Indonesia Role as Norm Enterpreneur in Mitigating South China Sea Conflict

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Abstract

Sejak konflik ini muncul di tahun 1990, persengketaan Laut Tiongkok Selatan telah menjadi salah satu isu panas dalam kawasan ini. Tidak hanya mengundang pihak-pihak yang bersengketa, tetapi juga pihak luar yang memiliki kepentingan di wilayah ini. Konflik ini kemudian berkonsekuensi juga untuk pertama kalinya ASEAN gagal mencapai konsensus dalam pertemuan tingkat tinggi di Phnom Penh, Kamboja di tahun 2012. Akan tetapi, meskipun terus meningkatnya tensi di kawasan ini, ASEAN masih berada dalam kondisi relatif damai. Hingga saat ini, konflik hanya sebatas kontak sengaja ringan antar negara, belum pernah ada perang dalam skala besar terjadi. Melalui teori Norm Life Cycle yang dicetus oleh Martha Finnemore, tulisan berargumen bahwa ASEAN Way yang berisi informalitas dan non-intervensilah yang menyebabkan kawasan ini masih damai. Akan tetapi, bukanlah ASEAN sebagai organisasi regional yang mengadaptasikan norma ASEAN tersebut pada pihak luar, akan tetapi justru Indonesia yang telah berhasil teradaptasi oleh norma ASEAN dan kemudian membawa norma ASEAN tersebut ke pihak eksternal. Serangkaian lokakarya dan pendekatan yang Indonesia lakukan telah berhasil menciptakan kerjasama dan kesepakatan yang tertuang dalam Declaration of Conduct dan terjaganya perdamaian dan stabilitas kawasan.

Keywords: constructivist, norms, workshops, identity, hedging, honest broker

Introduction

After the cold war ended in early 1990s, new conflict arise in Southeast Asia region. South China Sea, which regards as the vocal sea lane in East Asia that provides rich natural resources, strategic maritime rout as well as serving regional military strongholds being disputed by surrounding countries. China announced their eleven-dashed-line claim in 1993 before they reduce to nine-dashed-line following the escalation in the region and negotiation with Vietnam, one of the competitor. China's nine-dashed-line also conflicting with numbers of Southeast Asia states such as The Philippines, Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia, Singapore, and Vietnam. Whilst other ASEAN's member states did not have any claimant on the

territory, but Indonesia remains keeping guard on its outer island, namely Natuna, to maintain its fishing right after trespassing numbers of Chinese fishing vessel. However, Indonesia still claiming the country in the position of non-claimant state in the conflict.

The following years saw the conflict growth with United States-backed Philippines took the territory dispute into The Hague Tribunal Court and favor the Philippines on the ownership of Spartlys Island in South China Sea. The decision only made China more aggressive toward the claimant country in region, prove by rhetoric by both parties, naval clashes and several non-traditional tension among the countries. The region sole regional bloc, Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN) also defected from South China Sea tension. For the first time in history, the regional bloc that founded based on consensus and consultation decision making, failed to produce Joint Communique on 2012 ASEAN summit which Cambodia, a Chinese traditional ally took the ASEAN chairmanship, refuse to mention South China Sea. Arguing that it was a domestic issue between claimant countries and China, not an ASEAN collective issue against China. Following the failed communique, trust toward ASEAN to mitigate the conflict declining and the claimant countries began to seek alternative solutions to solve the dispute.

However, despite the growing tension in the region, there is no traditional conflict occurred in the region. Until now, fortunately, the conflict only limited to naval clashes and diplomatic rhetoric among countries. Realist argued that balance of power is the reason why there is no war on the South China Sea. Currently, China increasing their defense budget and already preparing to produce submarines and aircraft carrier to secure the South China Sea. Vietnam also putting its defensive posture by plotting naval patrol on the coast of Indochina and purchasing aircraft from Russia. While Philippines who relatively weak on military depend on United States security umbrella to secure its position and claim in South China Sea. The regional security architecture, ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) also seeing as ASEAN measure to balance China with its invitation to external great and middle

power despite its far distance, such as Canada, United Kingdom, and European Union. Thus, due to such condition, the war impossible to happen with the existence of the balance of power in the region.

While neo-liberalist argued that it is multilateral institutions that keep the region in relatively stable and peaceful. ASEAN which include China on ASEAN Plus Three (APT) facilitating the region platform to cooperate on economic sectors and strengthening the communication among the parties. However, neo liberal failed to explain how ASEAN's member states remain exist to balance and constitute China behaviour despite its asymmetrical position with China. Cooperation also could only lead to strengthening cooperation on certain areas, but are not there to solve or mitigate conflict. Since it is society or private sectors who conduct the cooperation while state only creates the regulation.

Therefore, there should be an explanation on how ASEAN success on maintaing China behaviour following the region identity. Thus, it is in line with constructivist view that emphasized on norms, idea, and values that keep peaceful region. However, this paper is not meant to explain on how ASEAN solve the South China Sea issue. Instead, this paper will explain on how ASEAN's member states, Indonesia, successfully becoming norm entrepreneur that promote ASEAN way on conflict management bring peace in the region. This paper argue that ASEAN play role as 'international norms teacher' which then adopt the existing regional norms to each member states and the member states expected to bring out the norms and value while conducting international relations.

It is not the first time ASEAN's becoming norm adopter to its member states and implement it in external conflict. During the third Indochina War, Indonesia solve the conflict bilaterally with conflicting parties through informal consultation using peaceful dialogue, negotiation and workshop until finally the peace agreed on Paris Peace Accord in 1991. The argument retested during the early years of Vietnam membership on ASEAN which saw the country still on the

undemocratic regime, but ASEAN member states, through bilateral consultation helping Vietnam achieving democratic regime and respects to human rights.

Indonesia will choose as the country to become norm entrepreneur due to its role as non-claimant states in the South China Sea but still had concern on the region stability and thus exercising informal conflict management to the conflict. Whilst Vietnam and Philippines currently keeping on traditional and legal measure to counter China aggressiveness in the region, thus aparting from the region identity. Indonesia also the country that sponsoring Paris Peace Accord which make the country has a legitimacy to following its success to manage South China Sea conflict.

This paper will answer how Indonesia play the role as ASEAN norm entrepreneur in mitigating South China Sea conflict. This paper will discuss theoretical framework to analyzing Indonesia role using Martha Finnemore's *norm life cycle* and follows with explanation on each phase norm life cycle and how Indonesia did each part of the norm life cycle.

Theoretical Framework

As have been mentioned before, constructivism will use to analyzing how norm that formerly belongs to Southeast Asia politic could adapt to managing South China Sea conflict. Constructivism put emphasizes on the intersubjective norms, values, and identity which always be constructed through the social interaction between actors.[1] Intersubjective means that the existing norms not only apply to one actor, but also distributed to actors in international system through socialization, persuasion, and argumentation.

Martha Finnemore further explains about how norms emerge from one place to another. Finnemore argued that there are three stages of norms, namely

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[1] Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," *International Organization* 46, no. 2 (1992):.

norms emergence, norm cascade and norm internalization.[2] On the norm emergence, state as norm entrepreneur persuade and attempting other country to follow the norms, then norm cascade through international socialization to become the norm followers and finally the following states adopt to the norms without any domestic pressure.[3] Norm life cycle also could define as norm diffusion which means transferring or transmitting norms from one place to another.[4] To take the norm from one place to another, actor needed and it define as norm entrepreneur which has the objectives to promote the local norms. In the context of ASEAN, nortm entrepreneuer functions as interpret and translate regional norms to external

	Stage 1 Norm emergence	Stage 2 Norm cascade	Stage 3 Internalization
Actors	Norm entrepreneurs with organizational platforms	States, international organizations, networks	Law, professions, bureaucracy
Motives	Altruism, empathy, ideational, commitment	Legitimacy, reputation, esteem	Conformity
Dominant mechanisms	Persuasion	Socialization, institutionalization, demonstration	Habit, institutionalization

actors.[5]

Source: Martha Finnemore, International Norm Dynamic and Political Change

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[2] Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamic and Political Change," *International Organization* 52, no. 4 (Autumn 1998):.

[3] Ibid

[4] Laura Allison Reumann, "The Norm Diffusion Capacity of ASEAN: Evidence and Challenge," *Pacific Focus* 32, no. 1 (April 2017):.

[5] Ibid

Stage I: Norm emergence

The first stage of norm life cycle saw the internationalization of domestic norms from one country. Finnemore argue that norms derived from the logic of appropriateness rather than the logic of consequences, it is how the actors determined whether it is right or wrong to exercising the norms.[6] In this part of process, ASEAN play the role as norm entrepreneur which adopting the norms to its member states through it's principle from the foundation in 1967 also by institutionalizing Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), Zone of Peace and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) and informally to the labelled of 'ASEAN Way' which explaining how ASEAN's member states should behave in international relations. It is not difficult for ASEAN to applying the norms to its member states, for the five founding father countries since the norm itself came from the respective countries. Consensus and Consultation arise from Malayan custom on decision making process which also known as *musyawarah dan mufakat* while non-intereference derive from Bandung Conference in 1955 when Indonesia promotes non-allignment and non-interference from external powers toward Asia-Africa countries.[7]

The norm emergence phased itself constituted of several stage: agenda setting, consolidation of support, institutional approach, negotiation, adoption and commitment.[8] On the agenda setting phase, the norm entrepreneur raising regional awareness through hosting conferences and meeting. In doing so, five first founding member of ASEAN coming up with the idea of non-interference from cold war condition also principle that becoming the guideline since Bandung Conference. After consolidating on the norms, value and principle, ASEAN institutionalized the norms on TAC and ZOPFAN, and obligate formal partner of ASEAN to sign those

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[6] Ibid. 2

[7] Donald Weatherbee, "The Cold War in Southeast Asia," in *International Relations in Southeast Asia: The Struggle for Autonomy* (Rowman and Littlefield, 2009).

[8] Justin Gest et al., "Tracking the Process of International Norm Emergence: A Comparative Analysis of Six Agendas and Emerging Migrant's Rights," *Global Governance* 19, no. 2 (Spring 2013):

agreements to strengthen their comittment to the region norms. In 2007, ASEAN Charter introduced as it meant to ASEAN desire to be driver and central actor of regional grouping as well as foster legitimacy and relevance of normative framework.[9]

At this point, ASEAN had emerged and ready to distrbuted to each member states and preparing each members to become the norm entrepreneur. ASEAN norm entrepreneur needed to intepret and translate the norms to external actor and could restrain their behaviour.[10] In the case of South China Sea, incorporating China to ASEAN 'Way' is significant to ensure the peaceful settlement of the dispute. Introducing the norms to external actors perceived as guideline in conducting interaction between states.[11] ASEAN Way objective itself, to the external actors, was to tame regional great power, shape their behaviour and ensure regional stability.[12] China had already signed TAC on 1980 and explicitly it shows their agreement with ASEAN model of dispute settlement on South China Sea.[13] However, it is not enough since China has been inconsistent on following TAC and Declaration of Conduct (DOC) with its naval skirmishes. ASEAN member states claimant party also moving away from ASEAN Way on managing conflict. Gustov characterize the nature of ASEAN on managing conflict as follows:[14]

- Passive rather than active collaboration; reliance on coordination and communication
- Comprehensive definition of security
- Consultative, not hegemomic or coalition building

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[9] Alice Ba, "Who's Socializing Whom? Complex Engagement in Sino-ASEAN Relations," *The Pacific Review* 19, no. 2 (August 16, 2016):.
[10] Ibid 4
[11] Ratih Indraswari, "Projecting the Intramural ASEAN Norms into Extramural Terrain - Constructivism: Does TAC Work in the South China Sea?" *Jurnal Ilmiah Hubungan Internasional* 9, no. 2 (2013):.
[12] Kei Koga, "ASEAN's Evolving Institutional Strategy: Managing Great Power Politics in South China Sea Disputes," *The Chinese Journal on International Politics*, 0, no. 0 (2018):.
[13] Ibid 11
[14]

- Consensual, not contractual
- Loose rather than tight organization
- Inclusive rather than exclusive membership
- Conciliatory rather than coercive

Thus, it is also needed a norm entrepreneur to re-promote ASEAN Way on managing conflict to its member states. Common position among ASEAN member states is needed before the countries engaged with non-member participant.[15]

Dobowska noted that ASEAN is not a unitary union.[16] Thus, the responsibility to introduce the region norm to external actors fall to its member states. Finnemore also noted that international organization is a norm teacher and providing the environment for socialization in which actors internalize the norms which then influenced the members states.[17] Indonesia, as non-claimant states and one of the norm promoter to ASEAN on its foundation on 1967, play the role as norm entrepreneur on South China Sea tension and diffusing the norms to external actors. Reumann explains that states wanted to become norm entrepreneur to bring normative change within community normative standards, recruiting new members, and generating the identity and coherence within the community.[18] Aside from that, it is also rationale from Indonesia free and active foreign policy to ensure the stable region while playing leadership role. While South China Sea had invited United States to interfere the region, Indonesia trying to centralize her and ASEAN role on managing the conflict, so that the region did not fall to cold war logic once again. During Marty Natalegawa tenure as Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Indonesia introduce 'Dynamic Equilibrium' concept, the objective was to diminish the power

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[15] Hasjim Djalal, "Indonesia and the South China Sea Initiative," *Ocean Development and International Law* 32, no. 2 (October 29, 2010):
[16] Joanna Dobkowska, "Hedging China? The Meaning of ASEAN Member States' Interest in Forging Their Relations with China". Presented on Lodz East Asia Meeting
[17] Amitav Acharya, "Asian Regional Institutions and the Possibilities of Socializing the Behaviour of States", Asia Development Bank, No. 82 (June:2010)
[18] Ibid 4

struggle and external strife that threatened the region.[19] Aside from that, ASEAN interdependency with China also could damage the regional development stability. Indonesia trying to secure the stability of the region through diminishing potential threat, thus the country play the role as honest broker in the regional conflict.[20] Jokowi administration main task on Global Maritime Fulcrum also shared the same goals to its 'Archipelagic Outlook' which is to ensure regional aspiration and leadership on managing conflict

As the great power in the region and despite its agreement yet inconsistent on ASEAN-led regional security architecture, China prefers to manage South China Sea conflict bilaterally, rather through ASEAN as a unitary bloc.[21] Providing the opportunity for Indonesia to exploit its leadership on ensuring regional stability. Identity of persuader, the persuasiveness of persuader argument, actor personal history, and prejudice regards as indicator on how the norm emergence could succeed.[22] Bilaterally, Indonesia also has advantage from its reciprocal positive views on China and had already helped on China acceptance in the ASEAN as well as the advantage from the economic cooperation.[23] China also avoiding political sensitive area in the discussion, that usually brought by member states.[24] This means that China had already familiar with non-interference norms brought by ASEAN. Therefore, Indonesia objective in managing conflict in South China Sea was to integrate China into ASEAN-led regional order while becoming the bridge among

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[19] Leonard Sebastian, "Indonesia's Dynamic Equilibrium and ASEAN Centrality," in *Prospects of Multilateral Cooperation in the Asia Pacific : To Overcome the Gap of Security Outlooks* (Tokyo, Japan: Tokyo : The National Institute for Defense Studies, 2014).
[20] Derry Aplianta, "Indonesia's Response in the South China Sea Disputes: A Comparative Analysis of the Soeharto and the Post-Soeharto Era," *Journal of ASEAN Studies* 3, no. 1 (2015):.
[21] Tran Truong Thuy, "Recent Developments in the South China Sea: Implication for Regional Security and Cooperation:, CSIS Working Paper
[22] David Guo and Xiong Han, "China's Normative Power in Managing South China Sea Disputes," *The Chinese Journal on International Politics* 10, no. 3 (April 2017):
[23] Rizal Sukma, "Indonesia-China Relations: The Politics of Re-engagement," *Asian Survey* 49, no. 4 (July 2009):.
[24] Emirza Adi Syailendra, "A Nonbalancing Act: Explaining Indonesia's Failure to Balance Against the Chinese Threat," *Asian Security* 13, no. 3 (September 2017):.

claimant states and providing environment for ASEAN member states to engage with China.[25]

Stage II: Norm cascade

During the norm cascade stage, begin the process of introducing the emerged norms to the external actors. In South China Sea case, ASEAN Way that has been adopted toward Indonesia through institutionalized by TAC and ZOPFAN or uninstitutionalized measure need to be socialize to China. Acharya define international socialization as getting actor to adopt or conduct the rules and norms of community over long term without using force.[26] To ensure whether international socialization works, Finnemore stated that the indicator is the recognition of identity and follow by redefining of state behaviour.[27] By agreeing to TAC and DOC, China already adopted to ASEAN Way. But it is only limited to institutional level and causing to inconsistency of the implementation.

To socialize ASEAN Way to China, Indonesia implement complex engagement hedging strategy. Complex engagement means Indonesia only entertain non-coercive, open enhance, over multiple levels and multiple areas based on common understanding and interdependence.[28] While hedging itself define as incorporating target states into the institutions as member state, aiming to constrain the target state behaviour by consolidating international norms.[29] Through hedging and complex engagement strategy, Indonesia will not only employing Track I approach but also inviting Track II actors and also abiding China to ASEAN Way, Indonesia objective was to avoid interference on domestic affairs and seeking peaceful means to managing conflict. By playing honest broker role on its hedging strategy, also proof of Indonesia effort to providing playing fields for all actors

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[25] Ibid
[26] Ibid 16
[27] Ibid 2
[28] Ibid 9
[29] Ibid 12

while accomodating them, but remain keeping the balance between great power using the ASEAN-led institutional norms.[30] By binding great power to ASEAN norms, Indonesia not only balance the power between them, but also providing channel of communication and integrates status quo.[31]

Acharya argued that the key of success socialization mechanism is persuasive and location, interaction and political situation should be considered.[32] Seeing political condition in region already filled with tension along with traditional measure that has been taken by respective claimants, Indonesia concrete measure on its hedging strategy was meant to de-escalate the conflict and building confidence among parties. Therefore, since early 1990s, Indonesia has taken initiative to hosting series of workshop on managing potential conflict in South China Sea. The series workshop eventually led to the signing of Declaration of Conduct in 2003. Workshop would serves as the bridge which would close the gap of informality and communication thus foster understanding and cooperation.[33] It also became the concrete implementation of Indonesia dynamic equilibrium and free and active policy, which is put emphasized on ASEAN Way norms to managing dispute.[34] By hosting series of workshop, Indonesia has showed its capability as regional leader and conflict management in South China Sea.[35]

Realist and pessimist ASEAN might argue that workshop is useless on solving the conflict, as it only seen as 'talk club' but not mitigating conflict. However, the purpose of workshop itself is to promote mutual understanding

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[30] Ibid 19

[31] Cheng Chwee Kuik, "How Do Weaker States Hedge? Unpacking ASEAN States' Alignment Behavior towards China," *Journal of Contemporary China* 25, no. 100 (March 2016):.

[32] Ibid 16

[33] Ibid 19

[34] Ibid 19

[35] Ralf Emmers, "Indonesia's Role in ASEAN: A Case of Incomplete and Sectorial Leadership," *The Pacific Review* 27, no. 4 (2014):.

between parties through exchanging views and ideas.[36] With China reluctant to negotiate with ASEAN as regional bloc and avoid to discuss sensitive issue, workshop becoming the least possible measure to mitigate conflict. Workshops goal was to de-escalate to tension, strengthen and consolidate ASEAN unity, inviting non-member states, and customing the informality on conflict management.[37] Thus, it is also necessary for providing platform to coordinate ASEAN member states before engaging with China. Hasim Djalal, former Indonesia ambassador and the promoter of managing conflict in South China Sea workshop stated that there are three objectives and modalities in conducting workshops:[38]

1. to promote dialogue and mutual understanding between the parties through theexchange of views and ideas;

2. to encourage the parties concerned to seek solutions to their disputes by creating a conducive atmosphere as much as possible; and

3. to develop concrete cooperation on technical matters on which everyone would and could agree to cooperate, no matter how small the matters were or how insignificant they might appear.

The workshop has successfully brought informality to South China Sea dispute and engaging all the claimant party which consequences to the formation of Declaration of Conduct in 2003. Toswend-Gault argued that the resources and attention that used on deadlock sovereignity-dispute negotiation could be diverted and converted to other functional cooperation.[39] Thus, it could mitigate conflict through the cooperative measure while mitigating potential conflict. Since the workshop is not to solve the conflict, but to manage the conflict.[40] The absence of

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[36] Agus Rustandi, "The South China Sea Dispute: Opportunities for ASEAN to Enhance its Policies in Order to Achieve Resolution", Indo-Pacific Strategic Papers (April:2016)

[37] Ibid 19

[38] Ibid 14

[39] Yann Huei Song, "The South China Sea Workshop Process and Taiwan's Participation," *Ocean Development and International Law* 41, no. 3 (2010):.

[40] Ibid

security community in ASEAN also consequences the conflict management done in

informality manner.[41]

Meetings held or activities carried out under the SCS Workshop process (tabulated by the author)

Year	Meetings	Venue
1990	1st SCS Workshop	Bali, Indonesia
1991	2nd SCS Workshop	Bandung, Indonesia
1992	3rd SCS Workshop	Yogyakarta, Indonesia
1993	TWG-MSR1	Manila, Philippines
	TWG-MSR2	Surabaya, Indonesia
	TWG-RA1	Jakarta, Indonesia
	4th SCS Workshop	Surabaya, Indonesia
1994	TWG-MSR3	Singapore
	TWG-MEP1	Hangzhou, China
	5th SCS Workshop	Bukittinggi, Indonesia
1995	TWG-MSR4	Hanoi, Vietnam
	TWG-SNSC1	Jakarta, Indonesia
	TWG-LM1	Phuket, Thailand
	6th SCS Workshop	Balikpapan, Indonesia
1996	TWG-SNSC2	Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei
	TWG-MSR5	Mactan, Cebu, the Philippines
	GEM-BD	Mactan, Cebu, the Philippines
	7th SCS Workshop	Batam, Indonesia
1997	TWG-MEP2	Hainan, China
	TWG-LM2	Chiang Mai, Thailand
	GEM-MEP1	Phnom Penh, Cambodia
	GEM-ETM1	Singapore
	GEM-HDI1	Kuching, Malaysia
	SCSBTC	Singapore
	8th SCS Workshop	Puncak, Indonesia
1998	TWG-SNSC3	Singapore
	TWG-LM3	Pattaya, Thailand
	TWG-MSR6	Manila, the Philippines
	GEM-HDI2	Singapore
	GEM-MEP 2	Manila, Philippines
	GEM-NL/NHR	Jakarta, Indonesia
	SGZC1	Vientiane, Laos
	9th SCS Workshop	Jakarta, Indonesia
1999	GEM-SAR/IAS	Kota Kinabalu, Malaysia*
	SGZC2	Bali, Indonesia
	GEM-EL1	Shanghai, China
	TWG-LM4	Koh Samui, Thailand
	10th SCS Workshop	Bogor, Indonesia
2000	GEM-HDI3	Bali, Indoneisa
	TWG-LM5	Cha Am, Thailand
2001	11th SCS Workshop	Banten, Indonesia

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[41] Ibid 16

Year	Meetings	Venue
2003	13th SCS Workshop	Medan, Indonesia
2004	14th SCS Workshop	Batam, Indonesia
	Exercise Palawan	Palawan, Philippines
2005	15th SCS Workshop	Anyer, Banten, Indonesia
2006	16th SCS Workshop	Bali, Indonesia
	Working Group Meeting on the Study of Tides and Sea Level Change and Their Impact on Coastal Environment in the SCS	Bali, Indonesia
2007	17th SCS Workshop	Yogyakarta, Indonesia
	Working Group Meeting on the Study of Tides and Sea Level Change and Their Impact on Coastal Environment in the SCS	Yogyakarta, Indonesia
2008	18th SCS Workshop	Manado, Indonesia
	Working Group Meeting on the Study of Tides and Sea Level Change and Their Impact on Coastal Environment in the SCS	Manado, Indonesia
2009	19th SCS Workshop	Makasar, Indonesia
	Working Group Meeting on the Study of Tides and Sea Level Change and Their Impact on Coastal Environment in the SCS	Makasar, Indonesia

Source: Yann Huei Song, "The South China Sea Workshop Process and Taiwan's Participation," Ocean Development and International Law 41, no. 3 (2010):.

Other nature of workshop was it is in form of Track II diplomacy, which involve relevant partner outside the government such as related ministry, think tank, journalist and bussiness and giving space for personal engagement. Track II benefit the claimant party mutual understanding, increased transparency and mutual trust.[42] Maintaining channel of communication, develop personal networks and personal and contact relations are the key to conflict management.[43] This argument stated by Slaugher as connectivity determine more than money and gesture on mitigating conflict.[44]

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[42] Mikael Weissman, "Why is there a relative peace in the South China Sea?" in Pavin Chachavalpongpun, ed. *Entering Uncharterd Waters? ASEAN and The South China Sea Dispute* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies), pp. 36-64.
[43] Ibid
[44] Melly Caballero Anthony, "Understanding ASEAN's Centrality: Bases and Prospects in an Evolving Regional Architecture," *The Pacific Review* 27, no. 4 (2014)

Conclusion

Indonesia has been playing its role as norm entrepreneur on South China Sea dispute since the conflict arise in early 1990s. As one of the norm promoter to ASEAN and the regional bloc itself have been institutionalizing their norms, Indonesia adopted by ASEAN the norm and diplomatic guideline to mitigate conflict and expose it to the external partners It is proved by Indonesia initiative to host series of workshop that based on consensual and informality that finally lead to the signing of declaration of conduct. Through the workshop, Indonesia has successfully adopt the norms to China which the behaviour has constrained by the adopted norms and preventing the potential conflict in the region.

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