

## PARADIGMS OF DEVELOPMENT IN ASIA-PACIFIC: CONTINUING DEBATES

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### Abstrak:

*Dalam teori-teori pembangunan negara sedang berkembang, muncullah aneka paradigma atau aliran yang berusaha menjelaskan penyebab, masalah, dan jalan keluar bagi kemiskinan yang dialami negara-negara dunia ketiga. Aliran pertama yang muncul adalah liberal-modernisme yang kemudian dikritik oleh aliran strukturalisme, yang kemudian dikritik oleh aliran dependensia. Ada pula penjelasan yang diberikan oleh aliran populisme yang menyatakan bahwa kemakmuran yang berkeadilan hanya mungkin dimunculkan oleh struktur ekonomi yang didominasi oleh usaha-usaha kecil dan menengah. Dalam kenyataannya di negara-negara Asia yang pembangunannya sukses (seperti negara-negara industri baru), muncullah konvergensi paradigma-paradigma tersebut dengan cara mengambil nilai-nilai positif dari masing-masing yang membuahkan kemakmuran bagi Taiwan, Korea Selatan, Singapura, dan Hongkong. Dari aliran liberal-modernisme mereka mengambil buah pemikiran bahwa perekonomian harus berlandaskan pasar yang setransparan dan seterbuka mungkin didasari atas semangat kompetisi; dari aliran strukturalisme mereka belajar untuk mengaktifkan peran pemerintah di dalam mengembangkan industri-industri strategis masa depan; dari aliran dependensia mereka menyadari bahwa pembangunan hanya mungkin berhasil jika mereka membangun industri yang mandiri tanpa tergantung pada negara manapun; dan aliran populisme mengajarkan mereka untuk terus memperkecil kesenjangan dan meningkatkan pemerataan di dalam masyarakat.*

Development studies have been, and probably will always be, a discipline that is full of debates. Different schools of thought each have convincing arguments on how nations should develop. The most prominent schools in development studies are liberal modernism, structuralism and the dependency theories. Each have different sets of theories and prescriptions on economic growth, distribution and cooperation. The first section of this essay will attempt to provide a critique of each theory by taking a look into their underlying assumptions of development itself.

Economic development in the Asia Pacific has also produced its own set of debates, generally on how the New Industrialised Economies have achieved their success. Is it because of states or markets, or both? How do democratisation and political freedom (or lack of it, i.e., authoritarianism) fit into their patterns of development? Besides these more empirical-based debates,

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the second section will also analyse the political systems underlying developments in the Asia Pacific region.

The third section will put forward some interesting, albeit more utopian ways of thinking about development. Here we will discuss the idea of development according to the populists and moralists. Like all theories, it is not completely applicable but they provide a refreshing insight into the philosophical and moral questions of development. For instance, they argue: "how could a society call itself 'developing' when there is a co-existence of massive poverty and great wealth" (Sismondi 1815 cf. Kitching 1982: 16).

Taking into account the broad and more traditional theories of development, the more empirical-based debates on East Asian development and the more unorthodox-utopian views, the final section will assess in which areas these theories may contribute to an understanding of how Asia Pacific can develop; and where they do not.

### **Modernisation, Westernisation, Development, Underdevelopment**

Poverty of the Third World has its roots in the industrial revolution which took place in Europe, exacerbated by European colonialism. Gramscians Gill and Law (1988: 283) and Realist Robert Gilpin (1987: 264) agree that global inequality started at this point as most economic activity and added value accumulated in industries of the core states following the industrial revolution.

According to Bairoch (1986), colonialism that followed the industrial revolution resulted in low level industrialisation, strong specialisation of export crops, and the beginning of demographic inflation. *Low industrialisation* meant the poor nations depended on few primary products, especially products of subsistent agriculture with sharp fluctuation in prices due to high inelasticity of supply. *Strong specialisation of export crops* meant "putting all your eggs in one basket" (Gill & Law: 282). *Demographic inflation* meant an increasing number of mouths to feed (Bairoch 1986: 197-204). All these were problems faced by newly independent countries of the third world.

Projections for the year 2000 point to the continued widening of the gap between rich and poor countries. The population of the first world will rise from 1.1 billion (1975) to 1.3 billion (2000), while the third world's population will increase from 2.9 billion to 5.0 billion. Thus by the year 2000, the more developed regions will have 21 per cent of the world population and the less developed region will have 79 per cent. Meanwhile only 23.5 per cent of the world's GNP will be enjoyed by the third world, and 76.5 per cent will be enjoyed by the first (Dube 1988: 12). Economic development is thus one of the major concerns of the third world. Nevertheless, development meant different things to the liberals, structuralists and *dependenistas*.

The Liberal-Modernist school includes the works of Kindleberger (1962), Lewis (1974) and Rostow (1980) among others. They do not pose the question "why the poor are poor", but as Adam Smith phrased it in *The Wealth of Nations*: "why certain societies have overcome the obstacles to development, and transformed themselves and through adapting to changing economic

conditions have become rich" (cf. Gilpin 1987: 264). In the liberal point of view, modernisation is the only path for third world countries to reach the state of high mass consumption. The third world must "take off" from a traditional subsistent economy into a plane of a modern economy. In the long run this will produce equalisation of economic levels, real wages and factor prices among nations of the globe (Rostow 1980 cf. Gilpin: 267). In effect, they say, "Just as the United States and Europe developed yesterday, and Japan and Mexico are developing today, so will you, the late starters, develop tomorrow" (Jones 1991:205).

The Structuralist school is mainly associated with scholars such as Nurkse, Prebisch and Myrdal (Gilpin: 283). They promote import substitution industrialisation (ISI) through protection of domestic industries through high tariff and non-tariff barriers (creating infant industries). This was important to safeguard the third world from institutions and structures that continue to perpetuate poverty. The benefits of trade and advancement in technology do not "trickle down" to third world economies. On the contrary, there is an increasingly unbalanced term of trade disadvantaging the poor countries. Structuralists advocated the creation of international organisations such as UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development) in the 1960s to promote the interests of less developed countries.

Dependency theory arose in the mid-1960s, partially as a response to the failure of structuralists' analysis and prescriptions. This school combines elements of traditional Marxism with economic nationalism. They include works of Frank, Baran, Dos Santos and Celso Furtado (Gilpin: 284). They argued that import-substitution industrialisation of the structuralists failed to produce sustained economic growth in LDCs (Less Developed Countries) because the traditional social and economic condition of LDCs remained intact. Neo-colonialist alliance of feudal elites with international capital was reinforced with the ISI strategy. Furthermore, there has been an increase in the maldistribution of income. They also view that domestic demand was too weak to sustain continued industrialisation. This caused an ever-greater dependence on MNCs taking advantage of ISI concessions (Gilpin: 283).

The dependency proponents put forward the "exploitation theory" which implies that the third world is poor because it has been systematically exploited. The first world continuously drains economic surplus through market, price and investment mechanisms. The dependency theorists argue that common trade among peripheries was vital and some even suggest barter trade as a logical solution (Griffin & Rouse 1987: 508-32).

Thus the liberals believe that poverty was caused by lack of capital and technology, structuralists believed that it was caused by the South's weak bargaining position in the world structure of trade; and finally the dependency theorists concluded that there was a systematic drain of surplus from the periphery to the core. Liberals prescribe international financial aid along with trade and foreign investment. Structuralists tend to prescribe protective industrialisation, while dependenistas prescribe a destruction of the linkage between capitalist centres and the peripheries.

It is apparent that the major issue of conflict between the Liberal-Modernists and the Dependenistas is international linkages. But another area of divergence is their terminology. Structuralists and Dependenistas speak of underdeveloped, developing and developed societies. Meanwhile, theories of modernisation talk about the idea of traditional, transitional and modernised societies (Dube 1988: 1).

Modernity is often regarded as a common behavioural system historically associated with the urban, industrial, literate and participant societies of Western Europe and North America. It is characterised by the use of scientific methods, rationality, growing through science and technology and high degree of social mobility. Daniel Lerner suggests that the modern society is dynamic and constantly changing, requiring people to switch roles and assume new statuses; opposed to traditional society which has ascribed statuses and roles (cf. Dube: 19).

Consequently, subscribers of Modernisation believe that the poor countries should consistently "learn from the West" to modernise and adopt new technology and even change their lifestyles, if necessary. Rostow bluntly stated that the ultimate test of modernisation is one car for every four persons in society (Dube: 1). Dependency writers, on the other hand, do not believe that development flows from the core Western countries to the periphery. As Paul Baran (1962) suggests, underdevelopment of the periphery is the result of the development of the centre. Andre Gunder Frank states another factor why the core cannot expect the peripheries to follow their path: it is because the core never faced the same situation in the first place. He finds that the now developed countries never faced a circumstance of underdevelopment the third world is experiencing at the moment. The first world may have been "undeveloped" but they were never "underdeveloped" (Frank 1987: 110).

Liberals define underdevelopment as a condition in which most nations find themselves because they have not kept up with the front-runners. Dependency theorists reject this and state that underdevelopment is a process in which LDCs are caught because of the inherent relationship between developed and underdeveloped nations (Gilpin: 282). Colonial metropolis-satellite relationships that grew with capitalism entail monopolistic and extractive processes imposed on the third world. This deprived underdeveloped nations the ability to control their own growth even after decolonisation (Ruccio & Simon 1987: 120).

According to the liberals, modernisation entails high productivity, low social waste and inefficiency. To achieve this, the third world must learn production techniques and adapt their technology to Western standards. This implies that economic cooperation with the first world and the advancement of Westernisation were necessary vehicles to promote modernisation. This includes technical assistance, foreign aid and foreign trade. But the "solution" offered by the liberals, is often seen as the "cause" of poverty by the dependenistas. Paul Baran comments:

Economic help ... may actually do more harm than good. ... Permitting the importation of ... machinery and equipment ... but not accompanied by any steps that are needed to assure healthy economic growth, foreign assistance may set off an inflationary spiral ... aggravating the existing social and economic tensions (Baran 1987: 107).

Modernists suggest that contact with the modern West is a necessary short-cut to access technology, not having to develop and implement the third world's own. But in the minds of dependency theorists, westernisation is perceived as the undermining and discrediting of all non-Western cultures. Although not a dependency theorist himself, Theodore Von Laue defined what westernisation meant to most people of the third world: it was "the subversion of traditional cultures" which created a "cultural chaos, with people facing the psychological misery of knowingly belonging to a backward society" (1987: 4-5)

S.C. Dube finds that the modernisation theory is rooted in the behavioural sciences, taking into account economics as a major factor in the modernising process. Meanwhile the development theories (structuralists and dependenistas) have drawn their main sustenance from economics, although institutional and motivational dimensions are figured in the discussions. Because of these similarities, Dube suggests that the distinctions of the two streams have become increasingly blurred, especially when observing the policies of third world countries (1988: 35). Even communist regimes now take on modernisation, such as the People's Republic of China under Deng Xiaoping who commented in the People's Daily (December 1984):

"in addition to Marx we must study some modern economic theories, as well as modern scientific and technological know-how. We can never rigidly adhere to the individual words and sentences or specific theories. Marx died 101 years ago" (cf. McWilliams & Piotrowski 1993: 327).

Deng encouraged private enterprise, profit seeking, capital investment and private wealth. His reform program contributed to China's annual growth rate of 10 percent (1981-92), the highest of major countries, with foreign investment rising dramatically (Ibid.).

From the other sphere, non-dependency writers such as Robert Gilpin agreed on the dependency theorists' explanation on the cause of underdevelopment. Nevertheless, he believes that it is wrong to assume that the fact of dependence provides the explanation of how these countries should proceed:

They are weak in a world of the strong ... Their foremost problem is not external dependence but internal inefficiency ... [Efforts to create efficient economies] may not succeed without a growing world economy open to their exports (Gilpin 1987: 304).

## **East Asia's Debate of Development, Democracy and Authoritarianism**

Debates on development were as lively in Asia as it was in other Third World regions. But after the 1970s, there was an added twist to discussions on development in the region, i.e., assessing how East Asia has done so well while other Third World countries are still staggering behind. Arguments centred on state dynamics: is it authoritarianism or democracy that is more conducive for development?

Initially East Asia started out as most other newly independent countries of the post-war era. They inherited their nationalist movements' mandate to create a viable orderly state, effective control over territory, establishing a legitimate sovereign state and responsive to its citizens' needs and to generate economic development (Kohli 1986: 170). With no other model of development to follow, this initial period saw enthusiasm for Western parliamentary forms. The Philippines, Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia, and Malaya attempted liberal-democratic ideas in the 1950s (Robison et.al. 1994: 9). Accordingly, modernisation theories became the mainstream, assuming a linear process of social and political development towards democracy as society became increasingly complex (ibid.: 12).

It was not long before hopes for continued democracy were shaken as Thailand, Burma, Indochina and Indonesia took on a one-party leadership or military dictatorship, by the 1960s. Furthermore, in Korea, after a short lived attempt at democracy under Chang Myon (1960-1), dictatorships of Park Chung-Hee and Chun Doo-Hwan brought authoritarian rule (Borthwick 1994: 299). Meanwhile Taiwan was consistently under a strong one-party leadership throughout this era. As a result, authoritarianism emerged as a common political arrangement (Robison et.al.: 9). Surprisingly (at least at first), authoritarian regimes in East Asia produced rapid growth in each of their countries.

These shifts caused a reassessment in development theory. Huntington (1968), for example, argued that authoritarianism may be a necessary or inevitable stage on the road to modernity. For scholars like him, authoritarian states were important in providing the integrative cement and organisational force necessary while national values and modes of behaviour are still in the process of formation (cf. Robison et.al.: 11). Huntington (1968) viewed that the tasks of managing integration, economic growth and political order could be best achieved by an authoritarian regime (cf. Ibid.: 13). Another contribution to this argument came from Gerschenkron (1962) who proposed that "late industrialisation" required rapid and large investments, requiring state dominance to direct capital and labour. This is contrary to earlier industrialisation, which had a long incubation period, allowing the bourgeoisie to build industrial capitalism for itself without the state needing to play the dominant role (cf. Robison et.al.: 25). From growing empirical evidence, a strong thesis thus emerged suggesting that there was a basic contradiction

between rapid economic growth and democratic forms of government (see Root 1996: 175-6).

By the mid-1980s, however, there was a retreat from pro-authoritarian theories, as several of these regimes began to crumble (Robison et.al.: 10). Bierstecker (1992) calls this period the "triumph of neo-classical economics", as theories from this front once again became the mainstream and managed to gain dominance in the World Bank, IMF and other international institutions (Kiely 1994: 136).

But during the same period, other scholars, studying the success of continued strong state planning in Singapore, Korea and Taiwan, repudiated such rationales. These "institutionalist" scholars maintain that, in Root's words, "good governance is independent of regime types" and what is important is institution-building (1996: 170). Meanwhile strong institution building is usually best-maintained under strong governments. Robert Wade (1992: 275) criticise neo-liberals for usually shying away from empirical evidence that point out the important role states played in managing development. Weiss (1996) also concludes that the main reason for East Asia's success was not that governments intervened less, but rather that they intervened more and efficiently (p. 181).

## **The Populist Moralists: Development as if People Mattered**

From the previous sections, we have seen extensive debates on the meaning of development and how it ought to be achieved. For East Asia, the most recent debates have focused on how much the government should intervene. Nevertheless, there is a commonality that we can attribute to all the arguments dealt with so far. All theories focus on the importance of accelerated growth through industrialisation. The Liberal-Modernisation and Structuralist schools prescribe industrial catch-up. The Dependency school also has no problems with industrialisation (as long as it is not connected with the core states). The empirical based neo-Statist and neo-classical schools debate on how governments in East Asia have intervened in accelerating development via industrialisation.

The common denominator of development these days seem to be industrialisation-the quicker the better. This seems so natural that it is hard to think otherwise. But the following group of theorists have another way of thinking. Although their arguments are rarely ever heard of any longer, their ideas are worth looking into.

This section's title was inspired by E.F. Schumacher's book *Small is Beautiful: Economics as if People Mattered* (Harper & Row, New York, 1973). "Small is beautiful" is a phrase that captures the most important element in populist thinking. Opposing development via rapid industrialisation, the populists' idea of a progressive society is where there was a healthy competition of small-scale industry and farming (Kitching 1982: 16).

The rationale for their argument comes from Sismondi's income elasticity of demand scheme. He argues that one big industry producing goods

worth £10,000 was less beneficial than 100 small artisans producing goods worth £100 each. This was because after a certain amount of disposable income, an individual's consumption for basic necessities will stop growing, and income will be directed towards more luxury items usually "imported from abroad" and thus expenditures will not be "trickling down" to other industries in society. The artisan's consumption of £100 each is seen as more valuable for the nation (cf. Kitching 1982: 24).

In a study of populism, Kitching's book *Development and Underdevelopment in Historical Perspective* (Routledge, London, 1982) gives insights on the importance of morality in pursuing development policies. He views that orthodox economics view volume and value of output or production as the sole indicator of progress (Kitching: 15). Every school of thought gave different answers and different political implications, but each emphasised production and its increase. Distribution was an issue that was focused on only insofar as it did not impinge on production (Ibid.). On the other hand populists saw the issue of distribution as primary; it was an ethical and social concern. Economic concentration was "simply and primarily unjust" (Kitching: 16).

Modern neo-populism, as Kitching recalls, differs from 19<sup>th</sup> century populism (Sismondi, et.al.) in that this new group of scholars were not essentially attacking capitalism on ethical grounds. They propose alternative patterns of trajectory of economic development which can be just as effective as large scale industrialisation but less costly in social or human terms (Kitching: 21). Its major aim was to place a barrier in the way of industrialisation and of rapid growth of industrial cities "swollen with new propertyless proletariat" (Kitching: 99).

Schumacher, for instance, argued that although there is a universal agreement that a fundamental source of wealth is human labour, the modern economist has been brought up to consider labour as little more than necessary evil. Labour is now simply an item of cost "to be reduced to a minimum if it cannot be eliminated altogether, say by automation" (1973: 54-5). Furthermore, in accordance with 19<sup>th</sup> century populists, he believes in smallness, and points out the danger of urbanisation brought by rapid industrialisation:

Humanity .. suffers an idolatry of giantism ... A highly developed transport and communications system has one immensely powerful effect; it makes people footloose. In the poor countries ... it produces mass migration into cities, mass unemployment and as vitality is drained out of the rural areas, the threat of famine. The result is a dual society, without an inner cohesion, subject to a maximum of political instability (1973: 66, 67-8, 70).

Schumacher sees a total imbalance between the city and the countryside, in terms of "wealth, power, culture, attraction and hope" (p.203). Another contributor to this sort of argument is Michael Lipton (1977) who view that third world countries, proceeding with catch-up industrialisation through protectionist measures and other industrial policies, are actually producing an



"urban bias". He argues that there is "price twisting", where policies are designed to make industrial input costs low and output high. While agriculture input prices (eg., fertiliser, credit) are set high and output low. This is in accordance with universal policies of developing nations to provide cheap food, necessary to keep industrial wages down in order to maintain the comparative advantage of cheap labour (1977: 13).

Small farming, Lipton argues, can rapidly boost income per capita to the same level as heavy industrialisation without intolerable hardship and repression in the stage of early development under a situation of plentiful labour and limited ability to save (p.23). However, Lipton does not say "don't industrialise", rather "a developed mass agriculture is normally needed before you can have widespread development in other sectors" (ibid.).

Thus Lipton, Schumacher and other scholars like them would like to see industrialisation proceed naturally, without "catch up" policy measures that tend to have severe human costs. Although from the previous section we might have been able to conclude that state authoritarianism produced order and stability needed for rapid growth and this produced the renowned "East Asian Miracle", the region would not be described as a miracle at all by the populists. Repression of labour and the other underclasses of society are too much of a human cost, even for double-digit growth rates.

## **The Future for Asia-Pacific: Lessons to be Learned**

Robison (1985) notes five characteristics of third world capitalist economies, which are also identifiable with those in East Asia: (1) rapid economic growth; (2) rapid industrialisation; (3) powerful national bourgeoisie; (4) strong authoritarian regimes; (5) developing political ideologies which legitimise power in terms of economic growth and technocratic government (p.299). Considering these features, it would seem that populist arguments discussed in the previous section would have little to offer to these high-growth economies. Nevertheless, unbalanced growth (a major concern of the populists) is common in Asia – reflected most clearly by the problem of urbanisation. Unbalanced growth causes the disadvantaged rural classes to sense that they can only take advantage of development in cities, only to find overcrowding and scarcity of clean water and health care while facing other social dilemmas. Social anxiety and poverty in urban areas are common in the Third World, including Asia.

Balanced growth of small and medium sized firms with large industries have proven to benefit sustainable growth in Taiwan. Most research comparing the paths of Taiwanese and South Korean industrialisation strategies conclude that Taiwan grew at a higher rate (see table), but without the high level of friction apparent in the Korean case (Cheng 1990; Castells 1992; Johnson 1993). One of the reasons for this is that Taiwan's economy emphasises more on gradual and shared growth among small and medium sized businesses, while Korea's policies have helped a number of big businesses to emerge as conglomerations, known as *chaebols* (see Chu 1989: 647-61).

Table-1 Real GDP Growth in Taiwan and Korea (%)

Year	Taiwan	Korea
1960-70	9.2	8.6
1970-80	9.7	9.5
1980-90	10.2	9.7
1991	7.6	9.1
1992	6.8	5.1
1993	6.3	5.8
1994	6.5	8.4
1995	6.7	9.3
1996	6.5	7.7

source: for 1960-90, *U.N. World Development Report 1991*, for 1991-6, *Institute of Developing Economies (Ajiro Keizai Kenkyusho)*.

As a result, emerging in South Korea was a society with distinct social classes and economic structures. In contrast, a society with class fluidity and overlapping economic sectors was evolving in Taiwan. Social classes were identifiable, yet interconnected even fused (Cheng 1990: 161). Rapid EOI in Korea gave rise to a social structure with only unidirectional mobility (from farmers to labourers) while Taiwan's structure afforded multiple-directional mobility (among farmers, workers and the self-employed).

Thus, although the populist's prescription to reject rapid industrial catch-up has not been followed in East Asia, their underlying assumption that balanced growth is sustainable growth has proven true, given the case of Taiwan in comparison with South Korea. Returning to the debate regarding democracy versus development (section two), we can again apply comparisons of Taiwan and South Korea.

Although the ruling KMT in Taiwan is authoritarian, it, unlike Korea, has successfully pre-empted political opposition by sponsoring a broad based coalition, while liberalising politics to drain the pool of the counter-elite (Cheng 1990: 168). The coalition encompassed farmers, state employees and labour. *Farmers* benefited from the 1972 NAP (New Agriculture Policy) which turned agriculture from an economic surplus base into a subsidised sector. *State employees* were also better-off through the 1974 overhaul of compensation schemes for civil servants. *Workers'* welfare also expanded, with added medical treatment and severance payments, but without unemployment relief (ibid.). Wade also pointed out that Taiwan pursues a populist approach in labour-management arbitration, usually favouring the "little fellow" (1990: 243); Korea's regimes in the past have been known for their use of military force against labour uprisings. We may conclude that even though authoritarian regimes may provide order and stability needed in the initial years of industrialisation, further development is sustainable only with increasing popular participation.

## Conclusion

From the three schools of thought discussed in the first section, we can conclude that each has its share of strengths and weaknesses. The liberal modernist school has a point in requiring third world countries to undertake social change. Nonetheless, their prescription of "westernisation" (adapting to western styles and culture) as the required social change is much questionable. Social change or social reform of self discipline in the light of Confucianism has contributed to growth in Northeast Asia and Singapore. Meanwhile Cuba has made progress in social welfare, not by following ultimate high technology, but applied technology, using resources already available to Cuba to support the needs of the masses (Dube: 50).

Although dependency theory helps us to understand why the third world is in a state of underdevelopment and dependence, to conclude that delinking the third world from advanced countries should be pursued by the Third World must be approached with great caution. Isolationism in itself does not solve problems of Third World poverty and inefficiency.

The structuralist theories also contributed to an understanding that the third world would be better off united to strengthen their bargaining position. But their idea of an ISI strategy may exacerbate feudalism, economic inefficiency and disparity.

From the debate of development, democracy and/or authoritarianism we can conclude that East Asian authoritarian bureaucracies may have imposed order and stability positively, but continued broadening of popular participation is needed for more sustainable development:

[Authoritarian] causes deep alienation, .... [it] ultimately weakens state leadership, whereas democratic accountability, no matter how messy initially, ultimately strengthens it. ... To be ultimately successful, a strategy for economic development must be democratically chosen, democratically planned, democratically implemented, and democratically modified (Bello and Rosenfeld 1990: 345-6).

To support this argument, Bello and Rosenfeld points out that authoritarian regimes in South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan faces signs of distress. Labour strikes in Korea, farmers' resistance in Taiwan, the flight of intellectuals from Singapore and environmental decay in all these countries is the price everyone in the NICs is paying for an authoritarian management of development (Ibid.: 3).

Although many of the populists' arguments may seem to be irrelevant in the Asia-Pacific, their basic underlying assumptions of balanced growth to minimise human costs seem to be applicable in any situation. Finally, after examining the important debates regarding development, especially in the Asia Pacific in great length we may come to the conclusion that all the theories and rationales we have dealt with in this essay provide nations with useful insight.

Most importantly is to remember that in specific situations and conditions, we must apply these theories critically and with extreme care.

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