

MODERN INDONESIAN ADMINISTRATION: COLLEGIAL, *ABDI-DALEM*, RATIONAL-, OR IDEOLOGICAL- BUREAUCRATIC?

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Abstrak

Meskipun rezim Suharto telah jatuh) selama lebih dari dua tahun dan Indonesia telah melaksanakan pemilu yang paling adil selama setengah abad usia kemerdekaan, namun tetap belum juga muncul hasil yang cukup berarti dalam reformasi di Indonesia. Tipe birokrasi Indonesia diduga telah menjadi factor penyebab kemandegan langkah reformasi ini. Tulisan ini mencoba mencari penjelasan mengenai sebab-sebab buruknya implementasi kebijakan dari akar kesejarahan yaitu dari keterbatasan-keterbatasan kelembagaan.

Kata kunci : collegial, *abdi dalem*, rational bureau, ideological bureau

Indonesia lacks neither programs for economic, social, and political reform nor capable individuals to staff them. Yet some two years after the fall of the Suharto regime and one of the fairest elections in a half century of independence Indonesia appears no closer to recovery than it was immediately after the beginning of the Asian crisis. Rather than want of, sometimes good, advice on how to overcome the crisis, the problem lies with shortcomings in implementing existing programs. This is most clearly reflected in the uncharacteristic cautious attitude on the part of foreign investors. Hesitation to commit themselves and their resources even under the National Unity Cabinet assembled by the new President is possibly a reaction to disappointment with past performance in the “reformation era” than a judgment of present prospects. Yet until proven otherwise, the apparent inability to make substantive improvements in the present system tends to be attributed to the fact that Indonesians are hopelessly corrupt, incompetent, or both.

This essay seeks explanation for poor policy implementation policy in historically determined institutional constraints. Such constraints successively and selectively produced, if not the system, at very least the boundaries within which that system could take form. In long-term perspectives reaching back to precolonial times many of the practices considered dysfunctional to a reformed administrative system are recognizable continuations of reactions to

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external circumstances which have subsequently become institutionalized. Administrators tend to conform to a system's norms which in turn have been inherited from the past. The approach is by no means a type of cultural reductionism in the form of "such is dictated by tradition and/or culture". Nor does it minimize the pernicious effects of unchecked personal self-interest, especially on the part of high-ranking officials. Rather it attempts to understand the workings of Indonesian administration within its own institutional premises and unique historical developments rather than within the context of modern, alien standards imposed from without.

ADMINISTRATION

For practical reasons the paper confines itself to the Javanese variant of Indonesian administrative practice. Preserved as copper plate and stone inscriptions, palm-leaf manuscripts, as well as documents written on Javanese tree-bark paper (*dluwong*, Chinese rice paper, and European-manufactured paper, only the Javanese historical sources provide a sufficient body of continuous information for tracing developments down to the present. In any event Javanese dominate the central administration which as a result tends to reflect their values and norms.

Reason for the choice of subject lies in administration's dual role as a mediator of power and its senatorial function. Administration is what stands between ruler and ruled. Moreover, it is the instrument for conveying orders, regulations, decisions, laws, and the like from the political elite to the masses. To a certain extent the reverse is true, especially in acceptance or lack thereof. Just as some metals are better conductors than others by virtue of their relative resistance, some administrative forms have more resistance to currents from the top or bottom of the power pyramid. At the same time administration's senatorial role dampens potential swings between extreme measures. This means that by its very nature it is conservative. Today's administration is manned by yesterday's ideals. This can be positive, as in preventing swings to dictatorial forms, or negative in slowing down or even effectively stopping the pace of reform.

ADMINISTRATIVE TYPES

The point of departure is the observation that Javanese administrative systems are characterized by the interplay of several identifiable types. Two indigenous and two foreign are singled out for consideration. The first two, "collegial" and "*abdi-Dulem*" (Javanese for "servant of the court") are local. They are also traditional in that Javanese administrations from the

fourteenth century, and possibly earlier, have alternated between the two. Of the foreign types, aspects of what can be termed a rational-bureaucratic mode were introduced as part of the Netherlands East Indies administration in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. “Bureaucracy” in the Weberian sense, however, applied only to those technical functions which were staffed primarily by Dutchmen and operated directly under colonial authority. They were bureaucratic to the same degree as the concept developed within administrative circles in The Netherlands. The other foreign model was in many respects a variant of the rational-bureaucratic one, with its basic principles complemented and in some case countermanded by the demands of political ideology. The name “ideological-bureaucratic” is logically a conflict of terms. In common with “collegial” and “*abdi Dalem*”, “bureaucracy” relates to how policy is implemented, “ideology” to the basis of that policy. Yet it is the non logical or a-logical aspect that is intended with the term. It stands for an administrative style where the manner of carrying out policy has been subordinated to considerations stemming from the world of ideas, perceived or imagined.

The four types are sketched below within their respective historical context. Subsequently it is shown how they can contribute to an understanding of contemporaneous Indonesian administration. It goes without saying that the results presented here are tentative. They are, in fact, borrowed from a longer work on Javanese/Indonesian administrative history, in which the development of the phenomenon is as important as their impact upon contemporary life (Hoadley 2000a). In that work it is argued that much of the inefficiency of Indonesian administration stems from selectivity in applying these concepts. Despite lip service paid to indigenous forms and an unrealistic belief in a European style rational-bureaucratic structure as providing the basis of public institutions, Indonesian administration is in reality an *abdi-Dalem* (courtier or servant) type in which administrators are totally subordinated to their respective superiors. This shift was facilitated by the fact that the colonial government had exploited, and thus undermined, the validity of traditional restraints. Manipulation of the so-called *adat* opened the way for introduction, even in excess, of the new nation’s ideological aspirations. Moreover the advent of a developmental state with its direct involvement in the country’s economic life, has given the manipulators of the *abdi-Dalem* administrative mode greatly enhanced scope of opportunities for accumulating power and riches at the expense of society’s expressed goals.

COLLEGIAL

One of the earliest re-constructible administrative modes was that resulting from Javanese predilection to utilize collegial bodies for administrative purposes. The type case is the fourteenth-century East Javanese kingdom of Majapahit. Available documentation of the governmental structure reveals an institutional acceptance of councils, meetings, and even informal gatherings in which the personal activities of King and Royal Family were aimed at ensuring acceptance of their governmental measures by those who were to carry out the sovereign's wishes. On the more formal, legal level these characteristics found expression in the Majapahit judicial tribunal consisting of seven equal members, the *sapto-uppapati* (seven leaders). The college represented the realm as a whole and their judgements were arrived at through a processor collective discussion and mutual discussion, i.e. *musyawarat mupakat* (Hoadley 2000a). The precedent is documented for at least one important successor kingdom, that of the coastal principality of Cirebon, West Java, in the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries. The central administration was dominated by similar councils which constituted the highest governing bodies. This was with the addition of Islamic overtones brought in by Sunan Gunung Jati, West Java's most revered *wali* (saint). Its judicial administration provided a continuity with the Majapahit *sapto-uppapati* e.g. the seven-member law court of the *jaksa pipitu* (seven judges). Consensus prevailed not only in the harmonizing of Sanskritic and Islamic legal traditions, but also within administrative functions. All decisions had to be unanimous in order to be valid (Hoadley 1994). The type, dubbed "collegial-consensus" or simply "collegial", provides an important element in Javanese administrative thinking. A direct connection with the past is seen in Indonesia's expectations that parliamentary decisions, particularly those of the People's Consultive Assembly (*Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat*) are to be arrived at by a process of *musyawarat-mupakat*, the latter by definition being unanimous. Prerequisite to any body relying on such a decision-making procedure is the existence of considerable consultation and reciprocity between all parties involved.

Without reflecting upon the Indonesian government's future, it can be noted that the administrative form had built-in advantages and disadvantages. The greatest disadvantage is time and vagueness. A decision reachable by a governing body of any size is bound to be conservative in that it must arrive at a sort of a "least common denominator" acceptable to all parties. Such a procedure takes time. Moreover no radical decisions are liable to emerge. One can expect

considerations of status and hierarchy to play an important role, especially in determining the direction of discussion and ultimately the decision. Western principles such as one-man-one-vote ideas are foreign to the system. However there is a great advantage of the collegial-consensus system. This comes from the consensus aspect which by definition eliminates opposition. Disappointment, discontent, and even potential revolt is built into a majority-minority system. That the fifty percent plus one can lord it over a possible forty-nine percent obviously requires an enforcement apparatus of considerable strength. In contrast a decision reached by consensus is, at least in theory, self-enforcing. Protest or even revolt against a decision one has oneself participated in and approved, a prerequisite of a true *musyawarat-mupakat*, loses any claim to a moral high ground. opposing such a decision is not only to renege on one's own position but also challenge the society as a whole.²

ABDI-DALEM

A second indigenous administrative type comes from its opposite, namely an authoritarian form. Autocratic power demands or is predicated upon, a loyal administration that at each descending level (province or district) carries out without question or, better yet, anticipates the orders of the immediate superior. The type case is the "*abdi-Dalem/courtier*" administrative mode. Its characteristic feature is total subordination of state servants to the sovereign as in the Central Javanese empire of Mataram in the seventeenth century, or that of its successor at Kartasura during the first half of the eighteenth century. The tradition continued down to the better-documented successor states in the principalities of Yogyakarta and Surakarta which resulted from the division of the Javanese realm by the Dutch in 1755 (Carey and Hoadley 2000).

As suggested in the name, the key element of the administrative type is the subservient administrator or "servant of the palace" (*abdi-Dalem*). Investigation of original Javanese archival material from Central Java in at the end of the eighteenth century documents the extent to which the sovereign personally directed the realm's administration, at least on paper. As is usual the ruler appointed the realm's highest officials, i.e. "raised" them, simultaneously granting them

² One can argue that formation of the present government, including the choice of heads of the People's Consultative Body (MPR) and the Parliament (DPR), is a textbook example of the exercise of *musyawarat-mupakat*. The MPR simply decided to chose those it felt were "best" to lead the nation at this point in time and came up with a reconciliation government hardly possible under the strict terms of representative democracy.

access to and/or use of manpower units in lieu of salary. However these grants were not common alienation of the realm's resources in order to secure its proper administration. As made quite explicit by the extant letters of appointment, the Mataram ruler also appointed directly his subordinate' officials. As a result the highest ranking ministers were served by and dependent upon the king's men, not their own appointees. This limitation was in addition to the customary expiration of all titles of "nobility" after three generations. In any event, the sovereign retained ultimate control over the manpower resources granted his ministers and other subordinates. These could be reassigned to other officials on the sovereign's will. The frequent redistributions of such manpower units and lands is well documented in *The Archive of Yogyakarta*.

Within such a framework the most important characteristic of a state servant was loyalty and submission. The usual expression of this was the *setia-durhaka* relation; expectations of total loyalty and abhorrence of anything smelling of "treason" no matter what the provocation³. The more specific Javanese expression was *sandika* "I hear and obey" or "I will not oppose you" uttered before the sovereign in a position of abject subservience (*sembah*). To this was added the little recognized, but crucial requirement commonly found in the Javanese legal texts listed under the "*aksara*". To the usual attributes of the authority of Javanese sovereigns is named *aksara kilat* (lightening) which was "...the knowing of the Sovereign will before it is uttered".⁴ The ideal public servant or administrator in this context must know and anticipate royal will. It not only freed the ruler from the details of daily administration but also in modern times of responsibility for excesses carried out by subordinates. This also explains why it is so difficult to prove that ex-President Suharto did or ordered such-and-such (killing of suspected communists in 1965, excesses in Timor or Aceh, monetary transactions, etc.). They were the results of the royal will as anticipated and carried out by "effective" administrators.

As with the collegial system, the *abdi-Dalem* system has its strengths and weaknesses. Practical application rested directly upon the relative strength of the ruler. Under a strong ruler, as Sultan Agung (Suharto?) the state functioned well as extension of his personal power or even charisma. Yet the system was institutionally shallow and hence vulnerable. Under a weak ruler, as Pakubuwana III of Kartasura the in-built over-centralization could no longer be sustained. Once it began to fall apart it usually continued to do so because of lack of institutional back-up

³ See the Hang Tuah v. Hang Jebat of classical Malay letters ...

⁴ B.M 12303 cited in Hoadley 2000 and Carey and Hoadley

or even opportunity for subordinates' initiative through which channels reform movements could be instigated.

TEXTS

How the two styles of administration articulated with one another can be seen from the nature of written juridical texts in the Javanese context. As noted earlier, the *musyawarat-mupakat* decision-making process entails finding a solution acceptable to the entire group. The tenacity with which parties advanced their own interests in concert with corresponding unwillingness to acquiesce in other's would seem to make decisions unnecessarily time-consuming at best and completely impossible at worst. Yet a couple of built-in features acted to speed up decisions. One was the emergence at an early stage of support from the majority for one point of view. In this case the *musyawarat-mupakat* is determined in advance, much along the lines of *Orde Baru* (Indonesia's government under President Suharto 1966-98) decisions in the Peoples Consultative Assembly and the House of Representatives which resembled a rubber-stamp instead of the truly collegial procedure. Particularly applicable to judicial proceedings, the second feature is a variant of the first. Instead of an agreement, in advance, or at an early stage, demonstrating overwhelming support for one measure, there could emerge a conviction as to the moral "rightness" of one alternative. If most of the *musyawarat* group were convinced of the moral superiority of a certain measure then the force of moral suasion would press for subordinating their personal wishes to the will of not only the group but, more importantly, supra-human justice, be it from the Hindu-Javanese past, Islam, or ingrained Javanese ideas of right and wrong.

This is where the juridical texts come in. Javanese judicial texts are not concerned with deciding cases or even providing the wherewithal for doing so, much less with assigning enforceable punishments. Rather they concentrate on ascertaining the nature of behavior, classifying actions, and identifying degree of responsibility for them. To some extent they also indicate resultant penalties for respective actions, although these are generally abstract and vague in the extreme.⁵ The collegial-consensus system could only identify the moral issues, or lack

⁵ A couple of cases from the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries in West Java provide good examples of this. In both of them the defendants' actions were identified as falling under the "*asta corah asta dusta*", the most heinous of crimes against society for which the highest penalty was prescribed. Although not given by the sources for the cases, the texts upon which these provisions are well known from a number of texts. To the chagrin of the Dutch, the judges, the *jaksa pipitu* as a type case of the collegial consensus system did not specify physical

thereof, about which all the judges could agree, even those judges associated with or even subordinate to the litigating or involved parties. It was up to the *abdi-Dalem* type of judiciary to carry out such punishments in the name of the sovereign. What is crucial here is that texts, with few exceptions, supported the collegial-consensus system by providing it with explanations, identifications, cryptic apothegms, and parables. At this point the case could be surrendered for further action on the authority of the sovereign or his surrogates, the *abdi-Dalem/courtiers*. The two systems were compatible, if hierarchical, rather than competitive.

BUREAUCRATIC

Imposition of Dutch hegemony over the island during the course of the eighteenth century introduced new administrative styles. Whether sponsored by the Dutch East India Company, the Dutch crown, or Parliament, they were all to some extent bureaucratic. They brought with them administrative innovations as functional specialization, departments or bureaus, organizational hierarchy, clearly-defined chains-of-command, meritocracy based on performance with corresponding demands of training and education, and goal-orientated administration. Motivation for their introduction stemmed from the *raison d'etre* of colonialism, namely economic exploitation of the colony for the material advantage of the metropolitan power *here* The Netherlands. Although clearly along the lines of a rational bureaucracy, especially in technical services as communication, infrastructure, health, and education, two factors prevented the emergence of more than an approximation of truly bureaucratic forms. First, the Netherlands Indies was run as a branch office of the Dutch ministry of colonies. Administration was, therefore, not autonomous in the sense that it stood or failed on its performance, nor did have the advantages of feed-back from subordinates. Second, from the very beginnings there grew up a double duality between Javanese-dominated generalist within the territorial administration and Dutch-initiated specialized functions within public services.

TERRITORIAL ADMINISTRATION

Acquisition of large geographic territories of Java raised the question of their administration. In the eighteenth century this was accomplished by imposing a Dutchman, “Resident”, at the local Javanese court via provisions of the various treaty arrangements.

punishments. In one case they mentioned further provisions which would be appropriate to the crime. In any event the Dutch East India Company took up the mantle and punished the convicted parties, as if they were the sovereign.

Authority to ensure Javanese compliance was only in emergencies dependant upon the strength of the local Dutch garrison housed in a *logi* (fortified lodge) at Yogyakarta or Surakarta or a fortress at Banten, Cirebon, Semarang, and Surabaya. More usual was the Resident's responsibility to convince or cajole Javanese potentates to abstain from measures hostile to Company interests and to carry out agreed upon measures. Maintenance of law and order (*rust en orde*) and providing access to the yields of agricultural production were the two most important. There was, however, a difference in priorities. For the Dutch law and order were pre-conditions for achieving economic results. For Javanese *tata tantrem*, the Javanese equivalent, was a goal in itself. Maintaining conditions favorable to agricultural production was a bothersome Dutch imposition.

In the eighteenth century, even under indirect rule by the Company, Javanese/Indonesian administration was considerably modified. First and foremost were the limitations imposed on potentates' freedom of maneuver. These were the direct results of adherence to the contents of the treaty arrangements. Breach, or even non-fulfillment, would call down the use of coercion by Company or, even more serious in the latter half of the century, dissolution of the *pax Nederlandica* held warring parties from each other throats. Subsequently came the first steps binding the Javanese elite to Dutch interests. This horizontal Dutch-Javanese elite alliance simultaneously weakened the vertical ties that bound Javanese to their rulers. More significantly, by exploiting the nominal nature of "traditional" authority for Dutch ends, i.e. establishment and continuance of colonial hegemony, the moral authority, and hence ability to command loyalty of the masses, of the age-old rules of conduct contained in the Javanese customary or *adat* law was hopelessly compromised. Arguably the most important modifications brought about in Javanese administration in the early colonial period was the introduction of the concept of statute law. As the potentates discovered only after some decades of contact with the Dutch Company, the contents of the treaty arrangements in the form of treaties, contracts, and concessions *were* obligatory, not optional. Their contents were to be translated into specific actions. Dutch legal hegemony over the islands' potentates meant that the conditions agreed upon and recorded by the written tracts became absolute. They had built into their contents provisions of enforcement which were to ensure that these conditions named in the tracts were fulfilled. With introduction of statute law, reinforced by complementary rules and regulations to enforce it, the sovereign and by implication his closest advisors either fell under

man-made law. They were not longer servants of an endogamous force, moral, religious, or whatever.

Javanese potentates subordinated to Dutch advisors became a permanent institution within the colony's administration. The pattern was strengthened by greater Dutch involvement in the local economy during the early nineteenth century. Dutch engagement in agricultural production neither directly as a royal or state enterprise during the Cultivation System (ca.1830-70) or indirectly through its official control over of land and labor resources allocated to private entrepreneurs required institutionalizing relations between Dutch holders of power and their Javanese administrators at the provincial and district levels. By accepting the Raffles' assertion that the sovereign was the owner of all land, the Dutch administration in essence introduced revolutionary changes. Access to land became conditional on compensation to the "owner", i.e. the sovereign Dutch colonial government, in the form of taxes, work days, or both. This was based on a fundamental expectation, namely that the sovereign actually possessed sufficient means of coercion to back up claims of absolute ownership. Yet in the collegial-consensus system of West Java the regional power-holder, *Bupati*, by definition lacked instruments necessary for realizing the commitments implied by the new socioeconomic order. As the entire system was aimed at resolving or avoiding direct confrontation between contesting parties by a collegial decision-making apparatus, it was incapable of enforcing requirements demanded by a centralized administration. For different reasons the *abdi-Dalem* system of Central Java was equally incapable of following the new directives. This was because the system did not allow power to accrue below the level of the sovereign. *Bupati* were receivers of the Sultan's or Susuhunan's orders, not regional powers in their own right. Hence the key to Cultivation System administration, which set the basic pattern for the colony down to 1942, lay at the level of the *Bupati* and his subordinates.⁶

⁶ Here it should be observed that Dutch hegemony in Java was of an "indirect" type. It worked though the existing local administration instead of creating its own as the British did in Burma. The relative indirectness, however, varied considerably between territories ceded to the Company at different points in time and the "Principalities" of Central Java. The latter remained under the nominal sovereignty of respectively the Sultan of Yogyakarta and the Susuhunan of Surakarta. In territories held directly by the Dutch existence of sufficient military power did not arise. After the defeat of the Javanese forces at the close of the Java War (1825-30) there was no power left to challenge the Dutch. Even the in the Principalities there was no local rallying point. The Dutch guaranteed the Javanese elite the right to continued exercise of authority in their own states in return for assistance against Pangeran Dipanagara as the primary figure of the revolt against European domination.

Needless to say, powers lacking in the collegial system and those not delegated in the *abdi-Dalem* one were readily supplied by the Dutch. Without the Regents there could be no Cultivation System and by extension no lucrative colony. The solution was for the Dutch to raise the *Bupati* to a position equivalent to that of a local sovereign and propped the office up with their own means of coercion. They also created an artificially maintained status differential for tame *Bupati*, complete with marks of difference, “court etiquette” and protocol. Crucial in this respect was the leadership of these *Bupati* and his subordinates. Their usefulness as a bulwark of continued Dutch power derived from their position as “traditional” and therefore natural leaders of the masses from whom loyalty was expected (see Sutherland, 1979). In terms of the typology used here the effect was either to transform a collegial system or to strengthen and intensify an *abdi-Dalem* one. The Dutch colonial government became the court/ruler to which they were subordinated and whose wishes they were to anticipate.

SPECIALIZED FUNCTIONS

As long as the Dutch continued to trade in the island’s surplus production of tropical goods the type of indirect rule described above was satisfactory. A completely different set of relations were needed, however, when the Dutch involved themselves in the process of production. Transformation of Dutch-Javanese administrative relations was effectuated by changing economic ones.⁷

Need for more effective economic exploitation of the colony led directly to the other development in the public sector on Java, namely that of specialized administrative functions. By this is meant areas of governmental responsibility aimed at implementing specific policies organized around full time employees qualified by education or training for the tasks so defined. Most commonly these were the results of new impositions on the local population for economic ends. The archetype was the *indigomaaker* (indigo inspector) created by the Dutch East India Company in the early eighteenth-century. His responsibility was to see to the improvement of the quality and quantity of exportable indigo delivered by the local direct producers to the Company. The advice given was backed by the weight of Dutch Javanese authority, the so called system of

⁷ A gauge of the strength of economic motivation was comes from the example of the coffee-producing areas of West Java. Despite different governmental forms Dutch and English private companies, including a liberal interregnum 1811-15, royal Dutch power, and authority delegated by the Dutch Parliament these lands remained under direct control from the early eighteenth to early twentieth centuries. Agricultural production was far too profitable to be subjected to mere politics or even ideology.

“forced deliveries”. This advice, as well as better techniques for cultivation and processing of the raw indigo in preparation for export, not infrequently drew upon imported foreign technology. A far more important continuation was the corps of advisors for coffee cultivation which were active throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. These pioneering initiatives of the Dutch were followed by the introduction of administrative and technical expertise concerning other export crops during the course of the nineteenth century. This included rice, which was exported to Batavia and other large cities, and more importantly sugar. These agencies and functions constituted functional model for much of the later technical services built up in Java which continued during the succeeding periods of the Ethical Policy down to 1942. With their origins in agricultural production they quickly extended to agriculture services such as crop research, disease control, irrigation services, through communications and infrastructure as roads and railways, post and telegraph and the like, down to health services and moderate social welfare initiatives.

With little exaggeration these services can be said to be white, educated, and bureaucratic. Almost inevitably the head of these specialized functional offices were *totok* Dutchmen, i.e. those coming to the Indies from Holland. While some *peranakan* Dutch, i.e. those born and raised in the Indies, could become heads, “natives” no matter how well qualified could not.⁸ Only with a great deal of effort could educated Javanese rise to any level of important within these agencies and bureaus. The peculiarities of the Indies apartheid system aside, these officials Javanese and Dutch, had received training and education in their line of work. Moreover, these services were organized along such bureaucratic lines as promotion on grounds of performance, full time employment with regular working hours, hierarchy of officials with a procedure for appeals, etc. This side of the public administration in the Indies resembled a bureaucracy in the Weberian sense, that is with due modifications for ethnic background.

Even the most bureaucratic sector of the colonial administration differed from a true bureaucracy in that it lacked autonomy. The whole colony was run as a branch office of the Ministry of Colonies. All activities, no matter how specialized, were ultimately subordinated to the goals set by an agency of the Dutch Parliament. One of the basic rules of the game was unquestioning acceptance of continuation of the Indies as a Dutch colony. If a colonial civil servant was questioned it or, even more damning, questioned to wisdom or morality of its

⁸ Sutherland

continuation, dismissal coupled with expulsion from the colony could follow, no matter how well the job in question was performed.⁹ Within the colonial system extra bureaucratic demands were imposed, ones obviously not in keeping with a modern, rational bureaucracy.

IDEOLOGICAL-BUREAUCRATIC

That rational bureaucratic forms were monopolized by the European sojourners in Java created problems upon the attainment of Independence in 1949. The bitter struggle with the intransigent Dutch who were trying to recover their former colony and Indonesian reaction to this meant that the new nation was deprived of the most modern bureaucratic sector of its administration, i.e. the Europeans. The bankruptcy of the colonial administration and the resultant compromising of traditional norms combined with the extremes of conscious engagement of administrators in political life to create what has been termed an “ideological-bureaucracy”. Between 1945 and 1965 the new administrative mode mixed policy making with policy implementation, while between 1966 and 1998 it fell prey to elite controlled administrative thinking and action.

During the first two decades following the attainment of independence in 1949 the overriding concern was with nation building. Like other newly independent nations, Indonesia rejected many of the basic governmental characteristics of its former colonial masters. These included a market economy, the binding alliances of the Cold War as NATO and SEATO, and after 1958 even parliamentary democracy in preference for forms considered more in keeping with Indonesian values. Within the administrative sphere this led to rejection of the principle that the state civil servants should be political neutral within the sphere of their professional activities. On the contrary, the Indonesian civil servants or PNS (*Pegawai Negara Sipil*) were expected to be politically engaged in activities which contributed to the establishment, development, and defense of the new nation. Yet since different political ideologies advanced different interpretations of the contents and means of attaining national goals, the central administration became a battleground in miniature of the national political arena. The resulting “spoils system” was characterized by paralyzing competition for the reins of government, one which led to a grossly over-staffed government departments, corruption, and political favoritism. This struggle was made even more intense by the fact that with Indonesia’s failing economy,

⁹ Example of Minke’s teacher or Fischbotten

only the central government and through it political parties had the funds for carrying out political activities. (see *Twilight in Jakarta*)

After 1966 and the establishing of the New Order under President Suharto the country was thoroughly de-politicized. It became in essence a one-party state under GOLKAR, an acronym for “functional groups”, an umbrella-collective which in theory was aimed at integrating representative from all walks of life in a party-like mass organization. The concept was, in fact, launched by President Sukarno in the early 1960s as an instrument for replacing western-style political parties and supporting his own version of “democracy”. In practice since 1966 the country has been governed by GOLKAR in which members of the military have been dominate. For the civil administration the New Order political machine was the flip side of its predecessor. PNS political engagement was retained and even expanded. What was new was the character of the expected engagement. The multiple interpretations of the pre 1965 period was replaced by an intensive propaganda campaign intended to raise the *Panca Sila* to a position as an all-encompassing state ideology. As originally written into the preamble to the Constitution of 1945, the *Panca Sila* , i.e. the Five Principles--belief in God, a just and humane world, democracy based upon the Indonesian principles of collective decision and mutual help, and social justice--were expressions of the new nation's collective ideals. However the Suharto regime raised them to a position over the constitution, thus becoming the fount of all legitimate authority, even for the public administration. Textbooks, administrative manuals, and class-room materials used to train and up-grade civil servants almost without exception open with the assertion that the *Panca Sila* is the basis of Indonesian state authority, before turning to the by implication less important constitutional provisions. To complement this for the general public numerous committees and institutions were established to the spread and propagation of *Panca Sila* thinking and action.

These effort at creating a “*Panca Sila*” state, i.e. one based upon the regime's own interpretations, had had far-reaching consequences for the national civil administration. By the 1970s and 80s, when the propaganda was the most intense, the pseudo (i.e. Dutch manipulated) *abdi-Dalem/courtier* administrative type had been recalled to active duty by the Suharto government. To its most distinguishable characteristic of loyalty to, or even anticipation of, superiors wishes and “as long as the boss is happy” (*asal Bapak senang* of Indonesian administration was grafted an additional ideological constraint in the form of the *Panca Sila*.. Tradition which guided the pre-colonial and even colonial *abdi-Dalem/courtier* administrative

mode was replaced by the current interpretation ultimately given *Panca Sila* by President Suharto as the highest *bapak*. The senatorial function of tradition which earlier ensured a minimum conformity with society's ideals and mores was shunted aside by the shibboleth of the *Panca Sila*. The result is the current Indonesian administration which is characterized by lack of initiative, that is before the boss has made a decision as to acceptable direction; top-heavy steering; and in general little or no differentiation made between public authority and private activities, official capacity and individual self-(family)-interest, and ultimately public funds and the private pocket-book. That public servants should be politically neutral was specifically rejected by Indonesian administrative teachings as was the myth of the effectiveness of the Weberian rational bureaucracy (cf. Miftah Thoha, 1992). Only under strong pressure of international donors as the IMF has the principle of political neutrality been legislated in November 1998, although its observation in the post election era has been close to non-existent.

APPLICATION

How does the above sketch contribute to understanding the dysfunctional nature of Indonesian public and private administration? Considerations of space dictate that only a couple of points can be raised. First use of the schema highlights the discrepancy between how Indonesia (and others) would like to see the administrative system, i.e. "Asian values" married to a European bureaucratic system, and reality, i.e. bureaucratic forms skewed by ideological concerns underpinned by *abdi-Dalem* traditions. Second, the observed phenomenon would seem to indicate that the problem lies with the basic structure of Indonesian administration rather than in its staffing. The following sketches in very broad terms what would be seen more as a research plan than a finished explanation or even hypothesis. The gap between aspirations and believe in a combination of collegial and Bureaucratic (bold print) and the actual situation of an unfortunate combination of Bureaucratic ideological and abdi-Dalem/courtier (double underline) is shown below.

	Collegial	<i>Abdi Dalem</i>	Rational bureau	Ideological bureau
Recruiting & training	mastery of tradition	malleable	training & special skills	▶ Same, <u>tempered by politically correct</u>
Decision making	consensual w/in trad. Rules	<u>Top-down "will of sovereign"</u>	delegated within set area by rules of bureaucracy	▶ Same, tempered by politically correct
Enforcement & control	self-enforcing	<u>Dependent on sovereign</u>	sector delegation within system	<i>ditto</i> , tempered by politically correct
Accountability	Direct	none	within area of responsibility	<u>only politically correct actions</u>
Termination	none/ age	Sovereign will	test effectiveness within rules	<i>ditto</i>

Indonesia's developmental ideas of the early years of independence centered about "Indonesian Socialism". As originally stated in the preamble to the Constitution of 1945, several collegial features have found their way into the independent government structure. These aspirations are in some ways reinforced by a belief in or aspirations toward a modern bureaucracy in the Weberian sense. Most governmental organs and agents are defined in terms of rational structures and functional offices. Yet reality belies both aspirations and assumptions. Collegial feature tend to become purely formalities, sort of window dressing by way of administrative national identity and connection with the past. A sort of pseudo bureaucracy (= ideological bureaucratic) replaces it. The ideological orthodoxy imposed by the Suharto era, in which the governmental structure monopolized the official interpretation of the state ideology; transformed it into an instrument of control. This is when it was not empty rhetoric. The realities of power fell into the *abdi-Dalem* mode in which administrator were governed by top-down power of the central state, the "best" *i.e.* most successful, civil servants were those who rightly anticipated the ruler's (Suharto's) wishes. Administrative practice was dependent upon congruence with the sovereign will. In short, there was no delegation of powers within a functional division of responsibilities or a backing up by the system as a whole via delegation-by-rules. Both recruitment and termination of personnel was dependent upon what is politically

correct vis a vis the ruler. The system was based upon the principle “*asal Bapak senang*” rule which permeates the entire system.

From even the short sketch presented above, the crisis in the current Indonesian administration appears to be structural rather than functional. Basic definitions, formulations, and construction of the administrative apparatus hinders piece-meal reforms of the type attempted by international bodies. Reforming Indonesian administration does not revolve about “merely” finding honest persons to man an otherwise rational bureaucratic structure: the structure, including definitions of official behavior/expectations, needs to be brought into line with reality.

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