.

To understand why Schumpeter can indicate this as a result of a century of economic liberalism, one has to realise why utilitarian philosophy goes along with (neo-)classical definitions of economics. In the perspective of Lionel Robbins’ famous definition, economics is not concerned with a particular class of social phenomena (production, distribution, exchange, and consumption of goods and services) but with a particular aspect of the human behaviour concerning this class of phenomena: how to behave rationally in situations when goods and services are scarce and have alternative uses. Although Robbins’ definition of economics is not unquestioned, it has marked an approach of economic science that has been oriented to the aggregation of utilities, being goods and services that are satisfactory for the needs of an individual actor. Here we are far away from the classical teleological approach of the common good and the anthropology connected with it. The toolkit of an economist (Schumpeter) that allows to make descriptive judgments and analytical assessments of economic processes and results within a framework of end-means rationality, does not fit in these kind of questions, let alone the reference to a supernatural $x$-factor. As Schumpeter has stated: although nearly every economist starts the research from an ideological bias, e.g. about the Common Good, which (s)he ex hypothesi is not aware of in the scientific rationalisations, the scientific work of the economics is directed on assumptions or propositions (theorems) that are developed in a procedure that makes models, carries out tests, is controlled by logic, induces
statistical data. 'The stock of facts and tools rejuvenates itself in the process', but a 'prescientific cognitive act which is the source of our ideologies is also the prerequisite of our scientific work'. Although, like mentioned, Knight stressed that economics is about individual behaviour that reveals individual preferences, he pointed out that economics, although growing up in an atmosphere that in the name of liberty of economic agents was directed against control, 'society cannot accept individual ends and individual means as data or as the main objectives of economic policy'. 'The actual interest or desires expressed in economic behaviour ... cannot be described apart from a system of social relations which itself cannot be treated in purely objective, factual terms'. He states that 'this almost exclusive interest in classical economics on liberation from a antiquated system of control' has raised a problem because 'the current standards of thinking have come under the extreme domination of the scientific ideal which has little if any applicability to the problem. The ultimate foundation of a group unity must be of the nature of morale and sentiment rather than knowledge. There is no intellectual solution of conflicts of interests' (idem,117). Normative discussions (e.g. political economy) are rejected as unscientific. As Schumpeter has put it: they are important although they are a prescientific prerequisite of the scientific work of economics. Especially in the framework of welfare economics, this distinction has become a decisive landmark of economic science. In the interpersonal comparisons of well-being, a rational and so: scientific analysis is possible if and only if people who are in similar circumstances, should be regarded as similarly well-off. The famous Pareto optimum (a state of affairs in which it is impossible to make anyone better off without making someone worse off) is the definition of a state of 'minimal benevolence' (Hausmann & McPherson, 261), implying that, other things being equal, it is a morally good thing if people are better off. 'It shows how completely economists identify well-being with the satisfaction of preferences' (id.). Most economists are triggered by this – finally utilitarian – principle because they define it as the only rational way to do. Otherwise, they should get involved in political and moral, controversial matters that should preclude scientific research in economics. Well-being seems to be just a part of the standard view of rationality and includes the theoretical defense of perfect competition, other things being equal (id. 262,263).

Although the standard view makes possible for economists to give 'purely technical advice' in many cases that are politically or morally
controversial, and although many economists think their science has anything to gain from ethics, this standard view is not that 'neutral' as is supposed. The 'minimal benevolence' is not that benevolent as suggested by this standard view. In the wake of the neo-liberal approach of economics, there always have been debates (so: doubts) about its core suppositions. Two types of debates require to look for alternatives.

The first type to be mentioned here is the (above mentioned) debate about 'interpersonal comparisons of utility'. In standard economics, everybody is believed to be equipped with a preference ordering in choosing commodity bundles. Everybody is believed too to be equipped with all relevant information (well-informed) and capacities to make a choice among these possible bundles from an index of preferences that an agent is entitled to handle freely and independently. But these suppositions are not always realistic. Information is curtailed by all kinds of reasons, possible preferences are restricted by law or institutions, individuals are deprived of knowledge and assess outcomes in a framework that is restrained by cultural traditions. There are many reasons to reckon not only with 'bounded rationality' but also with a non-utilitarian approach of economic agency. New research in economics makes clear that the traditional separation of positive economics and normative economics is not adequate enough to analyse how interpersonal comparisons of utility have to be understood. The standard view within which economic rationality and a utilitarian approach of well-being are deeply interwoven, has to be reviewed.

The second type of debates about the standard view is a debate about the definition and analysis of poverty. This debate arises during the last decades of the 20th century. 'The stranglehold of normative utility-based economics has been challenged'. Within micro-economics, there has been a lot of research about income-inequality. Shift in the age composition of males, increase in service-oriented work, changes in the labor-force participation of women, changes in skills caused by technology, changes in demographics, are some of the many reasons why traditional income-strata get tangled up. 'Most researchers sought to examine the quantitative impacts of changes in (un)employment and its important redistributive effects'. 'Because public policy makers agree that poverty is a disease that needs to be eradicated, it is very important how we properly quantify poverty measurement and how we do interpret change in any given measure we select to quantify it' (id.). From a macroeconomic perspective, this kind of welfare theory has been criticised because it does not pay enough attention to rights and freedoms.
According to the Nobel Laureate Amartya Sen, the conventional practice to represent values in terms of individual utility has to be criticised. He has introduced the concept of a person's capabilities or functionings, 'parts of the state of a person, on particular the various things that he or she manages to do or be in leading a life'. According to Sen, what really matters is the degree to which a person can freely choose alternative combinations of functions. Sen holds a plea for an egalitarian approach of this freedom.

Although Sen’s approach has brought to the floor the fundamental question about the very nature of freedom, critics state that his capability egalitarianism just pays attention to a broadened concept of liberalism. Today, many economists have fundamental questions about the character of rationality that tacitly is interwoven in welfare economics. Some state that rational choice theory does account for values in economic behaviour, only it does so in an unsatisfactory way. But others look for a fundamentally other approach of rationality because people in daily life seem to make choices in an evaluation process that is much more complicated than end-means rationality suggests. Even the so-called bounded rationality is a figure of instrumental and procedural rationality, they say, and empirical research raises questions of how to understand people’s choices in markets as a result of persuasive discourse regarding values. Far beyond the subjectification and individualization of value introduced by marginalists like Menger and Marshall, critics of this formalist approaches of rationality state that values are to be found in the interactions between people, are culturally transmitted and embedded in traditions, institutions and customs. These critics want to turn the attention of economics from onesided attention to 'what kind of bundles of preferences make me, individual actor, happy' towards 'how are the agents bundles of preferences embedded in traditional, societal, cultural (including: religious) representations of happiness'. That is a reason to pay renewed attention to the age-old aristotelian concept of (common) good being the telos of human life.

Another reason to do so, refers to the globalization. Welfare economics has inevitably been contextualized in the unprecedented globalization of cultures, societies and markets. The obviously ongoing and not diminishing problems of poverty, economic dependency and socio-religious clashes of civilizations bring new questions about the common good to the fore. These questions raise a new consciousness about and a new concept of political economy that engenders a normative framework that
transcends the reality of nation-states, encompasses local dynamics of economic freedom as well as intra-local dynamics of governance that orient conflicts of economic agents.

The right to welfare hinges ultimately on the value accorded to individual autonomy. Important question therefore is to reconsider this concept of autonomy. Some authors develop an 'economics for the common good', being a fundamental economical theory that states that on the basis of all concepts of welfare there is a universal norm, called human dignity. Its basic argument is that choices to pursue an action are acts of attribution of value or worth that is valuable, so the person him/herself must be the source of that value. Human dignity is a purpose of agents who must equally extend this value or worth to all other agents. This concept of agency is not based on pains and pleasures of solipsist individuals whose freedom is fundamentally endless although bounded by a lot of reasons and rules. This concept of agency implies the ability to control one's behaviour to choose what appears as really desirable and not just to follow one's inclinations or strongest desire', as the philosopher Gewirth states (quoted by Lutz; id., 135).

This approach wants to introduce a renewed concept of normative economics. Instead of being based on a principle of 'minimal benevolence', it is based on two principles. First: value or worth is to be attributed to all persons equally. Second: the norm of equal human dignity is rationally grounded, and therefore this equally attributed value or worth is a rightful claim to be treated in accordance with this claim.

This section has started by referring to the predominant thinking of economists which do not acknowledge any room for the concept of telos of human life. The section shows that there are new approaches in economics that put new questions about the neo-classical points of departure, summarized in the model of the homo oeconomicus. Actually, a whole branch of modern economists rephrases the fundamental questions of their science and make room for a new debate between theologians and economists about socio-ethical problems in public life.

Towards an Approach of Community Development from a Perspective of Public Theology

The dialogue between theology and economics on the reality of the economy is important. The dialogue on the reality of the economy is not
simply a specific application of a generic notion of the mission of the Church. Rather the faith community will encounter its own mission in actual economic reality and through the conflicts present in it, as the text of *Gaudium et Spes* of Vatican II has put it. The Church's social teaching has to do with a wide range of social conflicts; it addresses a series of social and economic problems, including the question of the actual content of the Church's mission. It has to do with social injustice in the labour market, issues about the humanisation of labour, issues about the mechanism of the labour market and about the mechanism of organised labour. Economic developments, symptoms of crisis and symptoms of stagnation are mainly present in the Church's social teaching owing to the fact that faith communities and their leaders are confronted with these social problems. In this arena, the discussion of economic reality is introduced via social problems.

This paper approaches the relationship between the two horizons in a perspective of public theology. An open conversation between theology and economics focuses on a new praxis-led theology. I agree with Tracy that a public theology has to be public as it is theocentric. He argues that theologians are not involved in public theological discourse unless they reflect deliberately and critically upon God, as their public reflections about the affirmations of God are their main task. Therefore a public theology has to deal with all sort of secular traditions of thought and their truth-claims. 'Theology can be said to be public insofar as it conveys a meaningful and true disclosure of something that is most relevant for human life in the current circumstance of society.' A public theology wants to relate critically the specific, particular traditions of Christianity and 'the whirlpool of Postmodernity'.

How does this affect the character of the publicness of theology? Tracy stresses the importance of Walter Benjamin's interest for fragments of infinity and sacred hope and for those people who are forgotten in modernity's historical developments. The people who do not partipate in the logos of the processes of rationalization in the actual world, are bearers of the plain sense of the passion narrative that displays the focal point of all adequately Christian understanding of God. In Tracy's view, their lives are signifiers of the hidden presence of God. He draws upon Hans Frei's work on Christian narratives in this respect.

So, the publicness of theology is not related any longer to a language of full presence of meaning in conscious thought. Neither is the publicness of
theology related to a concept of pure identity (in theisms, ego-ism or other-ism), nor to a concept of clear and distinct self-presence. The publicness of theology is related to and founded in the people who do not represent presence at all. This is the core of Christian God-talk.\textsuperscript{12}

I conclude that a public theology can be developed without assuming an onto-theological point of departure. There is a path for a theocentric theology that leaves behind this foundationalism and that is critical towards theological truth-claims that claim immunity of criticism. This public theology is open to a dynamically expansive, recursively critical view of human rationality.\textsuperscript{13} Therefore, this conception of rationality is suitable for a conversation with economics within which theology refers to its core in a way that is not normative in a foundationalist way. Instead, this strand of publicness of theology reveals its God-focus. In a conversation about purposeful behavior, directed by questions about values giving meaning to human life, theology stresses the values of fragments of infinity and sacred hope, and the values represented by those people who are forgotten in modernity's historical developments.

A fundamental question is how the words 'market' and 'privatisation' should be understood. Here visions of society collide and there is evidence of a power struggle. In the arena of society, the discussion has to do with how we are to impart meaning to the notion of the 'bonum commune' in terms of market forces, how we are to define it and under what systematic conditions can we make this issue more approachable.

Expressed in more ethical terms, this means that the idea of the eudaimonia (the bonum commune) is related, reciprocally and critically, to the scope of useful functions and capacities. Only specific useful functions and capacities can give meaning to the notion of 'the good life'. The content of this category can only be formulated with the help of actual time- and culture-specific possibilities for leading a humane life. This particularity means that the ideal of 'the good life' is constantly changing. But whenever the meaning of 'the good life' is attached to the realisation of functions and capacities in the concrete markets within an actual economy, the actuality of the economic reality is placed within a horizon that expresses a sense of that life. Designating this set of functions and capacities as 'the good life' suggests a coherence-creating correlation is contained within it that comes to the fore. It becomes possible to state that a concrete set of functions and capacities are in service to humanity.
In imagining humanity as horizon, religious traditions also occupy a meaningful place. Theologian Ignacio Ellucuría has clearly explained that a religious tradition has a utopian potential that is essential if we are to continue approaching any prevailing image of the *bonum commune* critically. Without the 'qualification' with regard to the *bonum commune* that issues from a religious utopia, its universal purpose threatens to become ideological. Ignacio Ellucuría explains that a religious utopia is the very thing that incites people to confront an idea of the *commune bonum* with fundamental human rights. In the social thinking of the Catholic Church, human dignity takes primacy over individual freedom of choice and autonomy [...] the deepest value of being human is ultimately not derived from the right to or power of self-determination [...] but the value of the human life as such is seen as inviolable. This goes much further than the Kantian approach of human dignity, which is often the determining factor in discussions on human rights, according to Ellacuría.

The horizon of public theology proposed here can finally been expressed with a category of Beemer: he describes the subject-matter of all theology, so: including community-development, as the birthright of the destitute, *it's about the essential vocation of the human individual. This is where the birthright derives its claim to universality.*

When we try to specify the consequences of these points of departure in programmes of community development, the next reflexions are useful. Community development has first and for all to be understood within the Church' mission for *diakonia.* When *diakonia* has to understood as a way to community development, diakonia is no longer about private supporting of people but has to be defined as a programme of bringing people together in a mutual acknowledgment of each other's capacities (Sen).

1. These programmes have to be focused on imagination. They have to be focused on imagination of our daily life being the context and content of our imagined practises and attitudes and ideas about 'a good life'.

2. These programmes have to be focused on mutual sharing the imagination of 'a good life' in a way that criticism of what obstructs it is part of it. Only by critically sharing the imagination of 'a good life', people will become actors of their own freedom.

3. These programmes have to be focused on sharing the imagination of 'a good life' in a way that praying addresses their common faith being the horizon of human life. Only by sharing their praying, people will
become actors of their own history with God.
4. These programmes have to be focused on mutual sharing not only the challenges of 'a good life' but sharing the unavoidable and inevitable evil as well. Only by mutually sharing the confrontation with evil, people will become human beings that are able to support the ambiguities and ambivalences in their imagined history with each other and with God.

End Notes:

7. See Lutz, o.c.
9. Ibid. p.199.
10. Ibid. p.206.
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