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ABSTRACT

The transition to democracy in Indonesia has somehow resulted in a majoritarian democracy. By linking the legacy of the New Order regime with the current understanding of democracy, this paper attempts to comprehend and analyze how deeply the common sense of the New Order regime has been rooted in the lives of Indonesian people. The legacy of the New Order regime has been rooted in the personal lives of individuals because the regime implemented its values in the realm of family structures and education systems. To help liberate the minds and souls of Indonesians and be truly democratic, society must be able to become autonomous. A critical pedagogical approach will help to lay bare the common sense and values that have been instilled by the regime so that people can live autonomously and side by side. Since democracy in Indonesia tends to favor the majority, this study proposes a critical pedagogical approach at every level of society to achieve a power-sharing arrangement by acknowledging and creating a space to challenge the domination.

Keywords: democracy, majoritarian democracy, autonomy

ABSTRAK

Transisi menuju demokrasi di Indonesia entah bagaimana menghasilkan demokrasi mayoritas. Dengan mengaitkan warisan rezim Orde Baru dengan pemahaman demokrasi saat ini, tulisan ini mencoba memahami dan menganalisis seberapa dalam akal sehat rezim Orde Baru telah mengakar dalam kehidupan masyarakat Indonesia. Warisan rezim Orde Baru telah mengakar dalam kehidupan pribadi individu karena rezim tersebut menerapkan nilai-nilainya dalam ranah struktur keluarga dan sistem pendidikan. Untuk membantu memerdekakan pikiran dan jiwa masyarakat Indonesia dan benar-benar demokratis, masyarakat harus mampu menjadi otonom. Pendekatan pedagogis kritis akan membantu mengungkap akal sehat dan nilai-nilai yang telah ditanamkan oleh rezim sehingga masyarakat dapat hidup mandiri dan berdampingan. Karena demokrasi di Indonesia cenderung berpihak pada mayoritas, studi ini mengusulkan pendekatan pedagogis kritis di setiap lapisan masyarakat untuk mencapai pengaturan pembagian kekuasaan dengan mengakui dan menciptakan ruang untuk menentang dominasi.

Kata kunci : demokrasi, demokrasi mayoritas, otonomi

Introduction

Democracy, which should be able to make society and the state more autonomous and liberal, has instead been used as a tool to support the majority and domination of the rulers. Globally speaking, the journey of democracy has experienced a setback. Various social phenomena encourage the decline of democracy. With this setback, is democracy no longer able to protect the social structure in society? India is one of the countries that is currently formulating the Citizenship Amendment Law (CAA) to perpetuate majority rule. CAA is a law that employs religion as the basis for obtaining citizenship.¹ This ensures the dominance of Hindus and will reproduce discriminatory attitudes in India against minority groups, especially Muslim groups.

Another example of the global democratic decline can be seen in Hungary. Viktor Orban's regime controls most of the media, abuses the rights of women and environmental activists, and spreads homophobia and xenophobia openly through pro-government media.² In other words, the state has limited and oppressed minority groups in India and Hungary, thus worsening their decline. The state is no longer present to guarantee the people's right to life, but this effort shows that what the state is doing is highly contrary to democratic values. India and Hungary are just two examples of the global decline of democracy. In 2019, The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) recorded a global democracy score of 5.44 (on a scale of 0-10) which was the worst since 2006. The EIU noted that one of the factors behind democracy's global decline can be identified as the loss of public trust in government.³

Democracy in Indonesia today is inseparable from its past. After the collapse of the New Order regime, Indonesia has had room to apply its identity, but the hollowness of this authoritarian power that has ruled for 32 years must be re-examined. This paper will discuss how education, civil society and media have influenced democratization and how these elements can play a major role as catalysts for democracy.⁴ A study by the Pew Research Center entitled "Globally, Broad Support For Representative and Direct Democracy", found that 70% of Indonesians are satisfied with democracy.⁵ However, when asked about a government equipped with military power, a surprising 68% of Indonesians stated that they would support a system of government in which the military forms the government.⁶ Despite the diversity of race, ethnicity, religion, and social class in Indonesia, we must admit that the legacy of the Suharto regime still underpins and is strongly attached to people's lives and politics in Indonesia.

Even though Indonesia has improved considerably after the fall of the New Order regime, many Indonesians unconsciously still cling to its narrative, and its authoritarian legacy is still alive. This issue must be resolved immediately to enable the Indonesian people to live up to the principles of democracy, all the way down to its roots. The legacy of the New Order regime forced the Indonesian people to understand social problems collectively in the sense of a communal identity. This does not mean that Indonesians do not consider themselves Indonesians, but that they still adhere to a strong communal identity, so that becoming part of the Indonesian nation is determined by the dominant

¹ Bilal Kuchay, "What You Should Know about India's 'anti-Muslim' Citizenship Law," *Aljazeera*, December 16, 2019, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/12/india-anti-muslim-citizenship-bill-191209095557419.html>.

² Kenneth Roth, "Hungary's Democracy Crisis Demands a European Response," *Hospodarske Noviny*, September 26, 2019, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/09/26/hungarys-democracy-crisis-demands-european-response>.

³ The Economist Intelligence Unit, "Democracy Index 2019: A Year Of Democratic Setbacks And Popular Protest," 2020, <http://www.eiu.com/Handlers/WhitepaperHandler.ashx?fi=Democracy-Index-2019.pdf&mode=wp&campaignid=democracyindex2019>.

⁴ Hans Antlöv, Derick W. Brinkerhoff, and Elke Rapp, "Civil Society Capacity Building for Democratic Reform: Experience and Lessons from Indonesia," *Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations* 21, no. 3 (2010): 417–39; Anggia Valerisha, "Dampak Praktik Konglomerasi Media Terhadap Pencapaian Konsolidasi Demokrasi di Indonesia," *Jurnal Ilmiah Hubungan Internasional* 12, no. 1 (2017), p.15–32.

⁵ Pew Research Institute, "Globally, Broad Support For Representative and Direct Democracy," October 16, 2017, <http://www.pewglobal.org/2017/10/16/democracy-widely-supported-little-backing-for-rule-by-strong-leader-or-military/>.

⁶ *Ibid.*

group. This attitude greatly influences the social and political attitudes of the people as citizens.⁷ It is important for the Indonesian people to question the moral framework that has been instilled by the New Order regime because it determines identity, affects knowledge, and limits individuals to become autonomous individuals, either formally or informally.

Indonesia has embraced democracy for more than a decade and it looks as if this democratic system will continue to exist. However, according to the Economist Intelligence Unit, Indonesia showed the biggest decline in democracy with a score of 6.39 out of 10 since 2008.⁸ Indonesia moved from the category of flawed democracy to hybrid democracy in this index. This trend is also supported by data provided by Freedom House in its world survey – examining democracy on the decline in many countries, although the decline in democracy in Indonesia is not directly linked to this global trend: there are factors specific to the context of the decline in democracy in Indonesia.⁹ These data show that there is something decidedly wrong with Indonesian democracy.

During the second term of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), which began in 2009, restrictions on democratic rights and freedoms continued to be allowed.¹⁰ At the end of President SBY's tenure, reports from organizations such as Human Rights Watch indicated that the government enacted the Law concerning Mass Organizations or Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), which did not provide details on the formal approval or denial application process that would allow NGOs to operate.¹¹ This is one concrete example of the decline of democracy in Indonesia. Another case example that illustrates the New Order regime is still alive is reflected in the abnormal condition of the relationship between the state and its people. Presidential Decree No.1 / PNPS / 1965 Article 156a of the Criminal Code (commonly referred to as the Blasphemy Law) is an example of violations of and the actual decline in religious freedom in Indonesia.¹² During Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's presidency, 106 people were imprisoned based on blasphemy charges via social media.¹³ The government has issued regulations that limit the rights of Indonesian citizens to organize and to practice their beliefs. These examples depict that there is an agitation in the government system of small or collective groups and freedom of expressions, to which the Indonesian people have to be critically aware of it in order to pursue their personal well-being as members of the society. The question that arises in this context is - can the Indonesian people's understanding of democracy be categorized as liberal?

Restrictions on democratic rights and freedoms did not only occur in the era of President SBY, but are still ongoing in the current era of Joko “Jokowi” Widodo's administration.¹⁴ An interesting example is to see how President Jokowi in managing the involvement Indonesian military in public sector. Since the beginning of Jokowi's administration in 2014, he has given nonmilitary domains to

⁷ Jeremy Menchik, “Nasionalisme Ketuhanan dan Demokrasi Beragama di Indonesia,” in *Sisi Gelap Demokras: Kekerasan Masyarakat Madani di Indonesia* (Jakarta: Pusat Studi Agama dan Demokrasi Yayasan Paramadina (PUSAD), 2015), 93–102.

⁸ The Economist Intelligence Unit, “Democracy Index 2018: Me Too?,” Political Participation, Protest and Democracy (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2019), http://www.eiu.com/Handlers/WhitepaperHandler.ashx?fi=Democracy_Index_2018.pdf&mode=wp&campaignid=Democracy2018.

⁹ Freedom House, “Freedom in the World 2018,” January 13, 2018, <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2018>.

¹⁰ Edward Aspinall, “Twenty Years of Indonesian Democracy—How Many More?,” *New Mandala*, May 23, 2018, <https://www.newmandala.org/20-years-reformasi/>.

¹¹ Human Rights Watch, “Indonesia: Amend Law on Mass Organizations,” Human Rights Watch, July 17, 2013, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/07/17/indonesia-amend-law-mass-organizations>.

¹² Amnesty International, “Prosecuting Beliefs,” Indonesia's Blasphemy Laws (United Kingdom: Amnesty International, November 2014), https://www.amnestyusa.org/files/_index-_asa_210182014.pdf.

¹³ Handoko Nikodemus, “106 orang dipenjara akibat penodaan agama di masa SBY,” *Rappler*, November 21, 2014, <http://www.rappler.com/world/regions/asia-pacific/indonesia/75678-106-orang-dipenjara-akibat-penodaan-agama-di-masa-sby>.

¹⁴ Aspinall, “Twenty Years of Indonesian Democracy—How Many More?”

Indonesian military and intelligence services.¹⁵ The decline of Indonesia's democratic has been accelerated significantly under President Jokowi, associated with the continued legitimation of majority against marginalized or minority groups.¹⁶ For instance, a woman received a prison sentence for filing a complaint against the Muslim call to prayer due to the mosque's *toa* (sound system) being too loud.¹⁷ Apart from religious sentiments, the majority group in Indonesia also criticizes minority sexual orientation groups, such as the LGBT group. According to *The Jakarta Post*, at least 300 people were arrested on suspicion of LGBT practices, and one Indonesian city is also planning to fine LGBT behavior in the neighborhood for disturbing public order.¹⁸

Laws in Indonesia are widely used to protect the state and the majority group, to oppress minority groups, and indirectly to deprive people of their rights to live, and intolerance in Indonesia continues to increase. Of all the examples illustrating this case, the specific language and terminology of the New Order regime is still used by the people of Indonesia. This language is typified by defending violent ways and deliberately dissolving society with sensitive issues that trigger an emotional response. Resistance to accepting diversity and defending the legacy of the New Order regime, such as intolerance, can lead to corrupt behavior that affects politics. Indonesian democracy has its dark side, but the Indonesian people rarely or never talk about the evils or "ulcers" of the Indonesian nation in democracy. There is a tendency to blame other scapegoats, such as foreign influences, etc while avoiding critically examining and reflecting on historical issues inherent in people's personal lives, and there is limited room to discuss the meaning of reforms that affect our socio-political and cultural life, which is a very personal matter.

Looking at the development of democracy in Indonesia, it seems that the moral framework of the New Order regime, such as silencing with fear, has left a common and lasting impression on Indonesian democratic culture. So what are the historical legacies of the New Order regime that have shaped democracy in Indonesia? This study considers it important to explore the common sense and culture formed by the regime, so that the journey of democracy in Indonesia is not always an exclusive privilege for the majority group. The way in which the New Order regime utilized and shaped the culture and common sense of the people will be discussed in more detail in the next sub-chapter.

Analysis

a. Conception of Common Sense and Democracy in Indonesia

The construction of the identity and characteristics of the Indonesian nation actually took place long before the state itself was formed. Many studies on the organic structure of Indonesian society have been carried out. Since this paper aims to focus on Indonesians' perceptions of democracy, it is important to explore the most basic and organic concept of Indonesian cultural values, which will be referred to as common sense. The latter, according to Antonio Gramsci, can be defined as a conception of the world that is accepted without critical thinking.¹⁹ In this sense, the conception of

¹⁵ Evan A. Laksmana, "Civil-Military Relations under Jokowi: Between Military Corporate Interests and Presidential Handholding," *National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR)* 14, no. No. 14 (October 2019): 63–71; Greg Fealy, "Jokowi in the Covid-19 Era: Repressive Pluralism, Dynasticism and the Overbearing State," *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies* 56, no. 3 (September 1, 2020): 301–23, <https://doi.org/10.1080/00074918.2020.1846482>.

¹⁶ Thomas Power, "Jokowi's Authoritarian Turn and Indonesia's Democratic Decline," *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies* 54, no. 3 (December 11, 2018): 307–38, <https://doi.org/10.1080/00074918.2018.1549918>.

¹⁷ BBC, "Dipertanyakan, Vonis 18 Bulan Penjara Bagi Meiliana Yang Keluhkan Volume Azan," August 23, 2018, sec. Indonesia, <https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/indonesia-45271624>.

¹⁸ Kiki Siregar, "'Moral Panic' Targets Indonesia's LGBT Community," *The Jakarta Post*, November 18, 2018, <https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2018/11/18/moral-panic-targets-indonesias-lgbt-community.html>.

¹⁹ Kate Crehan, *Gramsci's Common Sense: Inequality and Its Narratives* (Duke University Press, 2016), <http://gen.lib.rus.ec/book/index.php?md5=074e02d8e18b38fc4632bf5a54717c97>.

common sense is helping us to understand how ideas that were implemented by the New Order regime were reinforced the social structure in a lasting manner.²⁰ Previous research, such as that conducted by Colum Graham, has found that Indonesians have an organic relationship with values of harmony, paternalism, and reciprocity, values that many Indonesians still embrace whole-heartedly today.²¹ Derived from Graham's research, it can be emphasized that the organic cultures of Indonesian has had been used by the New Order regime and it must be analyzed in terms of political and historical contexts, because people's behavior towards knowledge production is inseparable from their own culture.

In order to constitute the conception in legitimate ways, the Indonesian government as the hegemonic actor is commonly using Gramsci's dimension of common sense to preserve the dominant social order and it becomes persuasive by using everyday language, thus this legitimacy becomes common sense within the population.²² One of the efforts of the New Order regime to maintain its grip on power was to form a state apparatus to control society with the long shadow of the regime thrown on every layer.²³ As a result, the state was constantly trying to impose a certain common sense and identity among citizens. The problem, as Graham points out, lies not only in the motives and goals of the regime, but also in the process by which the regime's ideology is produced and implemented. As such, this research will highlight the historical legacy and implications of the New Order regime framework that influenced contemporary Indonesian society's understanding of democracy.

For thirty-two years, Indonesians have lived in the shadow of fear and censorship, book bans and the imprisonment of progressives and groups considered enemies of the state. Similar to the origins of Indonesian cultural values mentioned above, Suharto's right-hand man, Ali Moertopo, suggested controlling society by implementing the Indonesian education system by combining the regime's ideology with the characteristics and values of the Indonesian nation. This made it possible to indoctrinate citizens with the Pancasila version of the New Order regime.²⁴ The regime used ideology for the purpose of mass propagation, thus giving birth to another definition of Pancasila and applying it to the education system throughout Indonesia in accordance with the ideas of the New Order.²⁵ In addition, the New Order regime saw an opportunity by making itself responsible for maintaining national culture during its reign. Therefore, the regime homogenized all cultures and ethnicities in an effort to allow the exercise of power over the essentially diverse Indonesian nation.

Democracy should be able to defend the rights of individuals across diverse nationalities. This paper seeks to understand liberal democracy itself at the most basic level. Furthermore, this paper will highlight how liberal democracy differs from illiberal democracy. Since the end of the Cold War, democracy has been adapted by almost all newly independent countries. Seeing the definition of liberal democracy according to John Rawls which optimistically creates the core principles of liberal democracy is to oppose the dominant pragmatic approach or in the sense of "justice as justice." The reason Rawls lays out the principles of liberal democracy is so that the concepts of democracy and individual autonomy cannot be separated.²⁶ Perhaps individual autonomy itself can even come from multidimensionality, accommodate the diversity of autonomous individuals in order to prevent them from being just majoritarianism, but can allow for power sharing.

²⁰ T. J. Jackson Lears, "The Concept of Cultural Hegemony: Problems and Possibilities," *The American Historical Review* 90, no. 3 (1985): 567–93, <https://doi.org/10.2307/1860957>.

²¹ Colum Graham, "Illiberal Democracy in Indonesia: The Ideology of the Family State," *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies* 52, no. 3 (September 1, 2016): 411–14, <https://doi.org/10.1080/00074918.2016.1283749>.

²² Lears, "The Concept of Cultural Hegemony."

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ Ali Moertopo, Center for Strategic and International Studies, and Yayasan Proklamasi, *National Development Strategy*, 1st ed. (Jakarta: Proklamasi Foundation, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1981).

²⁵ Graham, "Illiberal Democracy in Indonesia: The Ideology of the Family State."

²⁶ Sanford Lakoff, "Autonomy and Liberal Democracy," *The Review of Politics* 52, no. 3 (1990): 378–96.

Thus, Rawls argues that society needs to accept just and beneficial principles and must stabilize these in the right way despite the potential for social change. The main point of the principles that he emphasizes is the idea of a democratic society and independent free citizens who recognize the basic principles of administering political government fairly.²⁷ In other words, it is a system built on promoting values and morals over individual justice, freedom and righteousness. Democracy is liberal when it is able to protect individual freedom. However, basically people must have reason and be able to accept plurality, to create a just society.

Democratization has progressed since the end of the Cold War. The newly independent countries after the Cold War immediately transitioned to democracy. Fareed Zakaria stressed that today's world does not need more democracy but rather less.²⁸ Zakaria argues that the current form of government is quite democratic at a substantial level, such as elections, while at an equally substantial level, namely the right to life, it is not liberal.²⁹ What is happening today, according to Zakaria, is that the rise of democracy does not coincide with the increase of liberals.³⁰ Furthermore, the idea of democracy is slowly disappearing in democratic countries, leading to an imbalance in the accumulation of power and the use of power, both by the government and civil society.

In the context of Indonesia, violations of democracy have occurred because the majority group makes decisions on behalf of all groups and in the name of harmony, but in fact only for the interests of the majority group. The danger of a democracy that is not balanced with liberals is that people's rights to life are deprived, both materially and non-materially. Therefore, to oppose majoritarianism, awareness of autonomy and dignity as well as economic, civil, and religious freedoms must be emphasized to and instilled in each individual.³¹ To dig deeper, it is important to question the ties between contemporary democracy in Indonesia and the past or history that has shaped the nation's characteristics. Therefore, the next sub-chapter will go into this matter.

b. The Common Sense of the New Order and Today's Indonesian Democracy

Many studies on Indonesia discuss the main effort to encapsulate all local Indonesian cultures in one national culture based on the values of the state philosophy Pancasila. The New Order regime has transformed Pancasila, turning it into a tool that can shape Indonesian identity by using narratives of *gotong royong* (mutual cooperation based on solidarity) and *musyawarah* (deliberation) to legitimize its actions. The national culture formed by the New Order regime was centered on Javanese culture and greatly influenced the government bureaucratic system.³² Aspinall describes how the concept of Javanization that the state used as a tool to maintain harmony, respect the decisions of the majority, and maintain the political order is bound to create tension in society.³³ Other findings also explain how Javanese culture which was firmly indoctrinated by the New Order regime – in the shape of mutual cooperation and deliberation – was used daily in the realm of family and school.³⁴ The narrative of this deliberation states that there must be a leader to take decisions in an action to maintain

²⁷ John Rawls, "The Law of Peoples," *Critical Inquiry* 20, no. 1 (1993): 36–68.

²⁸ Fareed Zakaria, *The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad* (Revised Edition), Revised Edition (WW Norton & Company, 2007), <http://gen.lib.rus.ec/book/index.php?md5=f74ecd7c9039877dadf030e37bf110d2>.

²⁹ Fareed Zakaria, "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy," *Foreign Affairs* 76, no. 6 (1997): 22–43, <https://doi.org/10.2307/20048274>.

³⁰ Christopher Hobson, "Liberal Democracy and beyond: Extending the Sequencing Debate," *International Political Science Review / Revue Internationale de Science Politique* 33, no. 4 (2012): 441–54.

³¹ Zakaria, "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy."

³² William H. Frederick and Robert L. Worden, *Indonesia: A Country Study*, 6th ed. (Library of Congress, 2011).

³³ Edward Aspinall, Marcus Mietzner, and Dirk Tomsa, *The Yudhoyono Presidency: Indonesia's Decade of Stability and Stagnation*, Indonesia Update Series (Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2015), <http://gen.lib.rus.ec/book/index.php?md5=00e7f6ee2a9d6e17fbd0a4c5d0765c22>.

³⁴ David Bourchier, *Illiberal Democracy in Indonesia: The Ideology of the Family State* (Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY: Routledge, 2015., 2015), <https://search.library.wisc.edu/catalog/9910218088402121>.

harmony, and the stability of the nation must be protected by mutual cooperation between communities, and these principles must be implemented in every stratum of society. This principle and sense of kinship were perfected by Suharto as a national father figure known as *Bapak Bangsa* (Father of the Nation). The New Order regime used this ideology to unify Indonesia's diverse identities, and Suharto himself stated that:

*"I was reminded that a country that ignores its cultural heritage will lose its identity. A country without its identity will be weak, and in the end, a weak country will deteriorate from inside and outside... Only a country with its own identity can become a nation with self-confidence...[and] this is self-confidence, the ability to be independent and creative which is the key to success in development."*³⁵

The various ideas of the regime are described as guarantees of harmony and are mechanisms aimed at maintaining stability in society and the state. Thus, through everyday life experiences, the regime instills these values in the daily life of Indonesian people at the most basic levels, namely the family and school. Thought processes and the meaning of life are shaped through the regime's construction of knowledge. The philosophy and culture of deliberation and mutual cooperation are functionally a tool of the regime's oppression to shape the knowledge structure or common sense of the Indonesian people, which results in a silent and fearful society.

Why is individual autonomy needed in a democracy? And what kind of autonomy is needed? As Gramsci writes in *Prison Notebooks*, common sense does not form suddenly, but is produced through the intervention of masculine elements, history, and revolutionary activity, which create new cultures or social relations.³⁶ What has been formed by the regime under the pretext of values that build a national culture, has produced a majoritarian democracy in Indonesia. Instead of emphasizing representation and making individual rights central, the common sense born of the New Order regime served to promote communal interests. Case examples reflecting this specific focus on communal and majority interests have been mentioned in the Introduction section.

In an effort to escape the regime's shadow, this paper focuses on how the regime produced, conveyed, and perpetuated its ideology. Exploring this mechanism further is very important, because the ideological project of the New Order regime has not only shaped Indonesian national culture, but also the personal values of its people. One of Suharto's right-hand men, Ali Moertopo, emphasized the need for the New Order regime to play an educational role and encouraged the media to highlight the positive attributes of the regime's ideology at that time. Not only that, but the regime also created a Supervisory Agency for the Implementation of Guidelines for the Realization and Implementation of Pancasila, or P4 for short, which structured educational curricula from the elementary level to universities and the New Order regime used it to instill ideology and form common sense that suited their interests.³⁷

By establishing the P4 Supervisory Body, the regime indirectly formed an agreement or consent within the community. As Gramsci said, hegemonic culture requires organization, inner discipline, and a high awareness of one's historical reality.³⁸ Thus, based on this requirement established by Gramsci, Bourchier revealed that the indoctrination by the New Order regime was extraordinary, because not only did it create a new ideology, it was also highly integrated with existing

³⁵ G. Dwipayana and Ramadhan KH, *Suharto: My Thoughts, Words and Deeds: An Autobiography* (Jakarta: Citra Lamtoro Gung Persada, 1991).

³⁶ William Q. Boelhower, "Antonio Gramsci's Sociology of Literature," *Contemporary Literature* 22, no. 4 (1981): 574–99, <https://doi.org/10.2307/1207884>.

³⁷ Moertopo, Center for Strategic and International Studies, and Yayasan Proklamasi, *National Development Strategy*.

³⁸ Boelhower, "Antonio Gramsci's Sociology of Literature."

organic conceptions in society.³⁹ The ideology of this regime deeply instills a great appreciation for harmony and balance in every individual.⁴⁰

The New Order was also quite effective in creating collective awareness by initiating the P4 Supervisory Body in the struggle to form a new common sense. The use of education as a means to indoctrinate citizens shows that hegemonic actors, through manipulation of historical narratives, are able to form the collective consciousness of people with diverse backgrounds. As the values propagated by the New Order were a high success of the regime, the key themes of these values were hierarchy, order, leadership and the family.⁴¹ According to Gramsci, teachers in schools are the main legitimate agents in forming collective consciousness, so the common sense instilled by the regime determining the way Indonesians think is considered equally valid.⁴² This can happen due to the lack of autonomy or critical thinking skills of the community.

Another historical legacy that was used to strengthen the New Order regime consisted of the purge of another ideology from Indonesia. To instill the regime's version of Pancasila into the minds of the Indonesian people, the spread of the ideology of the New Order regime by manipulating history played an important role in the knowledge of Indonesian history. Under the New Order regime, the mass killings of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) also played a major role in strengthening the regime's power.⁴³ The genocide carried out by the New Order regime involved killing at least 500,000 people who were suspected of being communists and were systematically killed by the regime. The act of killing by the regime was made taboo, so people had to live as if the murdering had never happened and in the future, it was considered normal because it had been committed for the sake of maintaining national harmony. This purge of another ideology shows that the genocide by the New Order regime played an important role in securing the regime's power and in freely indoctrinating the Indonesian people.⁴⁴

In addition, to make people understand the genocide committed against the PKI, the regime created anti-PKI propaganda: spreading the idea of the PKI as a ghost, which characterized communists as a threat to the people. Using the medium of film as a propaganda tool, the regime released a movie entitled *The Treachery of G30S/PKI* (1984). Everyone, regardless of age, ethnicity or gender, was directed to watch this propaganda docudrama.⁴⁵ Thus, the Indonesian people were immersed in the regime's propaganda for nearly thirty-two years, blinded by the regime and forced to serve the regime's interests. The regime's propaganda approach to dealing with political opposition, such as the Communists, is an indicator of how successful the regime has been in manipulating the Indonesian people by creating a new kind of common sense.

c. Understanding Democracy in Contemporary Indonesia

During the second term of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, the historical legacy of achieving harmony in politics was based on the principle of prioritizing the majority group. Edward Aspinall observed that Yudhoyono's democratic principles were based on a majority approach, treated as essential to maintaining stability, harmony and prosperity.⁴⁶ Many religious minority groups, for

³⁹ Bourchier, *Illiberal Democracy in Indonesia: The Ideology of the Family State*.

⁴⁰ Joseph A. Buttigieg, "Gramsci on Civil Society," *Boundary 2* 22, no. 3 (1995): 1–32, <https://doi.org/10.2307/303721>.

⁴¹ Bourchier, *Illiberal Democracy in Indonesia: The Ideology of the Family State*.

⁴² Buttigieg, "Gramsci on Civil Society."

⁴³ Robert Cribb, "Unresolved Problems in the Indonesian Killings of 1965-1966," *University of California Press* 42, no. No. 4 (August 2002): 550–63, <https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2002.42.4.550>.

⁴⁴ Adrian Vickers, "Where Are the Bodies: The Haunting of Indonesia," *University of California Press on Behalf of the National Council on Public History* 32, no. No. 1 (2010): 45–58, <https://doi.org/10.1525/tph.2010.32.1.45>.

⁴⁵ Remotivi, "Reviewing Propaganda in the Betrayal of the G30S/PKI," Remotivi, accessed January 20, 2019, <http://www.remotivi.or.id/kupas/418/Menilik-Ulang-Propaganda-dalam-Pengkhargaan-G30S/PKI>.

⁴⁶ Aspinall, Mietzner, and Tomsa, *The Yudhoyono Presidency*.

example, have experienced repeated and ongoing attacks, such as the Ahmadiyya, Shia, Christian and Chinese descent groups.⁴⁷ This can be seen through the lens of Gramsci's common sense conception, resulting in the creation of a fatalistic way of thinking in civil society through the tragedy of oppression that has often been repeated in Indonesia over the years. By highlighting political action (which is culturally conditioned) and collective consciousness, it has overtaken individual thinking and in the end, society only acts when actors from the majority group are threatened by other parties. Therefore, Laksana argues that Indonesians understand democracy only as a tool to exert majoritarian power. In addition, collective consciousness prevents people from questioning the status quo or political order.⁴⁸

In 2013, the Yudhoyono administration introduced a new curriculum. According to Bourchier, during Yudhoyono's presidency, the curriculum only prioritized religious and moral education, science, social studies, and English.⁴⁹ However, the new curriculum carefully kept subjects such as human rights, power, politics and globalization at arm's length, as emphasizing the value of nationalism was considered most important for the state:

- Pancasila as the basis of the state and the nation's worldview;
- The 1945 Constitution;
- Being united in diversity;
- The Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia.⁵⁰

This can limit the ability of individual autonomy, because the basic and urgently needed knowledge to guarantee the rights of citizens has never been maintained by the state. The inability of individuals to be autonomous or rational will have an impact on individual rights and freedoms, so that if there is oppression in a group it will be understood, or even worse give rise to restrictions, in any form, which is itself a natural strategy in Indonesia that is adopted to maintain public harmony. So why does this problem continue to occur in Indonesia? A study of Indonesian nationalism illustrates that nationalism in Indonesia was built in stages and was initially encouraged by the New Order regime. Indonesian law serves as tangible evidence: Law no. 20/2003 / V Article 12 No. 1 concerning Education in Indonesia emphasizes that every student should obtain an education based on their religion.⁵¹ Given that many Indonesians are believers, this law becomes a stumbling block for them to acquire an education because those who happen to have a religion/belief that is not recognized by the state must learn other beliefs that are (Islam, Christianity, Hinduism, Buddhism or Confucianism) or end up without any education at all.

Why is it so difficult for Indonesians to realize or escape the ties of majoritarian democracy? Individual minds who have been imprisoned by the state through education have limited the people socio-political understandings, thus maintaining the historical legacy left by the New Order regime. This is deliberately maintained by the hegemonic actor, namely the state, to have the people fall under the control of the state by having them adhere to a distorted historical narrative. This answers why many people are reluctant to criticize the government. Essentially, people are under the impression that the state has the best interest at heart in carrying out the nation's and the people's goals, this leads to an uncritical behavior towards the state. The neglect of critical behavior of individuals has led to a setback of democracy in Indonesia. It can be seen from the recent past years of Jokowi's behavior in managing the country. For instance, in the name of discipline on controlling the Covid-19 pandemic,

⁴⁷ Andreas Harsono, "Undoing Yudhoyono's Sectarian Legacy," New Mandala (blog), May 13, 2014, <https://www.newmandala.org/undoing-yudhoyonos-sectarian-legacy/>.

⁴⁸ Ben Kristian Citto Laksana, "An Indonesian Democracy: Limits of a Majoritarian Democracy," *Jurnal Ilmiah Hubungan Internasional* 12, no. 2 (2016): 133–42, <https://doi.org/10.26593/jihi.v12i2.2649.133-142>.

⁴⁹ Bourchier, *Illiberal Democracy in Indonesia: The Ideology of the Family State*.p. 253

⁵⁰ Bourchier.

⁵¹ "Law of the Republic of Indonesia Number 2003 concerning the National Education System," 2003, www.komisiinformation.go.id%2Fregulation%2Fdownload%2Fid%2F101&usg=AOvVaw0cRIo7f-Pvu_O-H4L-ez2H.

Jokowi has repeatedly linked the involvement of the military to the need of public.⁵² As a result, it shows that the recent role expansion of Indonesian military as a discourse of the comeback of the Indonesian military in politics,⁵³ although the political ambitions remain in question.

Therefore, it is highly crucial to cultivate a critical mind and in order to pursue it everyone must have access to literacy. To become an autonomous individual, people must have critical and intelligent thoughts and ideas. According to Gramsci, hegemonic actors tend to make consent by creating and spreading common sense. These practices are called *forma mentis* (mindset or set of attitudes), and transmute the social order in certain ways.⁵⁴ Indonesians today are still afraid of *the other* being part of society, such as adherents of leftist ideology. Censorship and banning of books containing an interpretation of leftist ideology by the government is a common phenomenon in society – in other words, it makes perfect sense.

In a democratic country, such as Indonesia, it is necessary not only to be critical of others, but also of oneself.⁵⁵ However, how can individuals be self-critical if access to books is prohibited? In Indonesia, books are prohibited if they are considered to have the potential to violate public order, such as leftist ideology books.⁵⁶ The ban on books in Indonesia is considered legal and perfectly normal. The Supreme Court agreed to ban books based on the decree stipulated in D19/1/JA/03/2007 concerning the prohibition of books labeled as violating public order or contrary to the state.⁵⁷ As explained in the previous section, the fear of others in Indonesia has been widespread since the New Order regime. In this sense, the historical legacy of the fear of others and the consent created in society, indirectly, has shaped the nature of understanding without questioning. Through this common sense, the state can finally control groups in the name of national harmony, so that the groups controlled by the state will protect the political order in accordance with the interests of the state.

d. Democratic Values

Building a new sense of individuality and control over one's own destiny in Indonesia may be more complex than it seems. As noted in the previous section, there are complex issues to consider when it comes to identity and citizenship. It is important to note that the New Order regime used civil society as one of their propaganda tools to exert power.⁵⁸ The implementation of P4, cultural values such as deliberation (*musyawarah*) and mutual cooperation (*gotong royong*) has placed limitations on the democratization process in Indonesia, so that democracy serves only to support the majority group. Therefore, Irving argues that giving values to the idea of citizenship serves as a starting point for achieving autonomy, making it possible to guide individuals or groups with diverse identities to find a way of political coexistence – power sharing.⁵⁹

Cultural values and common sense shaped by the regime resulted in human rights and individual freedoms in Indonesia being limited. People do not have personal priorities because being in this communal society, we are made to struggle and contribute to society if we want to be accepted as part of society. This communal approach has marginalized minority voices. Also, democracy in Indonesia and the political process are basically only in the interests of the majority. If this happens

⁵² Fealy, “Jokowi in the Covid-19 Era.”

⁵³ Jun Honna, “Military Politics in Pandemic Indonesia,” *The Asia-Pacific Journal* 18, no. 15 (August 1, 2020): 1–9.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵ Robert Alan Dahl, *On Democracy* (New Haven, Conn. [ua]: Yale Univ. Press, 1998).

⁵⁶ RNB Aji, Artono, and C. Liana, “Responding Book Banning in Indonesia,” *Journal of Physics: Conference Series*, 2018, 1–5, <https://doi.org/10.1088/1742-6596/953/1/012183>.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

⁵⁸ Kylie Smith, “Gramsci at the Margins: Subjectivity and Subalternity in a Theory of Hegemony,” *International Gramsci Journal*, no. No. 2 (April 2010): 39–50.

⁵⁹ Helen Irving, “Citizenship, Statehood, and Allegiance” in *Managing Diversity*, ed. Nicholas Brown and Linda Cardinal, *Practices of Citizenship* (University of Ottawa Press, 2007), 37–68, <https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt1ckpcm2.5>.

often, then the Indonesian society will never lead to power sharing, but will always be pragmatic and only intended for the majority.

Although relatively few individuals and groups seek to work towards liberalization,⁶⁰ then what can we do about the prospects of democracy in Indonesia today? The inadequate democratization process and lack of liberalization in society will make democracy in Indonesia always lead to democracy for the majority. As previously written, the most important requirement at this point in time is to cultivate people's critical minds, and even though people are still haunted by the ideology of the New Order regime, there remains a hopeful future in store for Indonesia.

We must examine how the regime of the New Order instilled its ideology in society through kinship, paternalism, emphasis on harmony and hierarchy.⁶¹ Also, given the fact that Indonesian society is divided into several classes (whether based on ethnic, tribal, economic or religious backgrounds), it is necessary to expose the urgency of the ability of autonomy for the people. To enable them to be autonomous, this study considers the idea of a pedagogical approach by Morera to be significant.⁶² Putting relationships between individuals in an intellectual way (which means that individuals must have the ability to think critically about themselves), they can be extended critically to their surroundings, as well as in a broader scope, be critical of the history that has shaped us in our present state and how we relate to global conditions.

However, this will simply amount to nothing, because we need mass education reform and the creation of new spaces or other alternatives that allow society to be active and critical. However, this might be able to be achieved on individuals level. Based on the findings, this study proposes an alternative pedagogical approach by actively engaging in critical education and fostering inter-community relations based on the ideas of Paulo Freire. To combat the hegemonic culture and recover from the erroneous influence of historical narratives in Indonesia, Freire emphasized that to liberate the oppressed minds, basically intellectuals must have hope and dream in society because these intellectuals will be the driving force.⁶³ To begin with, intellectuals or scholars can start from addressing or acknowledging the status quo.⁶⁴ This might not lead to a social transform, but it will help to enlighten the oppressed mind of individuals in the society. It is safe to be said that by acknowledging the status quo, the Indonesians basically have created a space for a resistance towards the hegemony actor. In addition, this space will be a space where intellectuals and the people discovering the transformation space, to which they have to work on in order to overcome the domination.⁶⁵

Conclusion

The two components in this paper, the legacy of the New Order history and the current state of democracy in Indonesia, are related to one another. Unconsciously, the Indonesian people still live under the shadow of the New Order regime: mutual cooperation, deliberation, kinship, paternalism and hierarchy, which makes Indonesian people still yearn for a political leader or Father of the Nation who guides them in living a harmonious state life. These values that are applied on a daily basis in family

⁶⁰ Adam Schwarz, *A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia's Search for Stability*, 2nd ed. (Boulder, Colo. [ua]: Westview Press, 2000).

⁶¹ Graham, "Illiberal Democracy in Indonesia: The Ideology of the Family State."

⁶² Esteve Morera, "Gramsci and Democracy," *Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue Canadienne de Science Politique* 23, no. 1 (1990): 23–37.

⁶³ Paulo Freire, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* (Bloomsbury Academic, 2014), <http://gen.lib.rus.ec/book/index.php?md5=12f84ad5420f80bfe8e80cd7763ffd41>.

⁶⁴ Paulo Freire and Ira Shor, *A Pedagogy for Liberation: Dialogues on Transforming Education* (Macmillan Education LTD, 1987).

⁶⁵ Ibid.

and school life leave the impression that Indonesian society has put aside individual interests and rights.

Moreover, contemporary relics of the New Order are still alive. These values linger on in the political system, personal life, and the education system. Understanding historical heritage as an axiom is far from easy because it is not only about the attitudes expressed, but it also deals with what is embedded in the identity of the Indonesian people, their personal perspective and sense of citizenship. To deconstruct what the regime has shaped, as previously observed, an alternative or new space is needed to train comprehensive critical thinking in order to become autonomous. The narratives of mutual cooperation and harmony have supported the community to maintain public order, yet resulting in individual rights being sidelined. Therefore, it is necessary for Indonesians to reflect about their state of being after twenty-four years of independence from the New Order regime, creating a space for addressing and discussing the domination. Because the behaviors of current government present several risks and the government has been the key promoter of maintaining the harmony of majoritarian democracy.

After all, it shows the need for change to instill a social attitude that is conducive to critical thinking and acceptance of plurality in Indonesia. What should be noted is that people not only need critical thinking but they must also be active agents in taking actions aimed specifically at changing the hegemonic culture.⁶⁶ From there we can open up space for society to become more critical and active, and spark dialogue in society, promote reflection on historical heritage narratives and promote a more egalitarian political life centered on the people's needs.

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⁶⁶ Andrea DeJonge, Helmut K. Anheier, and Stefan Toepler, *International Encyclopedia of Civil Society*, 1st ed. (Springer-Verlag New York, 2010), <http://gen.lib.rus.ec/book/index.php?md5=4099e0dfceae139bb1f3896070ada325>.

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