

The Role of Women in Political Patronage and Political Alliance in the Joxzin Community Organization in the 2019 Election

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ABSTRACT

The aim of this research is to look at the role of women in political patronage relationships which resulted in a political alliance between the community organization Joxzin (Jogjakarta Islamic Never Die) and the political party United Development Party (PPP) in the 2019 elections in 2019. Sleman Regency, Special Region of Yogyakarta, Indonesia. Joxzin is a community organization consisting of male and female members. This research uses a convergent method of mixing qualitative and quantitative data which is then analyzed using the NVivo 12 Plus application. The findings obtained in this research are that Joxzin has political patronage ties. Joxzin has resources and power compared to patrons because Joxzin as a client can appoint Ahmad Zahran to be Chairman of the Branch Leadership Council of the Yogyakarta City Development United Party. With Joxzin's strong political alliance, Muhammad Yazid from the Sleman Regency Pilkada became a legislative member of the Yogyakarta Special Region People's Representative Council for the 2019-2024 period.

Keywords: Political patronage, political alliances, Woman, Joxzin, Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP).

ABSTRAK

Tujuan dari penelitian ini adalah untuk melihat peran perempuan dalam hubungan patronase politik yang menghasilkan aliansi politik antara organisasi masyarakat Joxzin (Jogjakarta Islamic Never Die) dan partai politik Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP) pada pemilu tahun 2019. Kabupaten Sleman, Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta, Indonesia. Joxzin adalah organisasi komunitas yang beranggotakan laki-laki dan perempuan. Penelitian ini menggunakan metode konvergen yang memadukan data kualitatif dan kuantitatif yang kemudian dianalisis menggunakan aplikasi NVivo 12 Plus. Temuan yang diperoleh dalam penelitian ini adalah Joxzin mempunyai ikatan patronase politik. Joxzin memiliki sumber daya dan kekuasaan dibandingkan patron karena Joxzin sebagai klien dapat menunjuk Ahmad Zahran menjadi Ketua Dewan Pimpinan Cabang Partai Persatuan Pembangunan Kota Yogyakarta. Dengan kuatnya aliansi politik Joxzin, Muhammad Yazid dari Pilkada Kabupaten Sleman menjadi anggota legislatif Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta periode 2019-2024.

Kata Kunci: Patronase politik, aliansi politik, Perempuan, Joxzin, Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP).

Introduction

The fall of the heyday of Soeharto's New Order in 1998 for thirty-two years led to the liberalization of the political system and also the liberalization of "preman" or bouncers in community organizations (mass organizations), they competed with each other to fight for territory and patronage.¹ In Indonesia, mass organizations' political involvement in supporting candidates' winning in the regional head, legislative, or presidential elections promoted to obtain winning votes has become a culture supporting winning. Mass organizations have become mediators or liaisons in political dynamics between political actors and the voting masses. Patronage is a two-way relationship between patrons and

¹ Wilson, I. D. (2018). Politik Jatah Preman: Ormas dan kuasa jalanan di Indonesia pasca orde baru. In 2018. <https://opac.perpusnas.go.id/DetailOpac.aspx?id=1207375>

clients. Patrons are individuals or groups with resources (material and non-material) above the client, while resources are where actors have control and have specific interests. Resources are also defined as something that can be controlled by actors.² In a two-way relationship, patronage can be divided into two categories. First: category as the recipient, and second: category as a giver. As recipients such as individuals, groups, or communities, and as givers such as individuals or groups who have above average resources, what is meant by resources can be finance, power, and power. In a two-way relationship, patronage is given, such as money, goods or goods, services or services, and even economic opportunities, in other words, resources.

From the current reformation era, political parties in Indonesia are more likely to conduct political patronage relationships because they aim to win a majority vote in winning the nominated candidates. For example, this happened in Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam when local Aceh local parties in the 2009 elections conducted political patronage to consolidate their political parties' interests.³ The practice of political patronage relations has so far expanded in political space dynamics. In the 2017 regional head elections in the Special Capital Region of Jakarta, Anies Baswedan and Sandiaga Uno collaborated with the Forum Komunikasi Anak Betawi (FORKABI) mass organization a winning vote. Ormas should have been independent, but it has become an extension and link between the political elite and the political party elite.⁴ In the Special Region of Yogyakarta (DIY), one of the legendary mass organizations in the early 1980s that only followed and enlivened political party campaigns and competed against the group's strength gangs in their existence. After three years of the resignation of Soeharto in 1998, he began to mobilize his members or mass to elect one political party. The community organization is the Brigade Joxzin (Jogjakarta Islamic Never Die), better known as Joxzin. Joxzin is a community organization consisting of men and women. During regional head elections, legislative member elections or presidential elections, Joxzin is always approached and asked by political party elites to support one particular party, for example Partai Persatuan Pembangunan or Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (PDIP). Joxzin has supported Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP) and Partai Demokrasi Perjuangan Indonesia (PDIP) during the Yogyakarta mayoral election in 2017. Joxzin's support for PPP has often won and obtained majority votes in legislative elections in districts and cities in DIY. In this study, the author will look at the two-way relationship between political patronage that has led to a political alliance between Joxzin and PPP organizations in the 2019 simultaneous general election in DIY.

Literature Review

Political Patronage of Community Organizations and Political Parties

In the two-way patronage pattern, the patron benefits and dominates more than the client because the client is weak to depend on the patron.⁵ Patronage is a concept of power that is born from an imbalanced relationship between patron and client. This phenomenon occurs because of interest and manipulation by their respective goals even though the two (patron and client) are unequal. From several literature reviews, the two-way relationship between patronage occurs because of individuals' or groups' interests and the existence of a two-way relationship between individuals and the group due to the two's social interactions. Patronage relationships continue to occur in the development era and in the period

² Ritzer, G., & Gooman, D. J. (2011). *Teori Sosiologi : dari sosiologi klasik sampai perkembangan terakhir postmodern*. Kreasi Wacana

³ Darwin, R. L. (Rizkika). (2016). *Institusionalisasi Partai Aceh: Patronase dan Konsolidasi dalam Transisi Demokrasi Pasca Konflik*. *Jurnal Administrasi Dan Kebijakan Kesehatan Indonesia*, 9(2), 81–94. <https://www.neliti.com/publications/101698/>

⁴ Fadiyah, D., & Zakiyah, U. (2018). *Menguatnya Ikatan Patronase dalam Perpolitikan Indonesia*. *Jurnal Politik Dan Sosial Kemasyarakatan*

⁵ Kausar A. S. (2009). *Sistem birokrasi pemerintahan di daerah : dalam bayang-bayang budaya patron-klien*. 244.

of democracy, both local, national and global democratic systems that occur in emerging countries, developing countries, and developed countries.⁶

Previous researchers have conducted several studies that have looked at several trends in research focus studies and an emphasis on political patronage between community organizations and political parties. Mass organizations can become clientelist brokers to enter into grassroots circles that create voters' bargaining power. Regarding political patronage in Indonesia or the terms patronage and clientelism, very little have been discussed and researched.⁷ Have a political patronage relationship that occurs between community organizations and political parties. In this case, sometimes, the position of elite community organizations becomes a liaison between voters and political elites. It can also be that community organization elites become clients of clientelism in terms of being agents of political parties that want to be won in elections.⁸ Mass organizations' position is weak due to the legitimacy of political patronage, which is due to a group of elites interested in monopolizing society with their political control.⁹ From previous studies that show that clients are below the patron in terms of strength and power, the research will see that their position can be above the patron

Table 1. Variants of patronage

	Public	Private
Individual	There are welfare benefits, patronage work, and contracts with the government.	Purchase votes.
Collective	Pork-barrel projects provide rewards in political support for community infrastructure development—government subsidies for citizen associations.	Donation of private communities to religious associations, sports, and other associations.

Source: Aspinal & Berenschot, 2019

From the table above, Indonesia's patronage and clientelism strategies often develop in buying and selling votes for victories in regional head and legislative elections. In private and public patronage, they are equally conspicuous in showing the buying and selling of votes. Currently, community

⁶ Kopeck, P., Spirova, M., & Scherlis, G. (2011). Beyond the Cartel Party? Party Patronage and the Nature of Parties in New Democracies

Ramli, M. (2016). Patronase Politik dalam Demokrasi Lokal (Analisis Terhadap Terpilihnya Hj. Marniwati pada Pemilukades di Desa Jojjolo Kecamatan Bulukumpa Kabupaten Bulukumba)

⁷ Subandi, Y., Qodir, Z., Jubba, H., & Nurmandi, A. (2021). Artificial Intelligence in Election Party of Broker Clientelism Joxzin (Jogjakarta Islamic Never Die). IOP Conference Series: Earth and Environmental Science, 717(1), 012040. <https://doi.org/10.1088/1755-1315/717/1/012040>

Tomsa, D., & Ufen, A. (2012). Party Politics in Southeast Asia: Clientelism and Electoral Competition in Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines. Party Politics in Southeast Asia: Clientelism and Electoral Competition in Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines, 1–222. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203080689>

⁸ Stokes, S. C., Dunning, T., Nazareno, M., & Brusco, V. (2013). Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism: The Puzzle of Distributive Politics. Perspectives on Politics, 13(2), 576–577. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592715000985>


⁹ Scherlis, G. (2013). The Contours of Party Patronage In Argentina. 42(3), 63–84. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/43670094>

organizations should carry out a two-way patronage relationship for political interests and prioritize openness and rationality in politics to aim that dirty politics do not poison democracy.¹⁰ In addition to clientelism brokers, the impact of a two-way relationship with political patronage is the emergence of political alliances due to patronage territory seizure. Anyone can conduct patronage regardless of whether they are rich or poor from existing and owned resources.¹¹

Methodology

In this research, data collection in political patronage between community organizations and political parties regarding the relationship line pattern that causes political alliances' emergence will use a mixed convergent research method (qualitative and quantitative data). This type of diverse convergent research combines qualitative data and quantitative data through separate analysis by comparing or connecting the results of the findings whether to confirm or not confirm each other.¹²

Figure 1. Convergent mixed methods



Source: Research Design: Creswell 2018

The figure above is a type of convergent parallel mixed methods research. Qualitative data will be taken from interviews, Focus Group Discussions (FGD), relevant documents, and notes found in the field and will become an observational checklist instrument. This will be conducted open-ended, while quantitative data collection is closed-ended. This type of parallel convergent mixed method will be analyzed using the NVivo 12 Plus application. Researchers here will conduct research focused on political patronage relationships that produce political alliances between community organizations and political parties, from the literature review that has been obtained using patronage theory, which is more focused on discussing political patronage, than with the existence of political patronage, patterns of political alliance relations emerge.

The Joxzin community organization was chosen because it has a large mass strength consisting of male and female members. One of the impacts of voting based on mass strength was winning legislative candidates in the 2014 general election, namely winning the female legislative candidate Sila

¹⁰ Harjanto, S. (2012). Pemilu, Politik Patronase dan Ideologi Parpol. <https://doi.org/10.33558/AKP.V1I2.593>

Muslimin, M. (2017). Patronase Politik Dalam Pemilihan Kepala Daerah (Kemenangan Hendrajoni-Rusma Yul Anwar Dalam Pilkada Pesisir Selatan Tahun 2015)

Subandi, Y. (2020). Political Patronage Of Islamic Community Organization Of Joxzin (Jogjakarta Islamic Never Die) With Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP) Islamic Politic In The General Election Of 2019 In The Special Region Of Yogyakarta-Indonesia. 24(6). <https://www.psychosocial.com/archives/volume%2024/Issue%206/30521>

Sufianto, D., Subagyo, A., & Kurnia, D. (2017). Pola Hubungan Patronase Pada Birokrasi Pemerintahan Kota Cimahi. Jurnal Caraka Prabu m, 1(1). <https://fisip.unjani.ac.id/e-jurnal/jurnal-ilmu-pemerintahan/caraka-prabu-vol-01-no-01/pola-hubungan-patronase-pada-birokrasi-pemerintahan-kota-cimahi/>

¹¹ Jaffrey, I. A. F. S., (2016). Kuasa Jalanan: Milisi dan Politik Pilkada di Indonesia. Pusat Paramadina. <https://www.paramadina-pusad.or.id/kuasa-jalanan-milisi-dan-politik-pilkada-di-indonesia/>

¹² Creswell, J. W., author. (2018). Research design : Pendekatan metode kualitatif, kuantitatif, dan campuran. <https://lib.ui.ac.id>

Rita, S.H, M.H with a score of 1,305 voice. With this, representatives of female legislative candidates succeeded in sitting in the seats of the Yogyakarta City Regional People's Representative Council (DPRD) for the 2014-2019 period. Therefore, this research focuses on the strength of Joxzin's masses, who have won legislative candidates several times in general elections.

Analysis

The Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP) has many militant Laskar or community organizations. Still, researchers will focus on Joxzin's community organizations carrying out political patronage in the 2019 general elections. Findings in 2014 Joxzin have supported several legislative candidates from PPP. Below is the winning table for legislative members supported by Joxzin in the 2014 election of legislative candidates in DIY who successfully passed and became a member of the Yogyakarta City People's Representative Council (DPRD DIY).

Table 2. Joxzin's support for the 2014 legislative elections

Joxzin's support for the 2014 legislative elections	Acquisition of legislative electoral districts
Yogyakarta City	2 Legislative Members


Source: <https://diy.kpu.go.id> and qui 2018

The table above shows the success of Joxzin's support and its members by making Sela Rita and Ida successful in becoming members of the Yogyakarta DPRD level II, Joxzin's militancy and loyalty in supporting PPP in the 2014 legislative elections marked by a surge in PPP votes in the city of Yogyakarta which rose by almost 300% of the vote or got 1,500 votes.¹³ Sela Rita is a legislative candidate from the Party Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP) and her closeness to Joxzin, especially among female members who have a vision in line with Joxzin's female members, but apart from that, also among male members, Joxzin also supports the advancement of Sela Rita as a legislative candidate from the PPP, from support for Sela Rita to the practice of political patronage.

The internal PPP clash between the Romahurmuzy camp and the Djan Faridz camp led to the emergence of the "PPP Khittah (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan Khittah)," declared in Yogyakarta on May 4, 2018. Internal chaos in the Central Leadership Council of the United Development Party (DPP PPP) also caused the disorder. In other regions, including the Special Region of Yogyakarta (DIY). The Joxzin community organization that supported PPP in the 2019 general election was involved in political patronage that supported Romy's camp. In the 2019 general election, Joxzin established a political patronage relationship with PPP, which led to a political alliance. Below are the political patronage findings between Joxzin and PPP that led to a political partnership using the NVivo 12 Plus application.

¹³ Subandi, Y., Qodir, Z., Jubba, H., & Nurmandi, A. (2021). Artificial Intelligence in Election Party of Broker Clientelism Joxzin (Jogjakarta Islamic Never Die). IOP Conference Series: Earth and Environmental Science, 717(1), 012040. <https://doi.org/10.1088/1755-1315/717/1/012040>

Figure 2. Political Alliance Consists of; Gains in protection, agreements with mass organizations and political parties, and the struggle for patronage areas



Source: NVivo 12 Plus

Several indicators in the political alliance variable: Advantages in protection, an agreement between mass organizations and political parties, and the struggle for patronage areas, the variables used in this research are the results of literature reviews from previous authors. For benefits in safety, Joxzin has a yield of 36% and PPP of 37%. In other words, both (Joxzin and PPP) protect each other when there are problems or social problems in the community. Then for the agreement between mass organizations and political parties, Joxzin, the percentage value is 28%, and PPP is 25%. They did not know what they agreed on because this happened between the Joxzin elite and the PPP elite. From the political alliance that has come to fruition, evidenced by his involvement in supporting PPP legislative candidates, the results achieved were winning M. Hasan Widagno Nugroho, who succeeded in sitting in the seat of the Yogyakarta City Regional People's Representative Council (DPRD) and Muhammad Yazid who succeeded in sitting in the chair. DIY Provincial DPRD for the period 2019-2024 (KPU DIY, 2019).

Regarding the indicators of the struggle for patronage territory, Joxzin has a yield of 34%. PPP 37%, the battle for patronage territory in the 2019 elections is very dominant because of the internal divisions within the PPP, which are divided into the Khittah camp and the non-Khittah camp, indirectly affecting the struggle for patronage territory fellow mass organizations under the PPP structure. In the indicator of benefits in protection, when Joxzin or PPP has a problem, they both protect each other. Meanwhile, the struggle for patronage areas is also very dominant due to the emergence of Laskar or mass organizations from competing political parties or mass organizations within the PPP structure.

In the relationship of political patronage, the client's position is disadvantaged and unfavorable in government and the consolidation of democracy. Still, the matter of patronage has become a culture and character in Indonesia. Even in Yogyakarta, there should be systematics to strengthen the political system and government system, eliminate clientelism, and the politics of protection.¹⁴ Joxzin's political patronage involvement with PPP in the 2019 elections was due to competition between community organizations. In the future, Joxzin will always promote and support PPP, regardless of the figure of the political party chairman, but Joxzin has principles with the desired chairman figure. In other words, it must be similar to the vision and mission of its community organizations. Also, the PPP organizational

¹⁴ Quimpo, N. G. (2005). Oligarchic Patrimonialism, Bossism, Electoral Clientelism, and Contested Democracy in the Philippines. *Comparative Politics*, 37(2), 229. <https://doi.org/10.2307/20072884>
 Rivera, T. C. (2011). Chasing the Wind: Assessing Philippine Democracy In Search of Credible Elections and Parties: The Philippine Paradox

structure in DIY or even in cities and districts that are not working well is still not optimal. If the PPP system ran optimally and optimally, Joxzin's political patronage and alliance might not have emerged in the 2019 elections.

It can be concluded that Joxzin exists and appears for PPP because several problems and factors made Joxzin involved in political patronage in the 2019 elections. The elements can be grouped as follows: First; Competition between Laskar or community organizations that support political parties. Second, the DIY PPP structure is not optimal due to the political parties' internal chaos, divided into PPP Khittah and PPP Non-Khittah camps. Third; The Branch Manager (PAC), as the spearhead who is in direct contact with the voting masses, is not running optimally and optimally. And fourth; There is no regeneration in student organizations that are affiliated with PPP. From several problems that arose in the PPP body, Joxzin's support emerged with his political patronage, which led to a political alliance in the 2019 election, resulting in my winning becoming a Member of the Regional People's Representative Council of the Yogyakarta Province for the 2019-2024 period. Also, with the strength possessed by Joxzin in the Yogyakarta City area, he succeeded in appointing AN as the Chairperson of the PPP Branch Leadership Council. A political party does not select the chairman of the DPC. Still, the client can nominate someone to be the chairman of the political party. The client has power resources above the patron, and this refutes the results of previous studies that state that clients are always under the patron.

From the results of interviews, Focus Group Discussions (FGD), and distributing questionnaires to the masses of community organizations and several political party elites, the data or results from figure 2 are as follows: For the struggle for patronage areas, the Joxzin Brigade had or obtained a result of 34% while the PPP had a result of 37%, a small percentage difference between the Joxzin Brigade and the PPP. The struggle for patronage areas in the 2019 general election was dominantly carried out by PPP legislative candidates or legislative candidates from rival political parties. Likewise, the struggle for patronage areas carried out between community organizations in support of the legislative candidates they support, especially the large mass strength of the three community organizations in DIY, between the Joxzin Brigade and Hamka Darwis and also the Kaaba Youth Movement. In figure 2 regarding the benefits of protection, the Joxzin Brigade gets a percentage of 36%, while the PPP elite gets a percentage of 37%, in other words, when elite community organizations have problems with the law, political party elites will protect them, and that has happened "when the commander of the Joxzin Brigade has problems. with acts of violence, even political party elites from the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP) who are currently members of the council are protecting the elite Joxzin Brigade" (Interview with Chaniago Iseda, 29 May 2018).

From figure 2, regarding the Joxzin Brigade agreement, the percentage result was 28%, while PPP obtained the percentage result of 25%. Agreements occur between community organizations and political parties, especially political party elites who will advance in legislative elections or regional head elections. Usually there is an agreement at the beginning if the candidate supported and promoted by the Joxzin Brigade wins and becomes a member of the council or regional head whether there will be "rewards in the form of cash or an agreement to be given land or areas that are economically profitable, such as parking lots or security for tourist attractions for groups and individuals" (Interview with Pristiawan Buntoro, 2 April 2021).

Discussion

The terms patronage and clientelism are very little discussed¹⁵ Therefore, the author is researching political patronage, especially between mass organizations and political parties that create

¹⁵ Tomsa, D., & Ufen, A. (2012). Party Politics in Southeast Asia: Clientelism and Electoral Competition in Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines. Party Politics in Southeast Asia: Clientelism and Electoral Competition in Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines, 1–222. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203080689>

political alliances. The patronage relationship is a two-way relationship between patron and client, and the patron usually has resources (material and non-material) above the client. The patron controls the client regarding resources, and resources can be interpreted as something controlled by the actor¹⁶ previous authors' opinion states that community organizations' position is weak due to political patronage's legitimacy, which an elite group causes with interest in monopolizing society with their political control. The opinion that previous writers have said, the current writer disagrees with what has been obtained from the research results because, from the results obtained in the study, the client (Joxzin) has the power and power as patron protector (PPP Political Party) because of the alliance between the two (Joxzin and PPP), the results obtained in the research of community organizations as clients are not weak, but substantial by being able to appoint and protect the chairman of Yogyakarta City PPP DPC. Also, clients are always involved in political party decision-making.

Speaking of power, especially in Java, the author tries to quote and reinforce the opinion of Benedict Anderson in his book entitled "The Idea of Power in Javanese Culture," which explains that power in Java is concrete, homogeneous, limited in number, or fixed and does not question its validity. In this case, Joxzin's strength is in the same area, namely in Java (DIY region), where Joxzin's power may be limited but concrete and accurate in terms of political patronage in the 2019 elections. According to Ali and Jaffrey¹⁷, the two-way relationship of patronage in politics is the emergence of political alliances in fighting over territorial patronage and its followers. Anyone can carry out patronage without seeing rich or poor from existing and owned resources. What has been explained by the previous author is that the author currently agrees with the results that have been obtained from research on political patronage between Joxzin and PPP. The political alliance variable benefits from mutual protection between the two (Joxzin actor and PPP actor) when social problems arise, competition for patronage areas. There is an agreement between the two parties (mass organizations and political parties, especially the elite of both), unknown to the general public and their members.

According to Agustino¹⁸, political patronage should not have appeared in the current democratic system and did not occur. If it was forced to exist and seemed to occur, it should slowly and slowly be minimized to not happen in the future, causing money politics and practices to emerge. Clientelism, The author currently agrees with what has been said by the previous writer. In other words, the current democracy should not be tainted with political patronage. The contemporary author's opinion can be strengthened by the previous writer's opinion, namely; Teehankee¹⁹, Quimpo²⁰, and Rivera²¹ argue that there must be systematics in strengthening the political system and government system of a country, to eliminate the practice of clientelism and also the method of political protection.

Aspinal and Berenschot explain variants of individual and collective patronage and patronage and clientelistic practices that occur in Indonesia, which are relatively frequent in buying and selling votes for victories in regional head elections, legislative elections, and presidential elections. The research that the author has done at this time that occurred in DIY regarding political patronage between

¹⁶ Ritzer, G., & Gooman, D. J. (2011). *Teori Sosiologi : dari sosiologi klasik sampai perkembangan terakhir postmodern*. Kreasi Wacana

Scherlis, G. (2013). The Contours of Party Patronage In Argentina. 42(3), 63–84. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/43670094>

¹⁷ Jaffrey, I. A. F. S., (2016). *Kuasa Jalanan: Milisi dan Politik Pilkada di Indonesia*. Pusad Paramadina. <https://www.paramadina-pusad.or.id/kuasa-jalanan-milisi-dan-politik-pilkada-di-indonesia/>

¹⁸ Agustino, L. (2014). Patronase Politik Era Reformasi: Analisis Pilkada Di Kabupaten Takalar dan Provinsi Jambi. *Jurnal Administrasi Publik*, 11(2)

¹⁹ Teehankee, J. (2009). Citizen-Party Linkages in the Philippines: Failure to Connect? Reforming the Philippine Political Party https://www.academia.edu/1908860/Citizen_Party_Linkages_in_the_Philippines_Failure_to_Connect

²⁰ Quimpo, N. G. (2005). Oligarchic Patrimonialism, Bossism, Electoral Clientelism, and Contested Democracy in the Philippines. *Comparative Politics*, 37(2), 229. <https://doi.org/10.2307/20072884>

²¹ Rivera, T. C. (2011). *Chasing the Wind: Assessing Philippine Democracy In Search of Credible Elections and Parties: The Philippine Paradox*

Joxzin and PPP has resulted in the considerable and dominant clientelism practice in mass organizations (Joxzin) messenger agents of political parties. Aian G. Villanueva & Nicole P. Salazar²² argue that non-government actors (community organizations) are very much seen in their political patronage role because they can influence government policy and political protection between them the two. From the influence of existing policies, for example, Joxzin can participate in the arrangement of parking lots in Yogyakarta, such as in the Bank Indonesia area, Malioboro, and also the Prawirotaman area.

This is the same as the author's research on the political patronage between Joxzin and PPP in the 2019 elections, both of which protect each other when there are problems. The role of the Joxzin mass organization actor is evident. Joxzin has a big name and has become a legend as a mass organization in Yogyakarta Special Region and Central Java. With it, Joxzin can influence the social structure by binding the voters with political parties. Joxzin has a considerable membership or mass, thereby communicating with voters or voters in the 2019 elections. What happens when the authors research accordingly and confirm each other with studies conducted by Cruz and Rueda. The role of female members is to gather the masses and direct the masses of women and even the masses of men to vote for one of the legislative candidates running in the general election. "The power of mothers" could make Sela Rita the legislative candidate who won the 2014 legislative general election.

Conclusion

The practice of political alliance is considerable, and Joxzin carries out dominance. In the future, Joxzin will continue to carry out political patronage by supporting PPP, seen from the militancy and loyalty to the Islamic political party. From the political alliance between Joxzin and PPP, the pattern of benefits in protection emerged. One example was when there was a social problem from one of the elite community organizations. The political party elite protected when there was a problem. Joxzin's involvement in political patronage in the 2019 elections with PPP in Yogyakarta was caused by several factors, There is competition between community organizations within political parties (competing political parties or community organizations under the PPP structure). The DIY PPP structure is not optimal due to the political parties' internal chaos, divided into PPP Khitah and PPP Non-Khittah camps. The Branch Manager (PAC), as the spearhead who is in direct contact with the voting masses, is not running optimally and optimally. There is no regeneration in student organizations that have affiliations with PPP.

From some of the problems that emerged above in the PPP body, Joxzin's support emerged in the 2019 elections, which became the spearhead and a substitute for PAC that did not run optimally in its management structure. This makes the relationship between Joxzin and PPP actors even more vital, hoping that, in the future, Joxzin will continue to support PPP. One more thing that the PPP and Joxzin should think about and do in the future is students' regeneration for the political party bearing the Ka'bah. The impact of the involvement of Joxzin's two-way political patronage relationship with PPP in supporting the legislative candidates brought up from PPP in the 2019 simultaneous general election is that Muhammad Yazid from the five constituencies of Sleman regency succeeded in becoming a member of the DIY Provincial DPRD for the 2019-2024 period.

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