

Creativity as the Conceptual and Pragmatic Framing of Mind

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ABSTRACT

As a philosophical concept, creativity is generally understood as a mental capacity of generating something new that has never existed before: ideas, compositions, arrangements, concepts, systems, forms, styles or products. As a mental capacity, it is widely believed that the end product of creativity is 'new idea', as an absolute creation of 'individual genius'. This general claim about 'newness' as a genuine product of creativity obscures the fact that an idea can only be generated based on previous ideas, through a mechanism of 'repetition'. The disavowal of repetition as an integral part of the concept of creativity leads to certain form of framing, namely a 'conceptual framing', through which newness as a relevant concept is celebrated in discourse, while the concept of repetition is concealed as irrelevant. This framing distorts the true meaning of creativity. In addition, there is another form of framing, which is more pragmatic, namely an 'economic framing', through which the profit motive of creativity is exposed, whereas social, cultural, educational, and spiritual motives are concealed. Both forms of concealment have fundamentally distorted the true functions, motives and aims of creativity.

Keywords:

•art, •creativity, •newness, •difference, •repetition, •borrowing, •field, •framing, •mental capacity, •social product, •capital, •power, •total expression

Introduction

Creativity is not a new philosophical concept or phenomena. It was a central concept in the development of modern philosophy of arts and sciences. However, this concept has been actively 'reinvented'—although in a more pragmatic emphasis—in what so called a global capitalistic society, in which the concept regains its central role in the social, economic and cultural lifes of the society. Creativity has become a central concept of recent global economic development, which has been reformulated as a 'creative economy' propelled by a 'creative industry' and supported by a 'creative class'. Creativity has been pragmatically recontextualized, so that it has its new pragmatic meaning.

What might immediately be recognized in this enterprise of revitalization is a kind of logical contradiction. As the need for new ideas, innovations and differences has become more intact in recent global economic system, creativity as a basic human capacity has been 'institutionalized'—or more precisely 'framed'—in an economic institution named 'creative economy'. The 'framing' of the concept of creativity in term of economic enterprise is at the same time the reduction of its meaning. Economic actors have to make endless efforts to find new ideas in a highly competitive climate in various economic sectors, likes entertainment industry, information arts, media arts, and consumer products. However, all ideas are 'framed' in a kind of 'economic frame'.

One of the central questions related to creativity in the context of creative economy is the question about 'idea', or more precisely 'new idea'. Can new idea truly or truthfully be generated in a creative activities likes arts, design or architecture, particularly in its economic setting? To put the question differently, does a creative process generate an absolute 'newness', that is, something that has *never existed* before? The argument put forwarded in this paper is that creativity is a contradictive term, which elucidates both a generation of new idea and the borrowing of previous one, the forward movement to the future and undeniable return to the past, generating newness and practicing repetition.

Creativity, Newness and Difference

The desire to create something new is one of the modern human honored capacities, as a reaction to his/her dissatisfaction with what has been achieved. One of exceptional characteristics of modern men/women is their concern with the generation of new ideas, products, thinkings, concepts, systems, in various fields of sciences, engineering, computer programming, arts, architecture, design, literature, entertainment, education, business, finance, law, and entrepreneurship. The idealized picture of creative enterprise is that it can insightfully generate 'new worlds', and reveal new horizons, habits, behaviours, values and meanings.

'The new' or 'newness' is widely believed as a magic word in the discourse of creativity, through which new worlds are revealed. The focus here is not so much on defend the notion of 'newness' as a sole foundational concept of creativity as it is on the critic of its conceptual position. By being positioned in various definitions as a central feature of creativity, one lost sight of the weakness of the use of the concept of newness in creativity. Although it is one of the important concepts in theories of creativity, newness is by no means a sole concept of the theories. A critical thinking about newness will reveal that some opposed concepts, particularly 'repetition', are inherent part of the theory of creativity.

It is widely accepted that creativity is a peculiar human mental capacity in generating new ideas. As remarked by Richard Florida, creativity “. . . involves the ability to synthesize. . . a matter of sifting through data, perceptions and materials to come up with combinations that are *new* and *useful*.”¹ Here, the end point of creativity is something new and useful. Creativity, in this sense, is a 'dialectical process', through which certain idea, concept, system, or product (thesis) is challenged (antithesis) to produce a new one (synthesis), which is called a “creative synthesis”. To put argument differently, creativity is a particular form of 'cultural subversion', that is, “. . . a process of destroying one's gestalt in favor of a better one”.² A new idea subverts and replaces the old one.

From the viewpoint of human individual, creativity is associated with a particular human mental capacity. According to Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, creativity refers to an individual who expresses unusual thought; experiences the world in novel, fresh, and original ways; or changes our culture radically.³ Creativity is an exercise of thought that generates new and useful ideas. 'Innovation' is a product of creativity, which contains fresh ideas that disturb public mind: technological innovation, management

innovation, market innovation, etc.⁴ Nevertheless, the same question can be put forwarded here: does human mind capable of generating a truly pure novel, fresh or original idea, independent to the previous ideas?

Based on its end process, a creative idea initiates certain pace of 'change'. To generate a creative work means to change the world. As remarked by Brewster Ghiselin, a creative process is “. . .the process of change, of development, of evolution, in the organization of subjective life”.⁵ However, what kind of change initiated through creative ideas? Is change means a totally new thing, or a partial modification of the old one? It can be argued, in this context, that change cannot be accepted as a total newness. All we can say about change is that it is a process of 'to and fro' between new idea and the old one. To put it differently, change is a compromise between 'tradition' and 'newness'. As remarked by John Jewkes, David Sawersand and Richard Stillerman, in every aspect of society there is a struggle “. . .to reconcile . . .authority and questioning, of tradition and novelty, stability and progress, continuity and change”.⁶ It means that change is not a total discontinuity from the past, but its very synthesis. In the context of creativity in arts, particularly the modern art, it is also widely accepted that creativity is an enterprise of producing 'newness'. The aim of modern art is to produce new forms, materials, compositions, idioms, and styles. The essence of modern art, as remarked by Jurgen Habermas, is “. . .”the new” which will be overcome and made obsolete through the novelty of the next style”.⁷ A peculiar objective of arts, according to Clement Greenberg, is “. . .to eliminate from the effects of each art any and every effects that might conceivably be borrow from or by the medium of any other art”.⁸ But, as can be argued later, this is an overstating claim in describing the practice of art in a distorted way, which is in fact never free from the 'borrowing': of form, medium, material, idiom, style, technique, function, dimension, etc.

It is also widely believed, that newness is the very essence of modern design. This belief can be seen in several definitions of 'design'. J.K. Page, for example, defines 'design' as “the imaginative jump from present facts to future possibilities”.⁹ J.B. Reswick defines design as “a creative activity—it involves bringing into being something new and useful that has not existed previously”.¹⁰ In the same tension, Jones defines design as a process to “initiate change in man-made-things”.¹¹ It can be seen from above definitions that newness is the main indicator of the progress of design. But, as has by now become very clear, there is no enough evidence for such simple claim. There is no an absolute newness, for example, in the design of an iron, which

has been remain a repetition of either its basic form, material, function, use, operational or meaning.

As has by now become very clear from the previous arguments, that the claim about newness as an unquestionable attribute of creative works is itself merely an odd example of the tendency of 'framing'. If we claim that there is no such a 'purely new idea', that an idea can only be generated based on previous ideas, we can put forward here a central argument about creativity, that the claim of newness is a form of 'concealment'. If we use Heidegger's concept of 'enframing' (*Ge-stell*), concealment is regarded as a basic element of framing. According to Heidegger, the essence of framing is *alētheia*, the revealing at the same time concealment.¹² It can be argued, that the above definitions of creativity are generally forms of *alētheia*, that is, at the same time the revealing of the concept of newness and the concealment of the concept of 'borrowing'.

Creativity and Repetition

If we put the above argument about creativity as newness in a new conceptual context, we will come up with another odd argument, that idea must be generated from 'nowhere'. This is because, if an idea is emerged from 'somewhere', it will be logically mean that it is a form of borrowing. In opposition to this, it can be argued that ideas are not generated from 'nowhere', but from 'somewhere', whether it is a particular concrete-immanent things, the inner world of mental 'objects', or other transcendental or metaphysical sources. One never starts a creative journey from an absolute 'zero point' or 'empty mind'. In the process of idea's generation, there is an intensive process of learning from 'somewhere'. One reuses, reactivates, revitalizes, reinvents, recontextualizes or reappropriates something (ideas, knowledge, principles, experiences, systems, forms, norms, habits, and ideologies) from 'somewhere' in order to produce a new synthesis.

To explain the contradictive character of creativity more clearly, it can be argued that the concept of creativity contains two oppositional conceptual elements. The first element, is not newness in the strong sense of the world—as has widely believed—but '*difference*'. Here, we have to make an accurate differentiation between the concepts newness and difference. Whereas newness can be understood as a 'totally new', difference is a 'partly new'. Whereas, newness is new in all aspects: concept, form, function, color, material, use, dimension, style, idiom; difference is new in a particular aspect.

To put it differently, difference is a newness in its very weak sense of the word. The second element of creativity is '*repetition*', as the opposite of difference. This philosophical concept has been critically developed by several thinkers like Bergson, Heidegger, Ricoeur, Derrida, and Deleuze. As can be seen, instead of newness, difference and repetition are two more moderate conceptual elements of creativity.

Repetition, in a conventional sense of the term, is seen as a historical phenomena of recurrence of the past or a reproduction of 'the same'. However, for Heidegger, repetition is not a reintroduction of the same, but an introduction of difference.¹³ Repetition is not a retrospection, but a 'projection', in the sense that it is not a recurrence of 'the same' *ad infinitum*, but an introduction of certain element of 'difference'. Something is repeated in order to produce difference. As also remarked by Ricoeur, repetition is “. . . the anticipation of the future, the recovery of fallenness and the moment of vision”.¹⁴ Everything that moves through time towards the future must repeat itself, in order to change itself, so that, it “. . . opens potentialities that went unnoticed, were aborted, or were repressed in the past.”¹⁵ Repetition is not a nostalgia of the past, but the opening of the future.

The claim about indivisibility of the concept of difference and repetition is made more clear by Gilles Deleuze, by distinguishing two models of repetition: a '*static repetition*' and a '*dynamic repetition*'. The first designates a type of repetition, in which the relation between repeating and repeated elements is a relation of 'sameness' and 'identity'. The second is a type of repetition, in which within the repeating elements there is a relation of 'difference'.¹⁶ As also remarked by Deleuze, the generation of something new only on condition that we “. . . repeat . . . what is produced, the absolutely *new itself*, is in turn nothing but repetition”.¹⁷ This is to confirm the previous argument about the contradictive nature of the concept of creativity: to repeat in order to produce difference, or to step back to the past in order to project to the future—*contradictio in terminis*.

Nevertheless, there has been a disavowal of the role of 'repetition' in the theory of creativity. This is because of the connotation of the concept as an 'enemy' of 'originality', as the most central concepts in the theory of creativity. In order to be original, an idea must contain no element of repetition. By being positioned as marginal concept, one lost sight of the role of repetition in the very logics of creative process itself, that in any process of generating new idea, one always needs existed (or past) knowledge and information. Based on this repetitive character, a new definition of 'creativity' can be proposed, as "*an activity of repetition of thing, in order to change it*

to produce something different for the future". Hence, repetition and different must be acknowledged as integral parts of the creative process, a process of 'recombination' of previous knowledge to produce new ideas.

From the previous arguments, several clues have already been provided about contradictive character of all creative activities, including arts, design, literature, architecture, sciences, technology, etc. A painting, sculpture, machine or building, for example, with an 'original' structure, arrangement, form or style has to be honestly regarded as a form of 'repetition', because of certain repetitive contents inherent in its structure: of function, genre, form, function, material, typology, use, ideology, myth, or meaning. Nevertheless, this is not to claim that there is absolutely no element of newness in a creative work. We have newness in arts, design, literature, philosophy, sciences and technology, but it is not as strong as what is widely accepted, of what we called 'difference'.

A modest claim must also be made in the context of creativity in science and technology. As widely acknowledged that sciences and technology aim at generating new ideas, functions or systems, of what is called 'invention'. However, the concept of invention itself as problematic as creativity, in term of its conceptual relation to newness. All inventions refer to or are repetitions of previous inventions, in order to improve or make them better. As bravely remarked by Jewkes, Sawers and Stillerman, that invention today "...has become more automatic, less the result of intuition or flashes of genius and more a matter of deliberate design".¹⁸ They "...were merely improvements or adaptations of existing knowledge".¹⁹ However, this is not also to claim that there is absolutely no 'newness or 'breakthrough' shown in any inventions, but only to emphasize that all inventions have certain repetitive contents.

The Framing of Creativity

As can be implied from the previous arguments, creativity is a process of generating ideas within a trajectory of time, that is, a temporal process to step back to the past, to bring to the present in order to project to the future. To put it differently, creativity is a 'diachronic-vertical' process, in the sense that it is a temporal process of generating ideas by reactivating the past resources in order to project it to the future. However, as can be argued later, there is also a 'synchronic-horizontal' dimension of the creative process, of what we call a 'social dimension' of creativity. In other word,

creativity have both diachronic and synchronic, vertical and horizontal, and individual and social dimensions.

The focus in this section is to explore a synchronic, horizontal and social dimensions of creativity. But, before a further discussion about this dimensions, it is worth briefly discussing the temporal dimensions of creativity, particularly its diachronic dimensions. Creativity as a process, in this connection, is experienced within the trajectory of time (past-present-future), in the sense that it is projected to the future but as a reaction to the past situation. This is, according to Henry Bergson, because our basic psychological experience of time is that of duration (*durée*), of a dynamic continuation of the past into the present and toward the future.²⁰ Duration is a continuous movement of the past that erodes the future, through which it increases and changes itself.²¹

However, the continuous diachronic movement of a thing can also be seen in term of its synchronic relation to 'other things' in a particular moment of time. As argued previously, the creation of thing aims at generating difference. But, difference connotes 'the other', in the sense that being different means that thing must differentiates itself diachronically or synchronically to other things. Diachronic difference is a historical difference, that is, what is called a “difference within time”, in which a thing differentiates itself from others in a historical setting. Synchronic difference, on the other hand, is an ahistorical difference, in which a thing differentiates itself from other things in 'space'. Pierre Bourdieu puts forward a related concept of 'habitus', that can be seen as a synthesis of both kinds of difference. Bourdieu defines 'habitus', as:

“...the durably installed generative principle of regulated improvisations, produces practices which tend to reproduce the regularities immanent in the objective conditions of the production of their generative principle, while adjusting to the demands inscribed as objective potentialities in the situation, as defined by the cognitive and motivating structures making up the habitus”²²

It can be seen from the definition that 'habitus' like 'difference' has two contradictive sides. On one hand, it is durable, regular, reproduced and therefore repeated; on the other, it can be transformed, changed and disrupted depends on the objective situation. Habitus is a regulated and repeated sets of dispositions or tendencies that can be reformulated in a new way in a new situation.²³ What can immediately be recognized from previous discussions is a parallelism between Bourdieu's concept of 'habitus' and

Deleuze's concept of 'repetition', in the sense that both concept contain two oppositional elements: past and future, reproduction and production, repetition and change, and static and dynamic.

Nevertheless, in the context of creativity, Bourdieu's notion of 'field' and 'trajectory' are particularly insightful in exploring both a synchronic and diachronic dimensions of difference. 'Field', according to Bourdieu, is “. . . a partially autonomous field of forces, but also a field of struggle for positions within it”.²⁴ Field is a particular determining space of struggling for a 'position' through the investment of various resources and capitals. The social competition for a strategic position can be understood in different words as a struggle for 'difference'. Hence, field is a place for generating difference. Yet, the difference can only be generated through the activation of habitus. It is within a particular field that a thing differentiates itself to the others, both in arts, fashion, literature, philosophy, sciences, technology even in everyday life. This is what we call 'synchronic difference'.

A field, according to Bourdieu, is “. . . a structured space of positions in which the positions and their interrelations are determined by the distribution of different kinds of resources or capital”.²⁵ The structure of field can be understood as “. . . the structure of the distribution of the capital of specific properties which governs success in the field and the winning of the external or specific profits which are at stake in the field.”²⁶ In the context of creative works of arts, an 'artistic field' can be defined as “. . . a space of literary or artistic positions defined by by possession of a determinate quantity of specific capital (recognition) and, at the same time, by occupation of a determinate position in the structure of the distribution of this specific capital”.²⁷

A field is a structured space, in which there is a synchronic and continuous struggle for a position among creative individuals. It is a space of the production of difference, in which a thing differentiates itself from others. Based on Bourdieu's notion of field, we can propose a specific 'field' of creativity, of what we call a '*creative field*'. Based on Bourdieu's definition of field, a 'creative field' can be defined as “a structured space of creative struggles for difference and differentiation and their interrelations that are determined by the distribution of different kinds of '*creative capital*'”.

From the point of view of system, creativity, according to Csikszentmihalyi, is an interrelations of three parts of a system. First, *the domain*, as a set of knowledge systems, symbols, rules and procedures shared by a particular society. Second, *the field*, which includes all members of a particular society who deals with and make judgment about creative works:

teacher, collector, writer, critics, or government agency. Third, *the individual person*, who uses symbolic resources in particular domain to create particular creative works containing new ideas, systems, forms or patterns: artists, musicians, architects, designers, scientists, engineers, entrepreneurs.²⁸

Based on Bourdieu's notion of field and Csikszentmihalyi's notion of creative system, we can identify here four interrelated fields that mutually support the creative field: *field of expression*, as a field in which new ideas or innovations are generated; *field of production*, as a field in which the ideas are produced in the various means of production (which is not only an economic production, but also 'cultural', 'social' or 'religious production'); *field of dissemination*, as a field in which creative products (which are not only economic products, but also 'cultural', 'social', 'political' and 'religious products') are distributed and disseminated; and *field of appreciation*, as a field of 'discourse' in which creative works are appreciated and given value based on a particular standard of judgment.

A struggle for positions, according to Bourdieu, is specifically determined by the kind of 'capital' owned and distributed. Bourdieu uses the concept capital in a very broad way, which includes '*economic capital*' or 'material capital' that comprises all material things that economically have value (money, gold, land); '*symbolic capital*', which comprises all non-material things but have certain cultural values (prestise, status, authority); and '*cultural capital*', which includes a broad range of goods or systems that shape cultural form and meaning (language, education, arts).²⁹ There is only implicit description about '*social capital*' in Bourdieu thinking, which has a particular relation to social ranks determined by the structure of relations between classes or groups in a society, as well as all the pertinents properties which gives its specific value to each of them and to the effects they exert to practice.³⁰

Being a social product, creativity must be understood in the context of a complex interrelation of all related fields (fields of expression, production, dissemination and appreciation) as a total fields that sinergetically reinforces creative impulse and encourages creative works. In a society, in which appreciation (interests, rewards, honour, awards) to creative works is relatively bad, motivation or impulse for creative works is unlikely to be strong. In a society, in which there is no demand or enthusiasm in generating creative ideas in a particular production system, creative individuals can be frustated, and try to find a more conducive environment. Moreover, without a good system of dissemination (socialisation, information, distribution) an healthy creative appreciation is unlikely to be

emerged.

Based on its domain, creative field can be constructed at the level of community, society or all humankind. In a particular situation, where a particular state is not capable of establishing a conducive social space for creativity, certain communities autonomously mobilize their own resources to create a 'creative space' and 'networks', for instance through the Internet. These autonomous movements can be seen in urban creative classes, who establish their own creative field: expressive system (community information and knowledge system), production system (independent production), dissemination system (community exhibition, festival, special market) and appreciation system (community journal, magazine and other media forms).

Nevertheless, in contrast to previous ideal picture of creative field, in recent global capitalist society, there has been a 'pragmatic framing' of creativity, which is understood as a privileged business of a 'creative class', by excluding the role of other classes in a society. Richard Florida defines creative class as "...people who add economic value through their creativity".³¹ It can be seen, that Florida's notion of creative class is too economic, which regards creative works as a peculiar form of economic capital. In contrast, it can be shown, that several forms of 'community arts', 'folk culture', 'sub-cultural arts', 'graffiti' or 'cultural festivals' produced by 'creative communities' are nothing to do with economic capital, but are seen more as social, political, cultural or religious 'capitals'.

Moreover, it is important to stress here, that creativity is a matter of the habit of mind in a chaotic situation. According to Gilbert Ryle, in the structure of mind there is a mechanism of 'volition' as "...a special acts, or operations, 'in the mind', by means of which a mind gets its ideas translated into facts"³² Yet, an idea is emerged from a million potential possibilities in a disorder situation, but mind capable of changing disorder to be an order. As also remarked by Csikszentmihalyi, there is an evidence that "...thought processes are less orderly than one would like to believe. In fact, it could be argued that chaos, not order, is the natural state of the mind"³³ Disconnected or random ideas or imaginations in the mind are captured to be organized in a more ordered way. A creative individual is like a philosopher, who generate a philosophical idea from the chaotic mind. As remarked by Michel Serres:

"...the philosopher does not wrap himself up in truth as in breastplate or shield, he does not sing nor does he pray to allay nocturnal fears, he wants to let the possible roam free. Hope is in these margins, and freedom. . . [T]he philosopher keeps watch over unforeseeable and fragile conditions, his position is unstable,

mobile, suspended, the philosopher seeks to leave ramifications and bifurcations open, in opposition to the confluences that contrast them or close them. He goes back up the thalweg a bit, he climbs the chreod, he is going to graze where branches multiply, where freshets are turbulent, where innovation burgeons forth, on the high plains”.³⁴

Like a philosopher, a creative individual cannot be restricted, driven, steered, directed, framed, determined or institutionalized. He/she lives in a margin, bifurcation, turbulence, chaotic, unstable, mobile, suspended, multiply and free world, which can not be economically, socially or culturally framed. It is why we have to see each field above in a more dynamic way. Creative mind has to be seen as a dynamic system, in which a dynamic involvement of individual is highly needed, in searching a particular window to a creative insight in a chaotic situation.³⁴ Formalization or institutionalization of creativity likes 'creative economy' or 'creative industry' has reduced a creative mind to be a merely tool of an highly determining economic power.

As a result, a rich and infinite horizon of creative mind, is miniaturized in a frame of 'industrialized mind', which leads to a paradox of creativity. Whereas creativity is an activity in a more chaotic, mobile and free environment; economy and industry are activities in a rational, determined, and measured environment. Hence, a creative mind has to frame itself so as to be compatible to the economic frame. From a creative point of view, a creative person like designer, has to be seen as “. . . a black box out of which comes the mysterious creative leap”.³⁶ The designer is capable of generating ideas without being able to explain how the ideas are generated, and to what end point they can be useful. To frame a creative mind in term of economic interest means to guide the mind in generating something pragmatically and economically *useful*.

Creativity and Power

As can be implied from the previous arguments, a set of capitals—economic, social, cultural and creative capital—is a determining factor in generating new ideas in a particular field. Capital, in this connection, can be seen as a kind of 'power', through which a particular knowledge or idea can be generated. The possession of an economic capital (asset), cultural capital (knowledge) or social capital (network) in term of the

economic, political, social and cultural relation of creativity can be conversed as a particular form of 'power'. Here, a creative person needs a particular knowledge to generate an idea, but the possession of the knowledge, on the contrary, can be conversed as a form of power.

Michel Foucault's notions of 'power' is particularly important to explain power relations in creativity. According to Foucault, every discourse about *space* at the same time a discourse about *power* (both these terms in the plural).³⁷ Yet, the discourse about power is also a discourse about knowledge, because knowledge is also a form of power. As remarked by Foucault, “. . . power is strong this is because. . . it produces effects at the level of desire—and also at the level of knowledge. Far from preventing knowledge, power produces it”.³⁸ However, in the recent postmodern society, relation of power and knowledge is much more asymmetrical, in the sense that knowledge become an integral part of economic power, by which the struggle for the mastering and possession of knowledge is a form of economic struggle. This is what is called by J. F. Lyotard as a 'mercantilism of knowledge' in post-industrial society, in which knowledge is produced as commodities for the profit seeking.³⁹

What is true for knowledge in a postmodern condition is also true for the relation of power in various field, particularly the creative field. What we can see in recent development of 'creative economy' is a kind of 'mercantilism of creativity', in the sense that creativity becomes an integral part of commodity and economic interest. Creativity can be an integral part of either social field, political field or cultural field, or even creative field itself. The later is a situation, in which a creative process or work is aimed at achieving a creative experience in itself, of what is understood in arts as “art for the art's shake”. Creativity can also be an integral part of social field, in which a creative work is aimed at solving a particular social problem or achieving a better quality of social life. However, in the condition of mercantilism of creativity as the characteristic feature of present era, creativity with its relevant knowledge system is exploited for profit seeking.

Because capital is a power, its possession and investment in a particular field (social field, political field, cultural field) does not only generate an amount of profit (social profit, political profit and cultural profits), but also produce a particular power and strategic position. Bourdieu identifies different kinds of capital that can be invested in various social situation: 'cultural capital', 'social capital', 'symbolic capital', and 'economic capital'.

'Cultural capital' includes a particular language, symbol, education and knowledge. Creativity, for instance, is highly determined by 'knowledge capital': the availability of knowledge systems, procedures, methods, rules, strategies, documentations and management systems, which are conducive in generating a creative environment. Based on Foucault's notion of 'discourse', it can be argued further that the structure of knowledge, power and social relation in a particular society determines the production of creative ideas and innovations in the society.⁴⁰ Discourse formation determines knowledge structure and creative expression. For example, in a society where knowledge (its source, access, and truth) is dominated by certain totalitarian power system, creative works will be centralized in a particular bureaucrat elites.

'Social capital' comprises all actors involved in the creative generation, production, consumption and appreciation. The quality of actors and their 'social field' will determine their creative quality. A reactive field blocks creative impulses, whereas a proactive field strengthens the impulses. A conservative field is restrictive and tolerates only a very limited portion of change, whereas a 'progressive field' is affirmative and highly tolerate to a very extreme ideas, in a much more dynamic environment. Moreover, an 'open field' is a field with a close and intimate relation between its systems (social, cultural, economic, political), which is highly open to certain collaborations or exchanges; whereas a 'closed field' is a field with a very exclusive and elitist systems.

'Economic capital' comprises all material things that have value and can be invested (money, gold, land). Creativity, in certain context and situation, is 'capital intensive', especially creative activity in a particular research center of multinational corporation, which its main objective is to produce new ideas, systems, or products for industrial purposes. In this kind of creative activity, a certain amount of money, instruments, softwares, hardwares, devices and infrastructures are highly demanded in order that a chain of continuous experiments can be conducted, to keep a continuous new idea's generation.

'Creative capital' is a creative individual who continuously capable of producing new ideas, concepts, systems, forms or products in incessant change situations. A creative individual is a smart, open, playful, discipline, imaginative, and fantastic person, who has self-esteem, need of achievement, anti-establishment spirit, subversive motivation, passion, sensitivity, and love of what he/she does,⁴¹ spontaneous, playful and unusual.⁴² According to Tony Buzan, 'mind mapping' is an important

capacity of creative individual, through which “...the mind should be left as 'free' as possible”.⁴³

The creative person, according to Howard Gardner, is “. . .a person who regularly solves problems, fashion products, or defines new questions in a domain in a way that is initially considered novel but that ultimately becomes accepted in a particular cultural setting”.⁴⁴ It means that besides an intrinsic capacity, a creative individual has to be a 'social man'. Moreover, a creative individual, according to Csikszentmihalyi, is an individual who has an aura of freshness and enthusiasm, smart, flexible, fluent, original, discipline, playfulness, imaginative, extroversion as well as introversion, humble, proud, rebellious, independent, passionate, objective, open, sensitive, playful.⁴⁵

In addition, there must be also an “intrinsic motivation”, by which creative individuals are engaged or absorbed in certain creative activities. Csikszentmihalyi calls this situation '*flow*', as “the state in which people are so involved in an activity that nothing else seem to matter; the experience itself is so enjoyable that people will do it even at great cost, for the sheer sake of doing it”.⁴⁶ As can be seen from above characteristics of creative individual, the individual can only produce creative works or fresh ideas in a rather flexible, open, free and playful place, with no predetermined aims, objectives, functions or uses. However, in recent capitalistic society, creative activities have been framed in one or other ways, so that it becomes a component of capitalistic commodity. As the result, creative ideas are reduced as a merely predetermined function of economic interests.

Conclusion

As a central concept in human cultural practice of man-made-world, creativity has been epistemologically and pragmatically framed in various ways. At the epistemological level, the concept of creativity is reduced as a mental capacity of generating new ideas or newness, by the disavowal of its repetitive dimension and character. Creativity is viewed as a product of human 'genius', who by exercising the power of his/her own mind and knowledge capable of producing 'original' work, which are totally free from elements borrowing from any external sources. This is a particular form of 'conceptual framing', through which one relevant concept (newness) is revealed or celebrated, while the other one (repetition) is concealed. This concealment distorts the true meaning of creativity.

At the pragmatic level, creativity is reduced as a 'commodity' for the profit seeking in the economic and industrial production of recent global capitalism, particularly in what so called 'creative economy' and 'creative industry'. As a part of economic interest, a new idea is produced as a commodity in a kind of mercantilism of creativity, in which creativity becomes an instrument of the profit seeking. This is what can be called an 'economic framing', through which one relevant motive (profit) is revealed or exposed, whereas other motives (social, cultural, educational, even spiritual) are concealed. Likes in epistemological one, the concealment in pragmatic level distorts the true and rich motives and aims of creativity.

What we have here is a distorted 'field of creativity', a 'framed creativity', in which the power of economy falsely over-determines the creative activities and creative works. This framing fundamentally distorts the wider function of creativity, to be a merely tool for economic interests. Being reduced as a merely tool of economic activity, we lost sight of the wider and richer functions of creativity. This can clearly be seen in the contemporary field of arts, where arts become an integral part of the market system, so that all practices, experiences, discourses and transactions about arts are merely the effect of the market mechanism. In principle, art is not merely a matter of economy, but also personal, community, social, political, cultural, religious or even all human life. Like an art, creativity is not a matter of economic interest but the total expression of humankind in its totality.

End Notes:

- ¹ Richard Florida, *The Rise of the Creative Class*, Pluto Press, Melbourne, 2003, p. 31.
- ² *Ibid.*, p. 33
- ³ Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, *Creativity: Flow and the Psychology of Discovery and Invention*, Harper Perennial, New York, 1997, p. 26
- ⁴ Holt, Knut, *Product Innovation Management*, Butterworths, London, 1983, p. 13
- ⁵ Bewster Ghiselin *The Creative Process*, A Mentor Books, New York, 1960, p. 12.
- ⁶ John Jewkes, David Sawers and Richard Stillerman, *The Sources of Invention*, MacMillan, Edinburg, 1969, p. 22
- ⁷ Jurgen Habermas, 'Modernity: an Incomplete Project', in Hal Foster, *Postmodern Culture*, Pluto Press, London, 1985, p. 4.
- ⁸ Clement Greenberg, 'Modernist Painting', in Richard Kostelanetz (ed), *Aesthetics Contemporary*, Prometheus Books, New York, 1986, p. 196.
- ⁹ J. K. Page as quoted in Christopher Jones, *Design Method: Seeds of Human Future*, Wiley Interscience, London, 1979, p. 4.

- ¹⁰ *Ibid.*
- ¹¹ *Ibid.*
- ¹² Martin Heidegger, *Basic Writing*, Harper San Fransisco, 1971, p. 294
- ¹³ Michel deBeistequi, *Thinking with Heidegger: Displacements*, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 2003, p. 55
- ¹⁴ Paul Ricoeur, *Time & Narrative: Volume 3*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1984, p. 76
- ¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p.77
- ¹⁶ Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, Columbia University Press, New York. 1994, p. 20-21
- ¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 90
- ¹⁸ Jewkes, Sawers dan Stillerman, *The Sources of Invention*, p. 37
- ¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 39.
- ²⁰ Ronald Bogue, *Deleuze: On Cinema*, Routledge, 2003, p.14
- ²¹ Henry Bergson, *Creative Evolution*, The Modern Library, New York, 1944, p. 7
- ²² Pierre Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, Cambridge Univertity Press, Combridge, 1990, p. 78
- ²³ *Ibid.*, p. 3
- ²⁴ Richard Harker, Cheleen Mahar dan Chris Wilkes, *An Intorduction to the Work of Pierre Bourdieu: The Practice of Theory*, MacMillan, 1990, p. 8
- ²⁵ John B. Thompson, 'Intoduction', in Pierre Bourdieu, *Language and Symbolic Power*, Polity Press, 1991, p. 14
- ²⁶ Pierre Bourdieu, *The Field of Cultural Production*, Polity Press, 1993, p. 30.
- ²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 30
- ²⁸ Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, *Creativity*, p. 28
- ²⁹ Richard Harker Cheleen Mahar dan Chris Wilkes, *An Introduction to the Work of Pierre Bourdieu*, p. 13
- ³⁰ Pierre Bourdieu, *A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste*, Harvard University Press, 1984, p. 106.
- ³¹ Richard Florida, *The Rise of the Creative Class*, p. 68.
- ³² Gilbert Ryle, *The Concept of Mind*, Penguin Books, London, 1990, p. 62
- ³³ Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, *Creativity*, p. 32.
- ³⁴ Michel Serres, *Genesis*, The University of Michigan Press, Itacha, 1992, p. 23.
- ³⁵ James Gleick, *Chaos: Making a New Science*, Cardinal, London, 1987, p. 16
- ³⁶ Christopher John , *Design Method: Seeds of Human Future*, Wiley Interscience, London, 1970, p. 47
- ³⁷ Michel Foucault, *Power/ Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Wrirings 1972-1977*, The Harvester Press, 1980, p. 149
- ³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 59
- ³⁹ Jean F. Lyotard, *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*, Manchester University Press, 1989, p. 5.
- ⁴⁰ Michel Foucault, *The Archeology of Knowledge*, Routledge, London, 1989, p. 38.
- ⁴¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 51-76
- ⁴² Primadi Tabrani, *Kreativitas & Humanitas: Sebuah Studi Tentang Peranan Kreativitas Dalam Perikehidupan Manusia, Jalasutra*, Yogyakarta, 2006, pp. 243-259

- ⁴³ Tony Buzan, *Use Your Head*, BBC Books, London, 1991, p. 95
- ⁴⁴ Howard Gardner, *Creating Minds: An Anatomy of Creativity Seen Through the Lives of Freud, Einstein, Picasso, Stravinsky, Eliot, Graham, and Gandhi*, Basic Books, 1993, p. 35.
- ⁴⁵ Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, *Creativity*, pp. 51-76
- ⁴⁶ Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, *Flow: The Psychology of Optimal Experience*, Harper Perennial, New York, 1990, p. 4

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